{"id":"EUVD-2025-209860","revision":"f7e7ed00c1964f98beaeebb06f3f407d","records":[{"revision":"f7e7ed00c1964f98beaeebb06f3f407d","observedAt":"2026-11-09T04:07:18.5+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2025-209860","aliases":["CVE-2025-64526","GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"],"title":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes…","description":"Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":6.9,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw","https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818","https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db","https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2025-209860","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"May 14, 2026, 6:32:01 PM","dateUpdated":"May 16, 2026, 12:49:25 AM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2025-209860","identifiers":["EUVD-2025-209860","CVE-2025-64526","GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}