{"id":"CVE-2026-58482","revision":"073a1c82a17e4936a77ab378e8090772","records":[{"revision":"073a1c82a17e4936a77ab378e8090772","observedAt":"2026-10-25T14:19:16.843+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-58482","aliases":[],"title":"Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` …","description":"Network-AI, a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator, has a shipped, exported, documented feature called `ApprovalInbox` (`lib/approval-inbox.ts`). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which `ApprovalGate` uses to require explicit human approval for high-risk operations. The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every route, including the state-changing `POST /approvals/:id/approve` and `/deny`. As a result, in versions 5.0.0 through 5.12.1, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent. This issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `ApprovalInbox` now accepts a `secret` option. When set, the mutating endpoints `POST /:id/approve` and `POST /:id/deny` require an `Authorization: Bearer <secret>` header, validated in constant time with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. `startServer()` already binds to `127.0.0.1` by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T17:18:15.997+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","score":5.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/commit/a59c13a1f0ce0e8a0779a90343eef92fac5ab4c3","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2","https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58482","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-352","CWE-862"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:network-ai:network-ai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-07-20T17:18:15.997","lastModified":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-58482","identifiers":["CVE-2026-58482"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}