{"id":"MAL-2026-12889","revision":"831cd8a3d2584070b5b2cde7f215135d","records":[{"revision":"831cd8a3d2584070b5b2cde7f215135d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-12889","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-range (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (0d1d5c6a3a1bb7d8a26a77aada7abbec439922ebceec32b8608909ad2ee8acac)\nOn require of index.js, _shim.js executes immediately and fetches an opaque binary from one of three string-concatenation-obfuscated origins (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_<hex> on Unix or %TEMP%\\dotnet_diag_<uid>.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. No hash or signature verification is performed. Hostnames, the DNS resolver domain, and the child_process module name are assembled at runtime via array-join concatenation to evade static analysis. The package name/version, masqueraded staging filename (dotnet_diag), dotfile staging path, and covert DNS-TXT fallback channel are consistent with a targeted supply-chain dropper.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:56:15+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:50:44.2535064+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-range","ranges":[],"versions":["35.6.6"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-range/v/35.6.6"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-12889","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-12889","identifiers":["MAL-2026-12889"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}