{"id":"GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"d68d9cd1f3ea497e900094c990c2a767","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-54272","aliases":[],"title":"ip-address: Misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks","description":"ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Versions 10.1.1 through 10.2.0 are vulnerable to SSRF through misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses. Address6.getType() classifies an address by matching it against a table of known IPv6 special-use prefixes, returning Global unicast when nothing matches. That table had no entry for the IPv4-mapped range (::ffff:0:0/96), so every mapped address fell through to Global unicast; NAT64 addresses matched their own NAT64 … labels. The boolean checks isLoopback, isUnspecified, and isMulticast compared getType() against a fixed label and so returned false, while isLinkLocal and isULA checked only the native IPv6 ranges. The library already exposed isMapped4() and to4(), but did not apply them inside these checks, so a mapped or NAT64 address was never normalized to its embedded IPv4 address before classification. For IPv4-mapped addresses the host OS routes to the IPv4 stack, so the misclassification is reachable on any dual-stack host. For NAT64, the classification bypass is unconditional but end-to-end reachability additionally requires a NAT64/DNS64 gateway in the deployment network.This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-27T17:13:09.244+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-27T17:42:10.446+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"ip-address","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"beaugunderson\",\n                    \"product\": \"ip-address\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \">= 10.1.1, < 10.2.1\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","score":6.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-54272","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-54272","identifiers":["CVE-2026-54272"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"cef1a0ce0b0a481cbff764b162eba79a","observedAt":"2026-10-25T13:17:28.253+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-54272","aliases":[],"title":"ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Versions 10.1.1 through 10.2.0 are vulnerable to SSRF through misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses. Address6.getType() classifies a…","description":"ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. Versions 10.1.1 through 10.2.0 are vulnerable to SSRF through misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses. Address6.getType() classifies an address by matching it against a table of known IPv6 special-use prefixes, returning Global unicast when nothing matches. That table had no entry for the IPv4-mapped range (::ffff:0:0/96), so every mapped address fell through to Global unicast; NAT64 addresses matched their own NAT64 … labels. The boolean checks isLoopback, isUnspecified, and isMulticast compared getType() against a fixed label and so returned false, while isLinkLocal and isULA checked only the native IPv6 ranges. The library already exposed isMapped4() and to4(), but did not apply them inside these checks, so a mapped or NAT64 address was never normalized to its embedded IPv4 address before classification. For IPv4-mapped addresses the host OS routes to the IPv4 stack, so the misclassification is reachable on any dual-stack host. For NAT64, the classification bypass is unconditional but end-to-end reachability additionally requires a NAT64/DNS64 gateway in the deployment network.This issue has been fixed in version 10.2.1.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-27T18:16:56.41+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-24T13:10:00.147+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":6.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54272","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Awaiting Analysis","weaknesses":["CWE-20","CWE-918"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-07-27T18:16:56.410","lastModified":"2026-10-24T13:10:00.147"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-54272","identifiers":["CVE-2026-54272"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"1dd2c62bab104bb29cc057ba150d5f05","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg","aliases":["CVE-2026-54272"],"title":"ip-address: misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks","description":"### Summary\n\n`Address6`'s special-property checks misclassify IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:0:0/96`) and NAT64 well-known (`64:ff9b::/96`) IPv6 addresses. These checks classify an address by its IPv6 wrapper rather than by the IPv4 address it embeds, so `isLoopback()`, `isLinkLocal()`, `isMulticast()`, and `isUnspecified()` all return `false` for literals such as `::ffff:127.0.0.1` or `::ffff:169.254.169.254` that actually route to loopback, RFC 1918, or link-local (cloud-metadata) destinations. `Address6` also had no `isPrivate()` method, so a mapped RFC 1918 address could not be detected at all.\n\nAn application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example, a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata endpoint.\n\n### Details\n\n`Address6.getType()` classifies an address by matching it against a table of known IPv6 special-use prefixes, returning `Global unicast` when nothing matches. That table had no entry for the IPv4-mapped range (`::ffff:0:0/96`), so every mapped address fell through to `Global unicast`; NAT64 addresses matched their own `NAT64 …` labels. The boolean checks `isLoopback`, `isUnspecified`, and `isMulticast` compared `getType()` against a fixed label and so returned `false`, while `isLinkLocal` and `isULA` checked only the native IPv6 ranges.\n\nThe library already exposed `isMapped4()` and `to4()`, but did not apply them inside these checks, so a mapped or NAT64 address was never normalized to its embedded IPv4 address before classification. The underlying CIDR matching is correct; the defect is that the special-use table omitted the IPv4-mapped range and the checks performed no embedded-IPv4 normalization.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`>= 10.1.1, <= 10.2.0`. The `is*` classification API was introduced for `Address4` in 10.1.1 and extended to `Address6` in 10.2.0. Releases before 10.1.1 do not expose this API and are not affected through this vector.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe misclassification covers the entire `::ffff:0:0/96` range, in both dotted and hex notation and case-insensitively, plus the `64:ff9b::/96` NAT64 well-known prefix:\n\n| Address | Reported as | Actually points at |\n|---|---|---|\n| `::ffff:127.0.0.1` / `::ffff:7f00:1` | Global unicast | loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`) |\n| `::ffff:10.0.0.1` | Global unicast | RFC 1918 `10/8` |\n| `::ffff:172.16.5.5` | Global unicast | RFC 1918 `172.16/12` |\n| `::ffff:192.168.1.1` | Global unicast | RFC 1918 `192.168/16` |\n| `::ffff:169.254.169.254` / `::ffff:a9fe:a9fe` | Global unicast | link-local / cloud metadata (IMDS) |\n| `::ffff:100.64.0.1` | Global unicast | CGNAT `100.64/10` |\n| `::ffff:0.0.0.0` / `::ffff:255.255.255.255` | Global unicast | unspecified / broadcast |\n| `64:ff9b::7f00:1` / `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` | NAT64 (well-known) | loopback / IMDS via NAT64 |\n\nFor IPv4-mapped addresses the host OS routes to the IPv4 stack, so the misclassification is reachable on any dual-stack host. For NAT64, the classification bypass is unconditional but end-to-end reachability additionally requires a NAT64/DNS64 gateway in the deployment network.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nA guard assembled from these checks lets internal hosts through:\n\n```js\nconst { Address4, Address6 } = require('ip-address');\n\n// true => block as internal, false => allow outbound\nfunction isBlocked(host) {\n  try {\n    const a = new Address4(host);\n    return a.isPrivate() || a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isCGNAT()\n        || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified() || a.isBroadcast();\n  } catch {}\n  try {\n    const a = new Address6(host);\n    return a.isLoopback() || a.isLinkLocal() || a.isULA()\n        || a.isMulticast() || a.isUnspecified();\n  } catch {}\n  return false;\n}\n\nfor (const h of ['127.0.0.1', '::1', '10.0.0.1', '8.8.8.8',\n                 '::ffff:127.0.0.1', '::ffff:10.0.0.1',\n                 '::ffff:169.254.169.254', '64:ff9b::7f00:1']) {\n  console.log(isBlocked(h) ? 'BLOCK ' : 'ALLOW ', h);\n}\n```\n\nOn affected versions this prints (note that every `::ffff:…` and `64:ff9b::…` internal target is allowed):\n\n```\nBLOCK  127.0.0.1\nBLOCK  ::1\nBLOCK  10.0.0.1\nALLOW  8.8.8.8\nALLOW  ::ffff:127.0.0.1\nALLOW  ::ffff:10.0.0.1\nALLOW  ::ffff:169.254.169.254\nALLOW  64:ff9b::7f00:1\n```\n\nThe first three lines (native loopback, native IPv6 loopback, and a literal RFC 1918 address) are blocked as expected; the IPv4-mapped and NAT64 forms of the same internal destinations are allowed through.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to the patched release. In the fix, `Address6` normalizes IPv4-mapped and NAT64 well-known addresses to their embedded IPv4 address before classifying, via a new `embeddedIPv4()` helper that `isLoopback`, `isLinkLocal`, `isMulticast`, and `isUnspecified` consult first. `Address6` also gains `isPrivate()`, `isCGNAT()`, and `isBroadcast()` for parity with `Address4`, and `getType()` now labels the `::ffff:0:0/96` range as `IPv4-mapped`. After upgrading, `new Address6('::ffff:127.0.0.1').isLoopback()` returns `true` and `new Address6('::ffff:10.0.0.1').isPrivate()` returns `true`.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, normalize embedded IPv4 addresses yourself before classifying: call `to4()` on any address where `isMapped4()` (or membership in `64:ff9b::/96`) is true, and run your IPv4 checks against the result.\n\n### A note on SSRF defense\n\nThese methods are address classifiers, not a complete SSRF defense. Regardless of this fix, a robust SSRF guard must resolve the hostname and validate the *resolved* IP against the socket it connects to, and account for DNS rebinding and redirects. Treat these checks as one layer, not the only one.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @OV-0-VO.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-03T19:52:33+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-10T03:51:12.8508961+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"ip-address","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"10.1.1"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"10.2.1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V4","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"MODERATE"}],"references":["https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/security/advisories/GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54272","https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/commit/4a1f613f4c1bec915677dea923c10aaa09361ef9","https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address","https://github.com/beaugunderson/ip-address/releases/tag/v10.2.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg","identifiers":["GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg","CVE-2026-54272"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. 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