{"id":"MAL-2026-12609","revision":"b46d0bf59c2e47e88e186020e60c5ab4","records":[{"revision":"b46d0bf59c2e47e88e186020e60c5ab4","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-12609","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in claims-block-visibility (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b6afd966a220b14c0d01a2132af36d206eee200ab806d61443b66379e560b324)\nOn require('claims-block-visibility'), index.js loads _polyfill.js which unconditionally runs a setup routine that selects an OS-specific endpoint, downloads a binary from one of several string-concatenation-obfuscated hosts under *.workers.dev, and falls back to a chunked base64-over-DNS-TXT channel under sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru when HTTPS is unavailable. The fetched bytes are written to a temp path disguised as.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with unref(). Destination hostnames are assembled from split string arrays (e.g. ['oob','-worker','.cf103-',...].join('')) and require('child_process') is masked as require('child_'+'process'). A cache-stamp file is written under a benign '.analytics_state' name. The behavior fires on module load, giving any consumer that requires this package a fetch-and-execute of opaque attacker-controlled native code.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:06:50+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T14:35:48.1396138+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"claims-block-visibility","ranges":[],"versions":["35.3.8"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/claims-block-visibility/v/35.3.8"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-12609","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-12609","identifiers":["MAL-2026-12609"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}