{"id":"GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v","revision":"1ac3b4e611864b4fb577f194c17e22b5","records":[{"revision":"1ac3b4e611864b4fb577f194c17e22b5","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v","aliases":["CVE-2026-48025","GO-2026-5255"],"title":"nebula-mesh: Decrypted CA private key persists in heap after signing","description":"`internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64` constructs a `CAManager` with the plaintext `ed25519.PrivateKey` after unwrapping via the master key; `internal/pki/ca.go:13-16` stores it. Callers at `internal/api/enroll.go:116`, `internal/api/updates.go:297`, and `internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40` use the manager for one `Sign()` and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not wiped before release.\n\nThe keystore package's contract (`internal/keystore/keystore.go` doc: *\"Callers MUST zeroise the returned plaintext DEK as soon as it is no longer needed\"*) is not met by the `CAManager` consumer. Decrypted CA private keys persist in process heap until Go's GC scavenges the underlying slice — minutes to hours under load, indefinitely on idle servers.\n\n## Affected\nAll released versions up to v0.3.6.\n\n## Threat model\nMemory-read access: core dump, ptrace, kernel swap to disk, container/VM snapshot, OOM-debug bundle, side-channel via shared cache lines. Not a remote-network vulnerability, but defeats the master-key + envelope-encryption design's promise of \"private key never lingers\".\n\n## Suggested fix\nAdd a `Wipe()` method on `CAManager`:\n\n```go\n// internal/pki/ca.go\nfunc (m *CAManager) Wipe() {\n    if m == nil {\n        return\n    }\n    keystore.Zeroize(m.caKey)\n}\n```\n\nAt each call site (`enroll.go:116`, `updates.go:297`, `mobile_bundle.go:40`, and any new caller), `defer caMgr.Wipe()` immediately after the `Resolve()` call. Pattern mirrors the existing `defer keystore.Zeroize(dek)` discipline in the keystore package.\n\nOptional follow-up: wrap `m.Sign()` to zeroize after each call, removing the contract on callers — but the `defer` pattern is sufficient as a minimum.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-10T18:34:29+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-26T21:00:09.4802461+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/juev/nebula-mesh","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.3.7"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null},{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.3.7"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"MODERATE"}],"references":["https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v","https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/bca1d5914fbaf3517d3b86145a802c00de4a8122","https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.7","https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v","identifiers":["GHSA-8h84-fhqq-q58v","CVE-2026-48025","GO-2026-5255"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}