{"id":"MAL-2026-10767","revision":"8cd8bf0454ff4387bf67c8a43931cc05","records":[{"revision":"8cd8bf0454ff4387bf67c8a43931cc05","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-10767","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in syft-acp-util (npm)","description":"The syft-acp-util package was published to the npm registry by user 'ada8877' (maintainer email k3mlol@proton.me) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the 'syft-acp' internal/private package naming convention (an ACP component library) of a target organization, so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.\n\nThe package declares a preinstall hook (\"npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js\") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.\n\nEach impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical to the earlier 'click2ai' campaign, sharing the same Sentry organization (o4510485815754752) and a related ProtonMail maintainer identity, and differs only in the package name and target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511744089718784.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ce769ca061fa185c98690c83ff80f642ed7eb2e94e4c6ed4a3f6e042065af40f)\npackage.json declares a preinstall script that runs examples/verify.js. That script calls init() with a hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN pointing at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511744089718784 and sendDefaultPii:true, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's cdn-cgi/trace endpoint, sets it as the Sentry user ip_address, then deliberately triggers a TypeError so an event containing the installer's public IP, hostname, and stack context is uploaded to the author-controlled Sentry project on every `npm install`. Separately, src/index.js exposes an init() whose dsn resolution falls back to the same hardcoded DEFAULT_DSN when no dsn option or SENTRY_DSN env var is supplied, so consumer applications that call the advertised init() without an explicit DSN will route their captured exceptions and default PII to the author's Sentry project.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-16T00:00:00+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-06T14:34:51.823615+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"syft-acp-util","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"}]}],"versions":["17.0.0","1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/syft-acp-util","https://www.npmjs.com/package/syft-acp-util/v/17.0.0","https://www.npmjs.com/package/syft-acp-util/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-10767","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-10767","identifiers":["MAL-2026-10767"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}