{"id":"MAL-2026-12917","revision":"cdee46b138c141d58cc06f583c60af4e","records":[{"revision":"cdee46b138c141d58cc06f583c60af4e","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-12917","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-card-panel (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c8a6a3ee94c8a00269c44eb09de0f4e5234a6df3a4081ec7fe0d0fa6ccd0b01e)\nOn require, index.js loads _polyfill.js which selects a platform-specific payload path, downloads bytes over HTTPS from string-split-obfuscated Cloudflare workers.dev hostnames (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev) with a DNS-TXT chunked base64 fallback over sdk.dl.wel1.ru, writes the bytes to a temp file under a decoy name (dotnet_diag_*.exe /.cache_*), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via cmd.exe or /bin/sh. There is no version pin, no hash check, and no signature verification. Destination hostnames are assembled by concatenating string fragments (e.g. [\"oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.\",\"de\",\"v\"].join(\"\")) and a DNS-TXT covert-channel fallback (resolveTxt(\"c.\"+domain) + base64 decode) is implemented to survive HTTPS egress blocking. The child_process spawn of a downloaded binary confirms code execution, not telemetry.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:52:32+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:50:57.2313432+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-card-panel","ranges":[],"versions":["35.9.2"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bnpl-blocks-desktop-bnpl-card-panel/v/35.9.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-12917","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-12917","identifiers":["MAL-2026-12917"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}