{"id":"CVE-2026-82405","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"d69c08caa52e4e50b93f0f17b0735b42","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-82405","aliases":[],"title":"Klever-Go Account takeover: `kleverUpdateAccountPermission` authorizes on attacker-controlled `RecipientAddr` instead of the authenticated caller","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the KleverUpdateAccountPermission built-in authorizes replacement of a target account's permissions by checking attacker-controlled vmInput.RecipientAddr instead of authenticated vmInput.CallerAddr. An attacker-controlled contract can choose a victim account with configured permissions as RecipientAddr, and contractHasValidPermission can accept the victim's default self-signer as authorization. UpdatePermission can then replace the victim's entire permission set with attacker-supplied Owner permissions, enabling asset theft or permanent lockout without a victim key or signature. Accounts without stored permissions and the native transaction path are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-23T19:26:12.967+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-24T15:05:37.458+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"klever-go","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"klever-io\",\n                    \"product\": \"klever-go\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 1.7.20\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":8.7,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/c58740eb74d7ee8f07db1e18a7d6214b5559ba32","https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82405","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-82405","identifiers":["CVE-2026-82405"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"c5a5b9bb3a8e4f6ca6f5beb9a9c41dd6","observedAt":"2026-11-11T16:11:03.013+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-85648","aliases":["CVE-2026-82405","GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm"],"title":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the KleverUpdateAccountPermission built-in authorizes replacement of a target account's permissions by checking attacker-controlled vmInput.RecipientAddr…","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the KleverUpdateAccountPermission built-in authorizes replacement of a target account's permissions by checking attacker-controlled vmInput.RecipientAddr instead of authenticated vmInput.CallerAddr. An attacker-controlled contract can choose a victim account with configured permissions as RecipientAddr, and contractHasValidPermission can accept the victim's default self-signer as authorization. UpdatePermission can then replace the victim's entire permission set with attacker-supplied Owner permissions, enabling asset theft or permanent lockout without a victim key or signature. Accounts without stored permissions and the native transaction path are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":8.7,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/c58740eb74d7ee8f07db1e18a7d6214b5559ba32","https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-85648","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Sep 23, 2026, 7:26:12 PM","dateUpdated":"Sep 24, 2026, 3:05:37 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-85648","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-85648","CVE-2026-82405","GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"d8dc93960c7849b9a13f1c1420ed023e","observedAt":"2026-10-25T16:19:10.271+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-82405","aliases":[],"title":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the KleverUpdateAccountPermission built-in authorizes replacement of a target account's permissions by checking attacker-controlled vmInput.RecipientAddr…","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.20, the KleverUpdateAccountPermission built-in authorizes replacement of a target account's permissions by checking attacker-controlled vmInput.RecipientAddr instead of authenticated vmInput.CallerAddr. An attacker-controlled contract can choose a victim account with configured permissions as RecipientAddr, and contractHasValidPermission can accept the victim's default self-signer as authorization. UpdatePermission can then replace the victim's entire permission set with attacker-supplied Owner permissions, enabling asset theft or permanent lockout without a victim key or signature. Accounts without stored permissions and the native transaction path are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.20.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-23T20:17:16.37+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-24T16:17:12.153+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":8.7,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/c58740eb74d7ee8f07db1e18a7d6214b5559ba32","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82405","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-863"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-09-23T20:17:16.370","lastModified":"2026-09-24T16:17:12.153"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-82405","identifiers":["CVE-2026-82405"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"10f68cf883b74f13a4a3e2b07a9e9a52","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","aliases":["CVE-2026-82405","GO-2026-6582"],"title":"Klever-Go Account takeover: `kleverUpdateAccountPermission` authorizes on attacker-controlled `RecipientAddr` instead of the authenticated caller","description":"### Description\n\nThe VM built-in function `KleverUpdateAccountPermission` (registered always-active, `creator.go:381-390` / `core/vmconstants.go:234`) rewrites an account's entire permission set. Its authorization check uses `vmInput.RecipientAddr` **attacker-controlled**  instead of the authenticated `vmInput.CallerAddr`. The sibling handler `kleverChangeOwnerAddress.go:86` uses `vmInput.CallerAddr` correctly, so the safe pattern exists in-repo; this handler deviates. The native transaction path (`txProcess.go:833`) is safe  it uses `tx.GetSender()`.\n\nMechanism:\n1. **Wrong variable:** `CallerAddr` is never referenced in the handler; auth is `contractHasValidPermission(target.GetPermissions(), RecipientAddr)`, which returns true if `RecipientAddr` is a signer with `Weight >= Threshold` in the *target* account's permissions and the permission grants `UpdateAccountPermissionContractType`.\n2. **RecipientAddr is attacker-controlled:** when a contract calls a built-in via `ExecuteOnDestContextWithTypedArgs` (`baseOps.go:1967`), `prepareIndirectContractCallInput` (`baseOps.go:2485`) sets `RecipientAddr = destination` (contract-chosen) and `CallerAddr = the calling contract`. The blockchain hook (`blockChainHook.go:454/467`) dispatches on `input.Function` and passes the input through unchanged; no guard forces `RecipientAddr == CallerAddr` and there is no SC-destination validation on this path.\n3. **Self-signer default satisfies the check:** `createDefaultOwnerPermission` (`accounts.go:1848`) makes an account its own signer (weight 1, threshold 1, Owner type), and `CheckPermissionGrantedForContracts` returns true for Owner, so `contractHasValidPermission(V.perms, V) == true`. (More generally, `RecipientAddr` can be set to *any* of V's signer addresses meeting threshold all public on-chain.) Accounts with no stored permissions have empty `GetPermissions()` and are immune.\n4. **Overwrite is unrestricted:** `UpdatePermission(V, attackerContract)` (`accounts.go:1863`) replaces V's permission set with attacker-supplied signers; if the attacker supplies an Owner-type permission, no default is appended and V's prior control is fully evicted.\n\n### Code walkthrough\n\n**(a) The vulnerable handler** — `core/kapp/builtInFunctions/kleverUpdateAccountPermission.go`:\n```go\nfunc (e *kleverUpdateAccountPermission) ProcessBuiltinFunction(vmInput *vmcommon.ContractCallInput) (*vmcommon.VMOutput, error) {\n    ...\n    address := vmInput.NextArg()                       // Arguments[0] — attacker-chosen target account V\n    contract, err := e.getUpdateAccountPermissionContract(vmInput) // Arguments[1] — attacker-chosen new permissions\n    ...\n    acc, err := e.accountsCacher.LoadUser(address)      // loads V\n    ...\n    // BUG: authorizes against vmInput.RecipientAddr (attacker-controlled), NOT vmInput.CallerAddr\n    if !e.contractHasValidPermission(acc.GetPermissions(), vmInput.RecipientAddr) {   // L91\n        return nil, errors.New(\"invalid permission operation\")\n    }\n    // overwrites V's entire permission set with attacker-supplied signers\n    resultCode, err := e.kappController.GetAccountsKApp().UpdatePermission(address, contract)\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n**(b) The check just name-matches `recipientAddr` against V's own signers** — same file:\n```go\nfunc (e *kleverUpdateAccountPermission) contractHasValidPermission(permissions []*state.Permission, recipientAddr []byte) bool {\n    for _, permission := range permissions {\n        for _, signer := range permission.Signers {\n            if !bytes.Equal(signer.Address, recipientAddr) {   // recipientAddr, not the authenticated caller\n                continue\n            }\n            if signer.Weight >= permission.Threshold &&\n                permission.CheckPermissionGrantedForContracts(transaction.TXContract_UpdateAccountPermissionContractType) {\n                return true\n            }\n        }\n    }\n    return false\n}\n```\n\n**(c) The dispatch makes `RecipientAddr` attacker-controlled** — `kvm/vmhost/vmhooks/baseOps.go:2464` `prepareIndirectContractCallInput` (invoked when a contract calls the built-in via `ExecuteOnDestContext`):\n```go\ncontractCallInput := &vmcommon.ContractCallInput{\n    VMInput: vmcommon.VMInput{\n        CallerAddr: sender,        // the calling contract (authenticated) — NOT used by the handler\n        Arguments:  data,          // attacker-chosen: [V, attackerPermissions]\n        ...\n    },\n    RecipientAddr: destination,    // the contract's chosen `dest` argument — attacker sets this to V\n    Function:      string(function),\n}\n```\n\n**(d) Every account with configured permissions is its own signer** — `core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go:1848` `createDefaultOwnerPermission` (appended by `UpdatePermission` when no Owner permission is supplied):\n```go\nreturn &state.Permission{\n    Type:      state.Permission_Owner,   // Owner grants ALL contract types incl. type 22\n    Threshold: 1,\n    Signers: []*state.Key{\n        { Address: ownerAcc.AddressBytes(), Weight: 1 },   // the account signs for itself\n    },\n}\n```\nSo `contractHasValidPermission(V.perms, RecipientAddr=V)` finds V's own address as a `Weight 1 >= Threshold 1` Owner signer → returns `true`.\n\n**(e) Contrast — the sibling handler does it correctly** — `core/kapp/builtInFunctions/kleverChangeOwnerAddress.go:86`:\n```go\ncallerAddress := vmInput.CallerAddr                        // authenticated caller\n...\nif !bytes.Equal(callerAddress, acc.GetOwnerAddress()) {    // checks the CALLER, not RecipientAddr\n    return nil, ErrOperationNotPermitted\n}\n```\n\n**Putting it together — the attacker's contract call:**\n```\nExecuteOnDestContext(\n    gas, dest = V,                       // → RecipientAddr = V\n    value = 0,\n    function = \"KleverUpdateAccountPermission\",\n    args = [ V, attackerOwnerPermsWithOnlyAttackerKey ],   // Arguments[0]=V, Arguments[1]=new perms\n)\n```\n→ `CallerAddr = attackerContract` (ignored), `RecipientAddr = V`, `contractHasValidPermission(V.perms, V) == true` → V's permissions overwritten with the attacker's key as sole Owner signer. The attacker never held a key of V and provided no signature from V.\n\n### POC\n\nput the following poc testcase under /core/kapp/builtInFunctions/ \n\nPOC Code: https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9\n\nRun:\n```\ncd klever-go\nGOTOOLCHAIN=auto go test ./core/kapp/builtInFunctions/ -run TestPoC_PermTakeover -v\n```\nOutput:\n```\nTAKEOVER CONFIRMED: caller=\"attacker-contract\" (attacker SC) rewrote account V=\"victim-account-V\"; new sole owner signer=\"attacker-key-EVIL\"\n--- PASS: TestPoC_PermTakeover\n--- PASS: TestPoC_PermTakeover_NoStoredPermsIsSafe\n```\nThe harm asserted is the takeover itself: after the call, V's permission set is a single Owner permission whose sole signer is the attacker's key; V's original owner signer is gone.\n\n### Impact\n\nFull takeover of **any account that has configured permissions**  i.e. every multisig / advanced-permission account , by an attacker who deploys a cheap smart contract and supplies only public on-chain addresses (no keys, no signatures from the victim). After takeover the attacker controls all of the victim's operations → theft or permanent lock of all the account's assets. Reachable via a permissionlessly-deployed contract (the plain-tx path is safe, so it is Critical-via-contract, not fully no-contract). No fork flag gates it.\n\nSeverity **Critical**: Impact High (full account/asset compromise)\n\n### Recommendation\n\nAuthorize against the authenticated caller, mirroring `kleverChangeOwnerAddress`:\n```go\nif !e.contractHasValidPermission(acc.GetPermissions(), vmInput.CallerAddr) { ... }\n```\nReconcile the SC-call authority model: on the built-in path `CallerAddr` is the calling contract, so a contract should only be able to update permissions of accounts that legitimately list *it* as an authorized signer — never an arbitrary victim. Consider also requiring the target account (`Arguments[0]`) to equal the authorized caller's account, matching the native `tx.GetSender()` model.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-23T19:27:08+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-01T20:56:19.9062493+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"1.7.20"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V4","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/c58740eb74d7ee8f07db1e18a7d6214b5559ba32","https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","identifiers":["GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","CVE-2026-82405","GO-2026-6582"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"47583aaca52e4598a042b80108358f29","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GO-2026-6582","aliases":["CVE-2026-82405","GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm"],"title":"Klever-Go Account takeover: `kleverUpdateAccountPermission` authorizes on attacker-controlled `RecipientAddr` instead of the authenticated caller in github.com/klever-io/klever-go","description":"Klever-Go Account takeover: `kleverUpdateAccountPermission` authorizes on attacker-controlled `RecipientAddr` instead of the authenticated caller in github.com/klever-io/klever-go","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-01T20:23:38+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-01T20:45:14.0798198+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"1.7.20"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/c58740eb74d7ee8f07db1e18a7d6214b5559ba32","https://gist.github.com/mabdullah22/a41f90aa5ba86bbebf121f739bd5f5e9","https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.20"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6582","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:GO-2026-6582","identifiers":["GO-2026-6582","CVE-2026-82405","GHSA-97cv-x867-6xhm"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.4460032+00:00","complete":true,"records":1779,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.4460032+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.6009016+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.6009024+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-de3b77103708811b6494d2ff7c979037d73ae579742cd1649a5c765137ae5083-bc2564cf749a574ebe6216cd53b2772c98ccf01e107d9e465c7cb9637c59db40","complete":true,"records":424281,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:56:40.1262638+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T19:56:47.8167322+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:56:40.1262638+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-11T19:18:45+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global EUVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-cbeeeca22e4a4c188e95cc4f8cfc6560","complete":false,"records":13759,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T21:08:58.0161049+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T21:08:58.011+00:00","error":"249 identifier lookups failed; latest failures include AccessDenied (HTTP 403). Other identifiers were checked independently.","lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T21:08:58.011+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13368,"expectedIdentifiers":13813,"failedIdentifiers":249},{"source":"first-epss:nuget","scope":"FIRST EPSS for explicit CVE aliases in the collected public NuGet archive. Not a global EPSS backfill.","generation":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.4460032+00:00","complete":true,"records":1097,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.4460032+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.6018487+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.6018491+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"nvd","scope":"Rolling NVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global NVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-f58072f00ed84b8dbc554f4a4e66e21a","complete":true,"records":13753,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:59:01.4643428+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T20:59:01.459+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:59:01.459+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13813,"expectedIdentifiers":13813,"failedIdentifiers":0},{"source":"osv:Go","scope":"Complete OSV Go ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"go-3562b6c78fd1bd0f0b55daf66a0926ae24f65e462df7f6d928caad458fc696bf","complete":true,"records":9947,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.3041045+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T04:27:43.6877707+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.3041045+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-11T03:32:46+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:NuGet","scope":"Complete OSV NuGet ecosystem archive, including GitHub Advisory Database records; NuGet version matching only","generation":"nuget-456002455e0ab94bb92c95476d4e6d175c104cd594749982afd96c893728ecbc","complete":true,"records":2010,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:56:40.2809572+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T02:36:58.1276999+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:56:40.2809572+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-11T01:17:51+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:crates.io","scope":"Complete OSV crates.io ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"crates.io-baa8362b4daf9e5f39d5563775a55935e7b442c0735d33274a921579ce4a0d66","complete":true,"records":3093,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.411286+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T13:00:02.5446881+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.411286+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-11T12:47:47+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:npm","scope":"Complete OSV npm ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"npm-757d3692f9a7b34792dad960197f3cc953a54db59b7d0ffe3835a0ed9926f76b","complete":true,"records":231690,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.1683586+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:40.6131056+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-11T20:58:42.1683586+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-11T20:03:03+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null}]}