{"id":"GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"4fd5aa8835984c2bb57363b89095927e","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-32887","aliases":[],"title":"Effect Bug: `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC","description":"Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage`-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, `auth()` from `@clerk/nextjs/server` returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-03-20T21:35:05.853+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-03-25T13:37:15.94+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"effect","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"Effect-TS\",\n                    \"product\": \"effect\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 3.20.0\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","score":7.4,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-32887","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-32887","identifiers":["CVE-2026-32887"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"c07d43f4148044d48ab247b4411b54a3","observedAt":"2026-11-13T12:06:30.1+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-13818","aliases":["CVE-2026-32887","GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g"],"title":"Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js Ap…","description":"Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage`-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, `auth()` from `@clerk/nextjs/server` returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","score":7.4,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-13818","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Mar 20, 2026, 9:35:05 PM","dateUpdated":"Mar 25, 2026, 1:37:15 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[{"id":"WID-SEC-W-2026-3046","title":"IBM Concert: Mehrere Schwachstellen","vulnerabilityIds":["CVE-2019-19921","CVE-2021-23337","CVE-2024-3651","CVE-2024-39338","CVE-2024-45590","CVE-2025-13465","CVE-2025-15284","CVE-2025-15599","CVE-2025-22874","CVE-2025-47273","CVE-2025-47907","CVE-2025-52881","CVE-2025-53643","CVE-2025-55184","CVE-2025-58056","CVE-2025-58188","CVE-2025-58189","CVE-2025-61723","CVE-2025-61730","CVE-2025-64649","CVE-2025-64756","CVE-2025-67221","CVE-2025-68121","CVE-2025-68146","CVE-2026-0540","CVE-2026-2327","CVE-2026-23490","CVE-2026-23897","CVE-2026-2391","CVE-2026-23949","CVE-2026-24486","CVE-2026-25528","CVE-2026-25547","CVE-2026-25639","CVE-2026-25990","CVE-2026-26007","CVE-2026-26019","CVE-2026-26996","CVE-2026-27142","CVE-2026-27212","CVE-2026-27699","CVE-2026-27903","CVE-2026-27904","CVE-2026-28684","CVE-2026-29063","CVE-2026-29181","CVE-2026-2950","CVE-2026-31808","CVE-2026-31900","CVE-2026-32274","CVE-2026-32288","CVE-2026-32597","CVE-2026-32630","CVE-2026-32887","CVE-2026-32952","CVE-2026-33186","CVE-2026-33532","CVE-2026-33750","CVE-2026-33814","CVE-2026-33816","CVE-2026-33916","CVE-2026-34043","CVE-2026-34073","CVE-2026-34077","CVE-2026-3520","CVE-2026-35469","CVE-2026-35515","CVE-2026-3627","CVE-2026-39823","CVE-2026-39825","CVE-2026-39826","CVE-2026-39892","CVE-2026-39984","CVE-2026-40175","CVE-2026-40179","CVE-2026-40181","CVE-2026-40190","CVE-2026-40347","CVE-2026-41066","CVE-2026-41182","CVE-2026-41238","CVE-2026-41239","CVE-2026-41240","CVE-2026-41305","CVE-2026-41324","CVE-2026-41425","CVE-2026-41481","CVE-2026-41488","CVE-2026-41602","CVE-2026-41636","CVE-2026-42151","CVE-2026-42154","CVE-2026-42198","CVE-2026-42211","CVE-2026-42338","CVE-2026-42342","CVE-2026-42561","CVE-2026-42577","CVE-2026-43870","CVE-2026-44405","CVE-2026-44431","CVE-2026-44432","CVE-2026-44486","CVE-2026-44487","CVE-2026-44488","CVE-2026-44492","CVE-2026-44494","CVE-2026-44496","CVE-2026-44728","CVE-2026-4539","CVE-2026-45409","CVE-2026-45736","CVE-2026-46625","CVE-2026-4800","CVE-2026-4923","CVE-2026-4926","CVE-2026-7246","CVE-2026-8723"]}],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-13818","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-13818","CVE-2026-32887","GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"3796e069b30d4aa292bc24f5e1479946","observedAt":"2026-10-25T07:19:26.892+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-32887","aliases":[],"title":"Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js Ap…","description":"Effect is a TypeScript framework that consists of several packages that work together to help build TypeScript applications. Prior to version 3.20.0, when using `RpcServer.toWebHandler` (or `HttpApp.toWebHandlerRuntime`) inside a Next.js App Router route handler, any Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage`-dependent API called from within an Effect fiber can read another concurrent request's context — or no context at all. Under production traffic, `auth()` from `@clerk/nextjs/server` returns a different user's session. Version 3.20.0 contains a fix for the issue.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-03-20T22:16:27.98+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-17T10:36:30.77+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","score":7.4,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32887","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-362"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:effectful:effect:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-03-20T22:16:27.980","lastModified":"2026-06-17T10:36:30.770"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-32887","identifiers":["CVE-2026-32887"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"508824acbce04e768d609511472231fc","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g","aliases":["CVE-2026-32887"],"title":"Effect `AsyncLocalStorage` context lost/contaminated inside Effect fibers under concurrent load with RPC","description":"## Versions\n\n- `effect`: 3.19.15\n- `@effect/rpc`: 0.72.1\n- `@effect/platform`: 0.94.2\n- Node.js: v22.20.0\n- Vercel runtime with Fluid compute\n- Next.js: 16 (App Router)\n- `@clerk/nextjs`: 6.x\n\n## Root cause\n\nEffect's `MixedScheduler` batches fiber continuations and drains them inside a **single** microtask or timer callback. The `AsyncLocalStorage` context active during that callback belongs to whichever request first triggered the scheduler's drain cycle — **not** the request that owns the fiber being resumed.\n\n### Detailed mechanism\n\n#### 1. Scheduler batching (`effect/src/Scheduler.ts`, `MixedScheduler`)\n\n```typescript\n// MixedScheduler.starve() — called once when first task is scheduled\nprivate starve(depth = 0) {\n  if (depth >= this.maxNextTickBeforeTimer) {\n    setTimeout(() => this.starveInternal(0), 0)       // timer queue\n  } else {\n    Promise.resolve(void 0).then(() => this.starveInternal(depth + 1)) // microtask queue\n  }\n}\n\n// MixedScheduler.starveInternal() — drains ALL accumulated tasks in one call\nprivate starveInternal(depth: number) {\n  const tasks = this.tasks.buckets\n  this.tasks.buckets = []\n  for (const [_, toRun] of tasks) {\n    for (let i = 0; i < toRun.length; i++) {\n      toRun[i]()  // ← Every fiber continuation runs in the SAME ALS context\n    }\n  }\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\n`scheduleTask` only calls `starve()` when `running` is `false`. Subsequent tasks accumulate in `this.tasks` until `starveInternal` drains them all. The `Promise.then()` (or `setTimeout`) callback inherits the ALS context from whichever call site created it — i.e., whichever request's fiber first set `running = true`.\n\n**Result:** Under concurrent load, fiber continuations from Request A and Request B execute inside the same `starveInternal` call, sharing a single ALS context. If Request A triggered `starve()`, then Request B's fiber reads Request A's ALS context.\n\n#### 2. `toWebHandlerRuntime` does not propagate ALS (`@effect/platform/src/HttpApp.ts:211-240`)\n\n```typescript\nexport const toWebHandlerRuntime = <R>(runtime: Runtime.Runtime<R>) => {\n  const httpRuntime: Types.Mutable<Runtime.Runtime<R>> = Runtime.make(runtime)\n  const run = Runtime.runFork(httpRuntime)\n  return <E>(self: Default<E, R | Scope.Scope>, middleware?) => {\n    return (request: Request, context?): Promise<Response> =>\n      new Promise((resolve) => {\n        // Per-request Effect context is correctly set via contextMap:\n        const contextMap = new Map<string, any>(runtime.context.unsafeMap)\n        const httpServerRequest = ServerRequest.fromWeb(request)\n        contextMap.set(ServerRequest.HttpServerRequest.key, httpServerRequest)\n        httpRuntime.context = Context.unsafeMake(contextMap)\n\n        // But the fiber is forked without any ALS propagation:\n        const fiber = run(httpApp as any)  // ← ALS context is NOT captured or restored\n      })\n  }\n}\n```\n\nEffect's own `Context` (containing `HttpServerRequest`) is correctly set per-request. But the **Node.js ALS context** — which frameworks like Next.js, Clerk, and OpenTelemetry rely on — is not captured at fork time or restored when the fiber's continuations execute.\n\n#### 3. The dangerous pattern this enables\n\n```typescript\n// RPC handler — runs inside an Effect fiber\nconst handler = Effect.gen(function*() {\n  // This calls auth() from @clerk/nextjs/server, which reads from ALS\n  const { userId } = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n    try: async () => auth(),  // ← may read WRONG user's session\n    catch: () => new UnauthorizedError({ message: \"Auth failed\" })\n  })\n  return yield* repository.getUser(userId)\n})\n```\n\nThe `async () => auth()` thunk executes when the fiber continuation is scheduled by `MixedScheduler`. At that point, the ALS context belongs to an arbitrary concurrent request.\n\n## Reproduction scenario\n\n```\nTimeline (two concurrent requests to the same toWebHandler endpoint):\n\nT0: Request A arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestA)\n    → Promise executor runs synchronously\n    → httpRuntime.context set to A's context\n    → fiber A forked, runs first ops synchronously\n    → fiber A yields (e.g., at Effect.tryPromise boundary)\n    → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberA_continuation)\n    → running=false → starve() called → Promise.resolve().then(drain)\n       ↑ ALS context captured = Request A's context\n\nT1: Request B arrives → POST handler → webHandler(requestB)\n    → Promise executor runs synchronously\n    → httpRuntime.context set to B's context\n    → fiber B forked, runs first ops synchronously\n    → fiber B yields\n    → scheduler.scheduleTask(fiberB_continuation)\n    → running=true → task queued, no new starve()\n\nT2: Microtask fires → starveInternal() runs\n    → Drains fiberA_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✓\n    → Drains fiberB_continuation → auth() reads ALS → gets A's context ✗ ← WRONG USER\n```\n\n## Minimal reproduction\n\n```typescript\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\"\nimport { Effect, Layer } from \"effect\"\nimport { RpcServer, RpcSerialization, Rpc, RpcGroup } from \"@effect/rpc\"\nimport { HttpServer } from \"@effect/platform\"\nimport * as S from \"effect/Schema\"\n\n// Simulate a framework's ALS (like Next.js / Clerk)\nconst requestStore = new AsyncLocalStorage<{ userId: string }>()\n\nclass GetUser extends Rpc.make(\"GetUser\", {\n  success: S.Struct({ userId: S.String, alsUserId: S.String }),\n  failure: S.Never,\n  payload: {}\n}) {}\n\nconst MyRpc = RpcGroup.make(\"MyRpc\").add(GetUser)\n\nconst MyRpcLive = MyRpc.toLayer(\n  RpcGroup.toHandlers(MyRpc, {\n    GetUser: () =>\n      Effect.gen(function*() {\n        // Simulate calling an ALS-dependent API inside an Effect fiber\n        const alsResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n          try: async () => {\n            const store = requestStore.getStore()\n            return store?.userId ?? \"NONE\"\n          },\n          catch: () => { throw new Error(\"impossible\") }\n        })\n        return { userId: \"from-effect-context\", alsUserId: alsResult }\n      })\n  })\n)\n\nconst RpcLayer = MyRpcLive.pipe(\n  Layer.provideMerge(RpcSerialization.layerJson),\n  Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerContext)\n)\n\nconst { handler } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(MyRpc, { layer: RpcLayer })\n\n// Simulate two concurrent requests with different ALS contexts\nasync function main() {\n  const results = await Promise.all([\n    requestStore.run({ userId: \"user-A\" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest(\"GetUser\"))),\n    requestStore.run({ userId: \"user-B\" }, () => handler(makeRpcRequest(\"GetUser\"))),\n  ])\n\n  // Parse responses and check if alsUserId matches the expected user\n  // Under the bug: both responses may show \"user-A\" (or one shows the other's)\n  for (const res of results) {\n    console.log(await res.json())\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n| Symptom | Severity |\n|---------|----------|\n| `auth()` returns wrong user's session | **Critical** — authentication bypass |\n| `cookies()` / `headers()` from Next.js read wrong request | **High** — data leakage |\n| OpenTelemetry trace context crosses requests | **Medium** — incorrect traces |\n| Works locally, fails in production | Hard to diagnose — only manifests under concurrent load |\n\n## Workaround\n\nCapture ALS-dependent values **before** entering the Effect runtime and pass them via Effect's own context system:\n\n```typescript\n// In the route handler — OUTSIDE the Effect fiber (ALS is correct here)\nexport const POST = async (request: Request) => {\n  const { userId } = await auth()  // ← Safe: still in Next.js ALS context\n\n  // Inject into request headers or use the `context` parameter\n  const headers = new Headers(request.headers)\n  headers.set(\"x-clerk-auth-user-id\", userId ?? \"\")\n  const enrichedRequest = new Request(request.url, {\n    method: request.method,\n    headers,\n    body: request.body,\n    duplex: \"half\" as any,\n  })\n\n  return webHandler(enrichedRequest)\n}\n\n// In Effect handlers — read from HttpServerRequest headers instead of calling auth()\nconst getAuthenticatedUserId = Effect.gen(function*() {\n  const req = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest\n  const userId = req.headers[\"x-clerk-auth-user-id\"]\n  if (!userId) return yield* Effect.fail(new UnauthorizedError({ message: \"Auth required\" }))\n  return userId\n})\n```\n\n## Suggested fix (for Effect maintainers)\n\n### Option A: Propagate ALS context through the scheduler\n\nCapture the `AsyncLocalStorage` snapshot when a fiber continuation is scheduled, and restore it when the continuation executes:\n\n```typescript\n// In MixedScheduler or the fiber runtime\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from \"node:async_hooks\"\n\nscheduleTask(task: Task, priority: number) {\n  // Capture current ALS context\n  const snapshot = AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()\n  this.tasks.scheduleTask(() => snapshot(task), priority)\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\n`AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()` (Node.js 20.5+) returns a function that, when called, restores the ALS context from the point of capture. This ensures each fiber continuation runs with its originating request's ALS context.\n\n**Trade-off:** Adds one closure allocation per scheduled task. Could be opt-in via a `FiberRef` or scheduler option.\n\n### Option B: Capture ALS at `runFork` and restore per fiber step\n\nWhen `Runtime.runFork` is called, capture the ALS snapshot and associate it with the fiber. Before each fiber step (in the fiber runtime's `evaluateEffect` loop), restore the snapshot.\n\n**Trade-off:** More invasive but provides correct ALS propagation for the fiber's entire lifetime, including across `flatMap` chains and `Effect.tryPromise` thunks.\n\n### Option C: Document the limitation and provide a `context` injection API\n\nIf ALS propagation is intentionally not supported, document this prominently and provide a first-class API for `toWebHandler` to accept per-request context. The existing `context?: Context.Context<never>` parameter on the handler function partially addresses this, but it requires callers to know about the issue and manually extract values before entering Effect.\n\n## Related\n\n- Node.js `AsyncLocalStorage` docs: https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html\n- `AsyncLocalStorage.snapshot()`: https://nodejs.org/api/async_context.html#static-method-asynclocalstoragesnapshot\n- Next.js uses ALS for `cookies()`, `headers()`, `auth()` in App Router\n- Similar issue pattern in other fiber-based runtimes (e.g., ZIO has `FiberRef` propagation for this)\n\n\n## POC replica of my setup\n\n```\n// Create web handler from Effect RPC\n// sharedMemoMap ensures all RPC routes share the same connection pool\nconst { handler: webHandler, dispose } = RpcServer.toWebHandler(DemoRpc, {\n  layer: RpcLayer,\n  memoMap: sharedMemoMap,\n});\n\n/**\n * POST /api/rpc/demo\n */\nexport const POST = async (request: Request) => {\n  return webHandler(request);\n};\n\nregisterDispose(dispose);\n```\n\n### Used util functions\n\n```\n\n/**\n * Creates a dispose registry that collects dispose callbacks and runs them\n * when `runAll` is invoked. Handles both sync and async dispose functions,\n * catching errors to prevent one failing dispose from breaking others.\n *\n * @internal Exported for testing — use `registerDispose` in application code.\n */\nexport const makeDisposeRegistry = () => {\n  const disposeFns: Array<() => void | Promise<void>> = []\n\n  const runAll = () => {\n    for (const fn of disposeFns) {\n      try {\n        const result = fn()\n        if (result && typeof result.then === \"function\") {\n          result.then(undefined, (err: unknown) => console.error(\"Dispose error:\", err))\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        console.error(\"Dispose error:\", err)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const register = (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => {\n    disposeFns.push(dispose)\n  }\n\n  return { register, runAll }\n}\n\nexport const registerDispose: (dispose: () => void | Promise<void>) => void = globalValue(\n  Symbol.for(\"@global/RegisterDispose\"),\n  () => {\n    const registry = makeDisposeRegistry()\n\n    if (typeof process !== \"undefined\") {\n      process.once(\"beforeExit\", registry.runAll)\n    }\n\n    return registry.register\n  }\n)\n```\n\n### The actual effect that was run within the RPC context that the bug was found\n\n```\nexport const getAuthenticatedUserId: Effect.Effect<string, UnauthorizedError> =\n  Effect.gen(function*() {\n    const authResult = yield* Effect.tryPromise({\n      try: async () => auth(),\n      catch: () =>\n        new UnauthorizedError({\n          message: \"Failed to get auth session\"\n        })\n    })\n\n    if (!authResult.userId) {\n      return yield* Effect.fail(\n        new UnauthorizedError({\n          message: \"Authentication required\"\n        })\n      )\n    }\n\n    return authResult.userId\n  })\n ```","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-03-20T20:34:06+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-10T03:50:36.8036015+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"effect","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"3.20.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect/security/advisories/GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32887","https://github.com/Effect-TS/effect"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g","identifiers":["GHSA-38f7-945m-qr2g","CVE-2026-32887"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.2943378+00:00","complete":true,"records":1781,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.2943378+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.4673918+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.4673928+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-7de4d7559a5263003f03d9f70577ab06f92ba4178309f26fce53e22a4a959294-f90179050d1e68c26defb06294e68ca9aad67fa6285a72a309f2510089445b08","complete":true,"records":425787,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:01:58.8542146+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:01:58.8389797+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:01:58.8542146+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-15T10:28:09+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global EUVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-f981543109394c8f9b3df5737aa835e7","complete":false,"records":13821,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:15:00.6236179+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:15:00.619+00:00","error":"257 identifier lookups failed; latest failures include AccessDenied (HTTP 403). Other identifiers were checked independently.","lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:15:00.619+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13558,"expectedIdentifiers":13874,"failedIdentifiers":257},{"source":"first-epss:nuget","scope":"FIRST EPSS for explicit CVE aliases in the collected public NuGet archive. Not a global EPSS backfill.","generation":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.2943378+00:00","complete":true,"records":1125,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.2943378+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.4693563+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.4693566+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"nvd","scope":"Rolling NVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global NVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-d33b5144615b488f88b7a7390696bc39","complete":true,"records":13833,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:18.0594066+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T10:02:36.038+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T10:02:36.038+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13874,"expectedIdentifiers":13874,"failedIdentifiers":0},{"source":"osv:Go","scope":"Complete OSV Go ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"go-64eea06dbd27de8464d5dbce1b78cc794cc59e2d901516ae0d3ea76e624cdae0","complete":true,"records":9955,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:12.198625+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-14T13:57:23.1208135+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:12.198625+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-14T13:17:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:NuGet","scope":"Complete OSV NuGet ecosystem archive, including GitHub Advisory Database records; NuGet version matching only","generation":"nuget-f4424d7d4861b1af1404bd15abcb83f295dcd003412a9340ca99dc8200aa148a","complete":true,"records":2014,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:01:59.0034935+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-13T19:57:08.2864435+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:01:59.0034935+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-13T19:33:10+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:crates.io","scope":"Complete OSV crates.io ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"crates.io-6086d649bcb454cdf302d7d9275177bda73550e1b6e446b3520e9b6266d3582c","complete":true,"records":3148,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.2566792+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.1034234+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:17.2566792+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-15T10:03:04+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:npm","scope":"Complete OSV npm ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"npm-ff18f36f13fcca3a20a3fb9274b59b8872d18869a99071730e1e79b625c8f612","complete":true,"records":232475,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:12.0533004+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:10.4195883+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-15T11:05:12.0533004+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-15T10:33:06+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null}]}