{"id":"EUVD-2026-109082","enisaUuid":"bf084a7f-4779-328e-8ebd-8ca71e0c12ff","description":"obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker\u0027s control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human\u0027s approval, while still requiring the caller\u0027s ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.","datePublished":"Oct 23, 2026, 2:04:33 PM","dateUpdated":"Oct 23, 2026, 2:04:33 PM","baseScore":7.1,"baseScoreVersion":"4.0","baseScoreVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","references":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4\n","aliases":"CVE-2026-115477\nGHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc\n","assigner":"GitHub_M","epss":0.35,"enisaIdProduct":[{"id":"f6dc05c2-9305-3969-b57d-1b8587bc0f2b","product":{"name":"obsidian-tc","vendor":{"name":"The-40-Thieves"}},"product_version":"1.13.0, \u003c 1.31.4"}],"enisaIdVendor":[{"id":"989eb1a8-aeff-354b-87a9-da2828e92964","vendor":{"name":"The-40-Thieves"}}],"enisaIdVulnerability":[{"id":"26588778-8120-3ae7-a0f7-aad6b34b1a03","vulnerability":{"id":"CVE-2026-115477","description":"obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker\u0027s control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human\u0027s approval, while still requiring the caller\u0027s ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4.","datePublished":"Oct 23, 2026, 2:04:33 PM","dateUpdated":"Oct 23, 2026, 2:04:33 PM","status":"PUBLISHED","baseScore":7.1,"baseScoreVersion":"4.0","baseScoreVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","references":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4\n","enisa_id":"EUVD-2026-109082\n","assigner":"GitHub_M","epss":0.35,"dataProcessed":"Oct 27, 2026, 7:15:10 AM","vulnerabilityProduct":[{"id":"2bc647a8-a0e1-333f-98b2-cc23aea29e0a","product":{"name":"obsidian-tc","vendor":{"name":"The-40-Thieves"}},"product_version":"1.13.0, \u003c 1.31.4"}],"vulnerabilityVendor":[{"id":"76094f3f-fb69-30eb-9b31-b725256e69ac","vendor":{"name":"The-40-Thieves"}}]}},{"id":"40da6475-4dd2-3270-a77d-afa05bba1951","vulnerability":{"id":"GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc","description":"obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP","datePublished":"Oct 23, 2026, 5:30:10 PM","dateUpdated":"Oct 23, 2026, 5:30:10 PM","baseScore":0.0,"references":"https://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/security/advisories/GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/issues/967\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/pull/969\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/commit/101c91c656e2c2b88bcf3696a5da035f8c032c71\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/blob/v1.31.4/CHANGELOG.md\nhttps://github.com/The-40-Thieves/obsidian-tc/releases/tag/v1.31.4\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-115477\n","enisa_id":"EUVD-2026-109082\n","aliases":"GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc\nCVE-2026-115477\n","epss":0.0,"dataProcessed":"Oct 27, 2026, 7:03:36 AM","vulnerabilityProduct":[],"vulnerabilityVendor":[]}}],"enisaIdAdvisory":[]}