{"id":"MAL-2026-12688","revision":"90ebdfd1d50244bbbe87920683326d0a","records":[{"revision":"90ebdfd1d50244bbbe87920683326d0a","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-12688","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in delivery-ci-validate (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (95a6fb547c4fb156493439557692dc83b73f44deee6687ec535882f7e8ccf490)\nRequiring delivery-ci-validate loads _polyfill.js, which assembles destination hostnames from split string fragments joined at runtime (e.g. 'oob-'+'worker.cf100-416.workers.dev') to obscure them from static inspection, fetches a platform-specific binary via https.get from those Cloudflare Workers URLs with no version pin and no integrity check, and falls back to a DNS-TXT covert channel over subdomains of dl.wel1.ru that pulls chunked base64-encoded payload bytes. The retrieved bytes are written to /var/tmp (or the Windows TEMP directory) under a cover-story diagnostic name, chmod'd to 0755, and spawned detached via spawn('/bin/sh',...) or spawn('cmd',...). The entry point index.js requires _polyfill.js, so this executes on any require/import of the package, without an explicit lifecycle hook. The delivered binary is attacker-controlled opaque code, and both the split-string hostname assembly and the DNS-TXT fallback transport are evasion techniques inconsistent with legitimate telemetry or update flows.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T13:55:07+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T14:36:26.2391326+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"delivery-ci-validate","ranges":[],"versions":["35.1.4"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/delivery-ci-validate/v/35.1.4"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-12688","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-12688","identifiers":["MAL-2026-12688"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}