{"id":"GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692","revision":"5bf7add9872841f7a92a93ca47b23a0b","records":[{"revision":"5bf7add9872841f7a92a93ca47b23a0b","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692","aliases":["CVE-2026-48032"],"title":"@hulumi/policies bypasses IAM-role policy checks when the role trusts multiple OIDC providers","description":"**Affected:** `@hulumi/policies` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-697 (Incorrect Comparison)**\n\n#### Summary\n\nAWS IAM trust policies can list more than one federated identity provider — for example, a role that accepts BOTH GitHub Actions OIDC and Google's OIDC. The `G_OIDC_1` and `G_OIDC_2` policy rules are supposed to flag IAM roles whose GitHub-OIDC trust is too permissive (e.g. wildcard `sub:` conditions that would let any branch or any pull request assume the role).\n\nThe bug: when the role's `Principal.Federated` field was a JSON array of multiple providers, the rules failed to recognise that GitHub Actions was one of them. The providers list was coerced into a single comma-joined string, the matcher only looked at the start, and the GitHub OIDC hostname was lost in the join. Both rules concluded \"this isn't a GitHub-OIDC role\" and skipped the wildcard check.\n\n#### Impact\n\nA trust policy that listed the real GitHub OIDC provider ARN alongside any second provider would slip past both detectors. Consumers using `HulumiHardeningPack` or `HulumiGithubHardeningPack` could ship an IAM role with wildcard `sub:` conditions (allowing untrusted PRs from forks to assume the role) while their policy validation reported the stack as compliant. The G_OIDC_2 detector also failed to mark such roles for the cluster-admin / `AdministratorAccess` blast-radius check.\n\n#### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@hulumi/policies@1.4.0`. The shared GitHub-OIDC-provider matcher now correctly walks lists of providers — if any element of the list is the real GitHub OIDC ARN, the role is treated as GitHub-OIDC-assumable and the wildcard / blast-radius checks apply.\n\n#### Workarounds\n\nNone reliable — upgrade is the fix.\n\n#### Resources\n\n- [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster A); regression tests at `packages/policies/tests/github/{g-oidc-2,github-oidc-issuer}.test.ts`.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-10T13:37:08+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-10T03:50:49.4259705+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@hulumi/policies","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"1.4.0"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V4","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/security/advisories/GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692","https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178","https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692","identifiers":["GHSA-g759-4pxw-6692","CVE-2026-48032"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}