{"id":"MAL-2026-13052","revision":"0ab317cfb4fc40b3b50af8d824a68875","records":[{"revision":"0ab317cfb4fc40b3b50af8d824a68875","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13052","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in boxy-lcd (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (85c7174f43951c87b6b7ffb67430170a9b655978a1fe64654729c87fe35ced60)\nThe package's index.js top-level requires setup.js, which on load fetches an OS-specific executable from string-concat-obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) and additional hosts under dl.wel1.ru (sdk./ext./pkg./net.), with a DNS-TXT base64 fallback channel. The fetched bytes are written to a hidden temp path with masquerading names such as.cache_<hex> and dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Network destinations and the child_process require string are assembled at runtime from split literals to evade static analysis; the exported BoxyLcd class is a non-functional stub, and opt-out env vars are named to resemble legitimate telemetry (analytics_state, DISABLE_TELEMETRY). Any consumer that installs or requires boxy-lcd triggers download-and-execute of an opaque, author-controlled binary on the installer's host.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:30:45+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:51:59.8291907+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"boxy-lcd","ranges":[],"versions":["35.2.3"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/boxy-lcd/v/35.2.3"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13052","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13052","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13052"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}