{
    "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
    "dataVersion": "5.2",
    "cveMetadata": {
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-58202",
        "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
        "dateReserved": "2026-06-29T17:09:25.872Z",
        "datePublished": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z"
    },
    "containers": {
        "cna": {
            "title": "OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`",
            "problemTypes": [
                {
                    "descriptions": [
                        {
                            "cweId": "CWE-640",
                            "lang": "en",
                            "description": "CWE-640: Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "metrics": [
                {
                    "cvssV3_1": {
                        "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                        "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                        "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
                        "baseScore": 8.3,
                        "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                        "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                        "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                        "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
                        "version": "3.1"
                    }
                }
            ],
            "references": [
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m"
                },
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_MISC"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819"
                },
                {
                    "name": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0",
                    "tags": [
                        "x_refsource_MISC"
                    ],
                    "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0"
                }
            ],
            "affected": [
                {
                    "vendor": "open-reception",
                    "product": "appointment-booking-software",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 2.0.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
                "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
                "shortName": "GitHub_M",
                "dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z"
            },
            "descriptions": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0."
                }
            ],
            "source": {
                "advisory": "GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m",
                "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
            }
        }
    }
}