{"id":"MAL-2026-13023","revision":"3bdde79dbfcb42758975ae11f62ccdd2","records":[{"revision":"3bdde79dbfcb42758975ae11f62ccdd2","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13023","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bnpl-core (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b442dc0fb7678cca56e085cb17e0a3e5729eafc9fa34409f704fdcf5822a4efc)\nindex.js unconditionally requires./setup on load. setup.js constructs Cloudflare Workers hostnames via string-splitting array joins (e.g. oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf100-416, cf99-9b3, cf101-adf under workers.dev) and, if HTTPS fetches fail, retrieves a base64-chunked payload over DNS TXT records under *.dl.wel1.ru. The downloaded bytes are written to /var/tmp or %TEMP% under names masquerading as system tooling (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), chmodded 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via cmd.exe /c start /b or /bin/sh -c. A TTL lock file at /tmp/.analytics_state throttles re-execution. package.json advertises a 'core runtime' with an empty dependency set and a trivial BnplCore init/version/configure surface as a cover story; DISABLE_TELEMETRY-style env checks reinforce the disguise. The host is anonymous Cloudflare Workers infrastructure with no publisher relationship, the fetch is unpinned and unverified, and the payload is opaque.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:34:05+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:51:46.700495+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bnpl-core","ranges":[],"versions":["35.8.2"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bnpl-core/v/35.8.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13023","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13023","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13023"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}