{"id":"GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","revision":"585d82078817468f9ac80b6cbbbbfad0","records":[{"revision":"585d82078817468f9ac80b6cbbbbfad0","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","aliases":["CVE-2025-69263"],"title":"pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies","description":"### Summary\n\nHTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash:\n\n`resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`:\n```javascript\nreturn {\n  resolution: {\n    tarball: resolvedUrl,\n    // No integrity field\n  },\n  resolvedVia: 'url',\n}\n```\n\nThe resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify:\n```yaml\nremote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz:\n  resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz}\n  version: 1.0.0\n```\n\nSince there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. \n\nThis affects:\n- HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`\"pkg\": \"https://example.com/pkg.tgz\"`)\n- Git shorthand dependencies (`\"pkg\": \"github:user/repo\"`)\n- Git URLs (`\"pkg\": \"git+https://github.com/user/repo\"`)\n\nnpm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata.\n\n### PoC\n\nSee attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip)\n\nThe POC includes:\n- A server that returns different tarball content on each request\n- A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball\n- A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package`\n\nTo run:\n```bash\ncd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc\n./run-poc.sh\n```\n\nThe output shows that each install (with `pnpm store prune` between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables:\n\n- Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing)\n- Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later)\n- Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time\n\nThe attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-01-07T19:06:59+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-02-03T03:16:20.731152+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"pnpm","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"10.26.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263","https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85","https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","identifiers":["GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw","CVE-2025-69263"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}