{"id":"CVE-2025-64526","revision":"40d56dec053b466298cee38014098487","records":[{"revision":"40d56dec053b466298cee38014098487","observedAt":"2026-10-25T03:17:29.935+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2025-64526","aliases":[],"title":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes…","description":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-14T19:16:29.233+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-14T13:10:00.187+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":6.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · nvd@nist.gov · Primary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","score":5.3,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db","https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818","https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0","https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64526","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-307"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:strapi:strapi:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-05-14T19:16:29.233","lastModified":"2026-10-14T13:10:00.187"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2025-64526","identifiers":["CVE-2025-64526"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}