{"id":"MAL-2026-13011","revision":"b61ad27766cf4b6a9e0a886224e87195","records":[{"revision":"b61ad27766cf4b6a9e0a886224e87195","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13011","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bnpl-blocks-mobile-large-bnpl-reviews (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (f4fb3bbd6df612646af310ca9ec9e4d53cdeed9298b7e3e7c0460439b92d2955)\nOn require() of this package, _loader.js selects a platform-specific asset path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package-arm64, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package.exe), downloads it over HTTPS from attacker-controlled hosts whose hostnames are reconstructed via split-and-join string obfuscation (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev), with a covert DNS TXT base64 fallback channel to sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched binary is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as dotnet_diag_<tok>.exe or.cache_<tok>, chmodded to 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd /c start with stdio ignored. There is no signature or hash verification, and the require() of child_process is itself obfuscated (require(\"child_\" + \"process\")). Cover-story opt-out env vars and analytics/dotnet_diag filenames provide plausible-deniability framing.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:36:23+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:51:41.0165277+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bnpl-blocks-mobile-large-bnpl-reviews","ranges":[],"versions":["35.8.2"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bnpl-blocks-mobile-large-bnpl-reviews/v/35.8.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13011","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13011","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13011"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}