{"id":"MAL-2026-10622","revision":"3357689a94cc4643a3fd05541179eb07","records":[{"revision":"3357689a94cc4643a3fd05541179eb07","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-10622","aliases":["GHSA-wf75-6wm5-v349"],"title":"Malicious code in chai-as-structured (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9508b72d48575443d9e68f1da1ef6bdd1ebc9351f271fba56b563701f03e56e2)\nThe package name evokes chai-as-promised but the shipped code presents itself as pino middleware. When the middleware factory in index.js is invoked, it spawns a detached node child process running lib/initializeCaller.js. That script constructs a fake process.env stub whose DEV_API_KEY, DEV_SECRET_KEY, and DEV_SECRET_VALUE fields are base64 blobs that decode to a URL and request headers pointing at https://tomato-brunhilda-40.tiiny.site/index.json (an anonymous file-hosting host). The response's cookie field is passed to new Function.constructor('require', response) with the host's require handed in, giving the fetched string full Node privileges. The base64 concealment, misleading DEV_API_KEY naming, detached child launch, and typosquat-style package name are consistent with intentional supply-chain attack tradecraft rather than any legitimate loader.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-14T20:33:52+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-01T11:31:30.4141799+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"chai-as-structured","ranges":[],"versions":["7.0.5"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/chai-as-structured/v/7.0.5","https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wf75-6wm5-v349"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-10622","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-10622","identifiers":["MAL-2026-10622","GHSA-wf75-6wm5-v349"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}