{"id":"EUVD-2026-28653","enisaUuid":"a81e18e1-d79a-30fd-9520-1277a42cfe83","description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the \"canonical\" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.","datePublished":"May 8, 2026, 2:55:50 PM","dateUpdated":"May 8, 2026, 7:42:57 PM","baseScore":9.3,"baseScoreVersion":"4.0","baseScoreVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","references":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj\n","aliases":"CVE-2026-41583\n","assigner":"GitHub_M","epss":0.28,"enisaIdProduct":[{"id":"3ff961b8-5f2a-3dd1-8fd5-ee15ecca3cfa","product":{"name":"zebra","vendor":{"name":"ZcashFoundation"}},"product_version":"zebra-script \u003c 5.0.2"},{"id":"86f6d862-9656-3288-a543-8a32bcdbbb54","product":{"name":"zebra","vendor":{"name":"ZcashFoundation"}},"product_version":"zebrad \u003c 4.3.1"}],"enisaIdVendor":[{"id":"c1a34be2-dd5d-3479-b49e-4f414d8c0b3f","vendor":{"name":"ZcashFoundation"}}],"enisaIdVulnerability":[{"id":"3057c087-0fc4-3327-9af1-00c223de125f","vulnerability":{"id":"CVE-2026-41583","description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the \"canonical\" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.","datePublished":"May 8, 2026, 2:55:50 PM","dateUpdated":"May 8, 2026, 7:42:57 PM","status":"PUBLISHED","baseScore":9.3,"baseScoreVersion":"4.0","baseScoreVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H","references":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj\n","enisa_id":"EUVD-2026-28653\n","assigner":"GitHub_M","epss":0.28,"dataProcessed":"Nov 7, 2026, 7:21:17 AM","vulnerabilityProduct":[{"id":"5a33da6d-015d-37ed-94c3-7180fdb414c6","product":{"name":"zebra","vendor":{"name":"ZcashFoundation"}},"product_version":"zebrad \u003c 4.3.1"},{"id":"bc12f8ae-e664-33d2-9770-3f3cb7e33d80","product":{"name":"zebra","vendor":{"name":"ZcashFoundation"}},"product_version":"zebra-script \u003c 5.0.2"}],"vulnerabilityVendor":[{"id":"d2e296e4-e721-31ac-9e18-a743571d1738","vendor":{"name":"ZcashFoundation"}}]}}],"enisaIdAdvisory":[]}