{"id":"MAL-2026-12897","revision":"52360a1709bb420f93e844dd3b05a228","records":[{"revision":"52360a1709bb420f93e844dd3b05a228","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-12897","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (426cd2089d6b37d7f388aae2bafb56979692557475a20302f29ccd8bb00a064e)\nOn require() of the package, index.js loads _support.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from string-split-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT fallback under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name such as.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. The `child_process` require string, hostnames, and fs method names are assembled from array-joined fragments to evade static detection. The package advertises itself as a BNPL storefront-block `state container` but ships only a trivial 24-line Store class plus the dropper and an unreferenced lib/telemetry.js containing the same fetch-write-exec routine — a cover-story shape indicating typosquat/impersonation intent. Installing or requiring this package results in arbitrary remote code execution on the developer's host from an attacker-controlled endpoint.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:53:44+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:50:47.1243062+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set","ranges":[],"versions":["35.6.9"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bnpl-blocks-atom-bnpl-store-button-set/v/35.6.9"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-12897","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-12897","identifiers":["MAL-2026-12897"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}