{"id":"EUVD-2025-15798","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"aeecc6b4e0f54bc7980cdeb962932270","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2025-47934","aliases":[],"title":"OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed","description":"OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.  When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2025-05-19T18:57:05.602+00:00","modifiedAt":"2025-05-20T13:02:58.605+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"openpgpjs","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"openpgpjs\",\n                    \"product\": \"openpgpjs\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \">= 5.0.1, < 5.11.3\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        },\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \">= 6.0.0-alpha.0, < 6.1.1\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":8.7,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/security/advisories/GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/bd54e8535ca29b3bef58a8c02296892e408be356","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v5.11.3","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v6.1.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-47934","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2025-47934","identifiers":["CVE-2025-47934"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"0a20aa2646844f56aee32764a67d1f09","observedAt":"2026-11-15T04:33:09.113+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2025-15798","aliases":["CVE-2025-47934","GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8"],"title":"OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these…","description":"OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.  When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":8.7,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/security/advisories/GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/bd54e8535ca29b3bef58a8c02296892e408be356","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v5.11.3","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v6.1.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2025-15798","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"May 19, 2025, 6:57:05 PM","dateUpdated":"May 20, 2025, 1:02:58 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2025-15798","identifiers":["EUVD-2025-15798","CVE-2025-47934","GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"d23554b603514e9b950fc1c86b006169","observedAt":"2026-10-25T02:24:54.05+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2025-47934","aliases":[],"title":"OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these…","description":"OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.  When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2025-05-19T19:15:52.33+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-17T09:28:51.587+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":8.7,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/bd54e8535ca29b3bef58a8c02296892e408be356","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v5.11.3","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v6.1.1","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/security/advisories/GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47934","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-347"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2025-05-19T19:15:52.330","lastModified":"2026-06-17T09:28:51.587"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2025-47934","identifiers":["CVE-2025-47934"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"2de42d1290834ba6b0a432552ffb4c71","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8","aliases":["CVE-2025-47934"],"title":"OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed","description":"### Impact\nA maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed.\n\nThis flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case.\n\nIn order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js.\n\nIn other words. any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature.\n\nBoth OpenPGP.js v6 and v5 are affected. OpenPGP.js v4 is not affected.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n- When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.\n- When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.\n\n### Acknowledgements\nWe would like to thank:\n- Edoardo Geraci and Thomas Rinsma of [Codean Labs](https://codeanlabs.com/) for finding and reporting this vulnerability\n- The [Sovereign Tech Agency](https://www.sovereign.tech/) for sponsoring the [OpenPGP.js bug bounty program](https://yeswehack.com/programs/openpgp-js-bug-bounty-program)\n- [YesWeHack](https://www.yeswehack.com/) for hosting the [OpenPGP.js bug bounty program](https://yeswehack.com/programs/openpgp-js-bug-bounty-program)","state":0,"publishedAt":"2025-05-19T21:54:43+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-10T03:50:57.5135032+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"openpgp","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"5.0.1"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"5.11.3"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null},{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"openpgp","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"6.0.0-alpha.0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"6.1.1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V4","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/security/advisories/GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47934","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/43f5f4e2bd67d0514d06acc60b6ee571a049c229","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/843a69d0adbdec0f87af09f9000a9223e6614e5c","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/commit/bd54e8535ca29b3bef58a8c02296892e408be356","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v5.11.3","https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v6.1.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8","identifiers":["GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8","CVE-2025-47934"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-15T13:01:41.3445250+00:00","complete":true,"records":1781,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:41.344525+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:46.2867767+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:46.2867777+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-7de4d7559a5263003f03d9f70577ab06f92ba4178309f26fce53e22a4a959294-24e910670d68255a90dfc1d94d37ac5394a0a43e960361a78142e746e5b8e0e9","complete":true,"records":425790,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:16.7308429+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:16.7018281+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:16.7308429+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-15T12:22:01+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global EUVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-ac698a176bdb4138a7faa053bf4c8afd","complete":false,"records":13821,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:05:19.1497221+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T13:05:19.339574+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:05:19.339574+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"first-epss:nuget","scope":"FIRST EPSS for explicit CVE aliases in the collected public NuGet archive. Not a global EPSS backfill.","generation":"2026-11-15T13:01:41.3445250+00:00","complete":true,"records":1125,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:41.344525+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:46.3027206+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:46.3027219+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"nvd","scope":"Rolling NVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global NVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-00496e381624434cb51cd6ee97f87d5f","complete":true,"records":13833,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:02:04.5706057+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T13:02:04.555+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:02:04.555+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13874,"expectedIdentifiers":13874,"failedIdentifiers":0},{"source":"osv:Go","scope":"Complete OSV Go ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"go-64eea06dbd27de8464d5dbce1b78cc794cc59e2d901516ae0d3ea76e624cdae0","complete":true,"records":9955,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:38.1237717+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-14T13:57:23.1208135+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:38.1237717+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-14T13:17:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:NuGet","scope":"Complete OSV NuGet ecosystem archive, including GitHub Advisory Database records; NuGet version matching only","generation":"nuget-f4424d7d4861b1af1404bd15abcb83f295dcd003412a9340ca99dc8200aa148a","complete":true,"records":2014,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:22.067621+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-13T19:57:08.2864435+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:22.067621+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-13T19:33:10+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:crates.io","scope":"Complete OSV crates.io ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"crates.io-6086d649bcb454cdf302d7d9275177bda73550e1b6e446b3520e9b6266d3582c","complete":true,"records":3148,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:41.1317031+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.1034234+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:41.1317031+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-15T10:03:04+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:npm","scope":"Complete OSV npm ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"npm-ff18f36f13fcca3a20a3fb9274b59b8872d18869a99071730e1e79b625c8f612","complete":true,"records":232475,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:28.8971106+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:10.4195883+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T13:01:28.8971106+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-15T10:33:06+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null}]}