{
    "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
    "dataVersion": "5.2",
    "cveMetadata": {
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-115477",
        "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
        "dateReserved": "2026-10-22T15:06:52.738Z",
        "datePublished": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z"
    },
    "containers": {
        "cna": {
            "title": "obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP",
            "problemTypes": [
                {
                    "descriptions": [
                        {
                            "cweId": "CWE-285",
                            "lang": "en",
                            "description": "CWE-285: Improper Authorization",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        }
                    ]
                },
                {
                    "descriptions": [
                        {
                            "cweId": "CWE-863",
                            "lang": "en",
                            "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "metrics": [
                {
                    "cvssV4_0": {
                        "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                        "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                        "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                        "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                        "userInteraction": "NONE",
                        "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                        "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
                        "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                        "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                        "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                        "baseScore": 7.1,
                        "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
                        "version": "4.0"
                    }
                }
            ],
            "references": [
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc"
                },
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_MISC"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967"
                },
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_MISC"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969"
                },
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_MISC"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71"
                },
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_MISC"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md"
                },
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_MISC"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4"
                }
            ],
            "affected": [
                {
                    "vendor": "The-40-Thieves",
                    "product": "obsidian-tc",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": ">= 1.13.0, < 1.31.4",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
                "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
                "shortName": "GitHub_M",
                "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T14:04:33.518Z"
            },
            "descriptions": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4."
                }
            ],
            "source": {
                "advisory": "GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc",
                "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
            }
        }
    }
}