{"id":"GHSA-7q85-xj36-vmfc","revision":"9ca42a8e9aac41fbab44c7851aa6d6e0","records":[{"revision":"9ca42a8e9aac41fbab44c7851aa6d6e0","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-7q85-xj36-vmfc","aliases":["CVE-2026-77301"],"title":"adm-zip: Uncontrolled memory allocation via the declared uncompressed size (DoS)","description":"### Summary\nadm-zip allocates an entry's output buffer from the declared uncompressed size (central-directory `size` field) before validating it against the actual data. A tiny crafted ZIP that declares a huge uncompressed size forces a multi-gigabyte allocation from a few bytes.\n\n### Impact\nOn adm-zip 0.5.17 (latest), Node 24, a 105-byte ZIP with one stored entry declaring size = 1,774,399,200 makes `new AdmZip(buf).getEntries()[0].getData()` commit ~1.8 GB of resident memory in ~4.4 s before throwing `Error: ADM-ZIP: CRC32 checksum failed`, roughly 16 million times the input size. Because the buffer is committed before any validation, on a memory-constrained host (containers, serverless, small VMs) the allocation OOM-kills the process before the CRC check (uncatchable), and concurrent requests can exhaust memory even on larger hosts. Any service that reads entries from untrusted ZIPs is exposed to a remote denial of service.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\nAttachments are not supported in the advisory form, so the 105-byte PoC (sha256 `980d34356fbb248fe527b9d0ac3eabc5c99393a374014be6199523de16709386`) is inlined as base64 in this self-contained reproducer:\n\n```js\nconst AdmZip = require('adm-zip');\n// 105-byte crafted ZIP, base64-inlined\n// sha256 980d34356fbb248fe527b9d0ac3eabc5c99393a374014be6199523de16709386\nconst b64 = \"UEsDBBQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABQAAAAUAAAABAAAAYWhlbGxvUEsBAhQAFAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAFAAAA4C7DaQEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGFQSwUGAAAAAAEAAQAvAAAAJAAAAAAA\";\nconst buf = Buffer.from(b64, \"base64\");          // 105 bytes\nconst zip = new AdmZip(buf);\nzip.getEntries()[0].getData();   // commits ~1.8 GB, then throws \"ADM-ZIP: CRC32 checksum failed\"\n```\n\nThe single entry declares uncompressed size = 1,774,399,200 with a compressed size of 5. `getData()` allocates the full declared size before the CRC check runs, so the memory is committed regardless of the (tiny) actual payload.\n\n### Root cause\n`zipEntry.js` does `Buffer.alloc(<declared uncompressed size>)` before checking the declared size against the compressed size / available bytes.\n\n### Suggested fix\nValidate the declared uncompressed size against the compressed size and a configurable maximum before allocating (yauzl, for example, requires the caller to bound this); reject or stream when the declared size is implausible relative to the input. Happy to send a patch.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-18T17:18:01+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-18T17:30:08.40522+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"adm-zip","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.6.1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/security/advisories/GHSA-7q85-xj36-vmfc","https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/commit/491600683dacb6cb9fe0718a0eeb9cb5eb49afa6","https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip","https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/releases/tag/v0.6.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7q85-xj36-vmfc","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-7q85-xj36-vmfc","identifiers":["GHSA-7q85-xj36-vmfc","CVE-2026-77301"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}