{"id":"EUVD-2026-90083","enisaUuid":"59eeb61a-8333-32d3-971c-66bad94a3707","description":"CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: \u003cmessage\u003e. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.","datePublished":"Sep 30, 2026, 4:25:02 PM","dateUpdated":"Sep 30, 2026, 7:34:04 PM","baseScore":7.6,"baseScoreVersion":"4.0","baseScoreVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","references":"https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/security/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc\nhttps://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/releases/tag/v13.10.0\n","aliases":"CVE-2026-55177\nGHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc\n","assigner":"GitHub_M","epss":0.38,"enisaIdProduct":[{"id":"af074e0c-2be9-31b8-a5f2-929e4d81b083","product":{"name":"CloudTAK","vendor":{"name":"dfpc-coe"}},"product_version":"\u003c 13.10.0"}],"enisaIdVendor":[{"id":"909180df-d969-37a7-a00e-8d36d50988f6","vendor":{"name":"dfpc-coe"}}],"enisaIdVulnerability":[{"id":"243717d6-c998-3522-8ea4-8f931b660589","vulnerability":{"id":"CVE-2026-55177","description":"CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: \u003cmessage\u003e. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.","datePublished":"Sep 30, 2026, 4:25:02 PM","dateUpdated":"Sep 30, 2026, 7:34:04 PM","status":"PUBLISHED","baseScore":7.6,"baseScoreVersion":"4.0","baseScoreVector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","references":"https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/security/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc\nhttps://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/releases/tag/v13.10.0\n","enisa_id":"EUVD-2026-90083\n","assigner":"GitHub_M","epss":0.38,"dataProcessed":"Nov 15, 2026, 7:20:23 AM","vulnerabilityProduct":[{"id":"58689ece-a1ce-33b6-8fb4-710a37635ba6","product":{"name":"CloudTAK","vendor":{"name":"dfpc-coe"}},"product_version":"\u003c 13.10.0"}],"vulnerabilityVendor":[{"id":"a04bc9de-5e7c-3250-b447-c669e211f169","vendor":{"name":"dfpc-coe"}}]}},{"id":"2b4c3684-020c-31c8-b4f5-3c269eff73be","vulnerability":{"id":"GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc","description":"CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in the /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard","datePublished":"Jul 17, 2026, 9:35:10 PM","dateUpdated":"Jul 17, 2026, 9:35:10 PM","baseScore":0.0,"references":"https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/security/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc\nhttps://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK\nhttps://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/releases/tag/v13.10.0\n","enisa_id":"EUVD-2026-90083\n","aliases":"GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc\nCVE-2026-55177\n","epss":0.0,"dataProcessed":"Nov 15, 2026, 2:52:09 AM","vulnerabilityProduct":[],"vulnerabilityVendor":[]}}],"enisaIdAdvisory":[]}