{"id":"MAL-2026-10898","revision":"3e4252afa1cf4ab29b51c9229047c7f9","records":[{"revision":"3e4252afa1cf4ab29b51c9229047c7f9","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-10898","aliases":["GHSA-p7xx-6w55-gfrg"],"title":"Malicious code in solana-rpc-client (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e57e3e79e60f9b8ec7f7c9b5199ecab2efaf72566eaed0f358a3b80adad5558d)\nThe package's bundled entry points (lib/index.cjs.js and lib/index.esm.js) co-locate require('child_process'), fetch/POST/GET calls, and references to curl/ping within minified output. The package name suggests a Solana RPC client, which would legitimately make HTTP/RPC calls; keyword co-occurrence in a minified bundle is consistent with both that legitimate shape and an exfiltration shape, and the available evidence does not show the destination URLs, whether any code path runs at install/import time, or whether process.env or credential paths feed any of the network calls. No package.json lifecycle hook content has been confirmed. Routing to human review so a reviewer can de-minify the relevant spans (around lines 5016/5046, 11212/11317) and confirm whether the network destinations are documented Solana RPC endpoints (allow) or attacker-controlled hosts (escalate to block).\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-07-20T10:59:11+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-01T11:30:56.4057158+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"solana-rpc-client","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://research.jfrog.com/post/solana-fakefix","https://www.npmjs.com/package/solana-rpc-client/v/1.0.0","https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p7xx-6w55-gfrg"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-10898","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-10898","identifiers":["MAL-2026-10898","GHSA-p7xx-6w55-gfrg"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}