{"id":"EUVD-2026-45982","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"c21ac794562d46f590156a29770d84f6","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-46428","aliases":[],"title":"lettre has TLS hostname verification disabled when using Boring TLS backend","description":"lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.11.22, an inverted-boolean bug in lettre's `boring-tls` integration silently disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict) configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the `boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are unaffected. Version 0.11.22 patches the issue.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T15:37:58.396+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-21T15:49:36.495+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"lettre","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"lettre\",\n                    \"product\": \"lettre\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \">= 0.10.1, < 0.11.22\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","score":9.1,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/lettre/lettre/security/advisories/GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/commit/f5efffc88360dbdbfcef80f465e42d5bce68ca35","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/releases/tag/v0.11.22","https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0141.html"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46428","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-46428","identifiers":["CVE-2026-46428"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"127a6a6e59594bde9b5e8f2ee66558d8","observedAt":"2026-11-09T11:11:05.917+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-45982","aliases":["CVE-2026-46428","GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53"],"title":"lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. 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Version 0.11.22 patches the issue.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","score":9.1,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/lettre/lettre/security/advisories/GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/commit/f5efffc88360dbdbfcef80f465e42d5bce68ca35","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/releases/tag/v0.11.22","https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0141.html"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-45982","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Jul 20, 2026, 3:37:58 PM","dateUpdated":"Jul 21, 2026, 3:49:36 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-45982","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-45982","CVE-2026-46428","GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"3580568f40ba4fadbaa9b2cc34844858","observedAt":"2026-10-25T12:17:14.897+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-46428","aliases":[],"title":"lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.11.22, an inverted-boolean bug in lettre's `boring-tls` integration silently disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict) …","description":"lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.11.22, an inverted-boolean bug in lettre's `boring-tls` integration silently disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict) configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the `boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are unaffected. Version 0.11.22 patches the issue.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T16:17:01.347+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-23T17:58:34.99+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":9.1,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/lettre/lettre/commit/f5efffc88360dbdbfcef80f465e42d5bce68ca35","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/releases/tag/v0.11.22","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/security/advisories/GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0141.html"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46428","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-295"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-07-20T16:17:01.347","lastModified":"2026-07-23T17:58:34.990"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-46428","identifiers":["CVE-2026-46428"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"9e7e3b51dee34135b7b6c8d3b89d17cb","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:54.901+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","aliases":["CVE-2026-46428","RUSTSEC-2026-0141"],"title":"lettre has TLS hostname verification disabled when using Boring TLS backend","description":"### Summary\nAn inverted-boolean bug in lettre's `boring-tls` integration silently\ndisables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict)\nconfiguration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate\nfor any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN\ncredentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the\n`boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are\nunaffected.\n\n### Details\nboring's `SslConnectorBuilder::set_verify_hostname(bool)` /\n`verify_hostname(bool)` API takes a *verify* flag — `true` means enforce\nhostname verification, `false` means skip it. (Boring docs:\nhttps://docs.rs/boring/latest/boring/ssl/struct.ConnectConfiguration.html#method.set_verify_hostname)\nlettre's `TlsParametersBuilder` exposes the opposite-named flag\n`accept_invalid_hostnames: bool` — `true` means *accept invalid* (skip\nverification), `false` means verify. lettre passes this flag directly to\nboring at both TLS-upgrade sites, inverting the semantics:\nsrc/transport/smtp/client/net.rs:202 (sync)\n    .verify_hostname(*accept_invalid_hostnames)\nsrc/transport/smtp/client/async_net.rs:377 (async)\n    config.set_verify_hostname(accept_invalid_hostnames);\nConcrete behaviour under `boring-tls`:\n  * accept_invalid_hostnames = false  (the strict default)\n      → set_verify_hostname(false)  → hostname verification SKIPPED\n        (wrong; the caller asked for strict verification)\n  * accept_invalid_hostnames = true   (explicit opt-in to \"dangerous\")\n      → set_verify_hostname(true)   → hostname verification ENFORCED\n        (wrong; the caller opted into accepting any name)\nBoring's own warning on `set_verify_hostname`:\n    \"If hostname verification is not used, *any* valid certificate for\n    *any* site will be trusted for use from any other. This introduces\n    a significant vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks.\"\n`native-tls` (src/transport/smtp/client/tls.rs:355) uses\n`danger_accept_invalid_hostnames(self.accept_invalid_hostnames)`, whose\nflag name and semantics match lettre's — unaffected. `rustls` uses a\nseparate verifier path — unaffected.\nThe bug was introduced in PR #797 (\"Add support for boring TLS\"), commit\n985fa7e, first released in v0.10.1, and persists unchanged through v0.11.21\n(latest). Zero existing tests cover `accept_invalid_hostnames` end-to-end\nwith any backend, which is why the inversion has gone undetected.\nFix: negate the flag at both call sites. Two-line patch:\n    -    .verify_hostname(*accept_invalid_hostnames)\n    +    .verify_hostname(!*accept_invalid_hostnames)\n    -    config.set_verify_hostname(accept_invalid_hostnames);\n    +    config.set_verify_hostname(!accept_invalid_hostnames);\nI have the patch ready locally and can push to a private fork if a\ncollaborative fix branch is preferred.\n\n### PoC\nSetup (any lettre version >= v0.10.1, built with the `boring-tls`\nfeature, default-strict configuration):\n1. Generate a TLS cert for any hostname the attacker controls, e.g.\n   `attacker.example`, signed by any CA in the client's trust store\n   (e.g. a Let's Encrypt cert is sufficient).\n2. Stand up an attacker SMTP server on the network path between the\n   lettre client and the intended MX. Have it present the\n   `attacker.example` cert on STARTTLS or implicit TLS.\n3. Use lettre with default-strict TLS to send to the real MX hostname,\n   e.g. `mail.example.com`:\n       use lettre::transport::smtp::client::{Tls, TlsParameters};\n       use lettre::{AsyncSmtpTransport, Tokio1Executor, Message};\n       let tls = TlsParameters::builder(\"mail.example.com\".to_owned())\n           .build_boring()\n           .unwrap();\n       let mailer = AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::relay(\n               \"mail.example.com\",\n           )?\n           .tls(Tls::Required(tls))\n           .build();\n       mailer.send(message).await?;     // succeeds against attacker\nExpected with hostname verification: handshake fails because the\npresented leaf cert's SAN does not match `mail.example.com`.\nActual on `boring-tls`: handshake succeeds. lettre proceeds with the\nSMTP transaction, sending MAIL FROM, RCPT TO, message body, and any\nconfigured SMTP AUTH credentials to the attacker.\nSymmetric inverse PoC (proves the inversion, not just a missing check):\nconfigure `.dangerous_accept_invalid_hostnames(true)` and try to connect\nto a server whose cert SAN matches the connect domain. With the bug,\nthe handshake *fails* because lettre passes `true` to `verify_hostname`\nand boring rejects... actually wait, it succeeds (SAN matches). Better\ninverse demonstration: connect to a server whose cert SAN matches the\nconnect domain with `accept_invalid_hostnames=true`, then connect to a\nmismatched-SAN server with the same flag — the latter is rejected,\nproving the flag is inverted (the user opted into accepting any name,\nyet lettre enforces strict verification).\nA reproducer cargo project can be produced on request.\n\n### Impact\nWho is impacted: any lettre user who\n  1. enables the `boring-tls` feature, AND\n  2. relies on default-strict hostname verification\n     (i.e. does NOT call `.dangerous_accept_invalid_hostnames(true)`).\nThis is the entire \"I want strict TLS\" population on `boring-tls`. They\nget the opposite of what they asked for: a TLS handshake that ignores\nhostname mismatch.\nExploitation: an attacker on the network path between the lettre client\nand the target SMTP server, holding any chain-valid TLS certificate\n(e.g. a free Let's Encrypt cert for a domain the attacker owns), can\npresent that certificate when the lettre client connects to the intended\nMX. boring accepts the handshake, lettre proceeds, and the attacker\ngains read/write access to:\n  * SMTP envelope (MAIL FROM, RCPT TO)\n  * Message bodies, attachments, headers\n  * Any SMTP AUTH credentials (PLAIN, LOGIN, CRAM-MD5, etc.)\n  * Any DKIM signatures and DMARC alignment downstream depends on\n    can be inspected and selectively dropped\nConfidentiality and integrity impact: High. Availability impact: None\ndirect (the attacker can choose to forward or drop, but the bug itself\ndoes not deny service).\nCloudflare's email-fwdr independently identified and mitigated this\ndownstream by promoting a previously-metric-only post-handshake SAN\ncheck to a hard error (fix landed 2026-05-12). Because we're mitigated\ndownstream, we are not on a publication clock; we are reporting so the\nupstream fix can ship and other lettre+boring-tls deployments can stop\nrelying on per-caller workarounds. Happy to coordinate on embargo\ntiming.\nAffected versions: every released lettre version with `boring-tls`\nsupport, from v0.10.1 (PR #797, commit 985fa7e) through v0.11.21\n(latest). No prior advisory or fix.\nSuggested fix: two-line negation of the flag at the boring call sites\n(see Details). Patch is ready locally and can be attached to a private\ncollaboration fork.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-28T14:29:10+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-28T14:45:27.6769714+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"lettre","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0.10.1"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.11.22"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V4","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/lettre/lettre/security/advisories/GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46428","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/commit/f5efffc88360dbdbfcef80f465e42d5bce68ca35","https://github.com/lettre/lettre","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/releases/tag/v0.11.22","https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0141.html"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","identifiers":["GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53","CVE-2026-46428","RUSTSEC-2026-0141"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"676f682e68cd4457aadeed8a85b02fc4","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:54.901+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0141","aliases":["CVE-2026-46428","GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53"],"title":"TLS hostname verification disabled when using Boring TLS backend","description":"An inverted-boolean bug in lettre's `boring-tls` integration silently\ndisables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict)\nconfiguration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate\nfor any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN\ncredentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the\n`boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are\nunaffected.\n\nThe bug was introduced in v0.10.1 and persists through v0.11.21 (latest).","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-14T12:00:00+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-12T18:00:14.0451695+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"lettre","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0.10.1"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.11.22"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V4","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","score":null,"severity":null}],"references":["https://crates.io/crates/lettre","https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0141.html","https://github.com/lettre/lettre/commit/f5efffc88360dbdbfcef80f465e42d5bce68ca35"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0141","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0141","identifiers":["RUSTSEC-2026-0141","CVE-2026-46428","GHSA-4pj9-g833-qx53"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. 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