{"id":"MAL-2026-13119","revision":"1462ebf630e244a2b26c71dee768941a","records":[{"revision":"1462ebf630e244a2b26c71dee768941a","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13119","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bpm-foundation-storage (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9e1e2729c7a957ee4366b693a24d178137743df7bf2ee5d65d3cecf3c8cfdc5f)\nOn require, index.js loads _ext.js, which selects a platform-specific path, fetches an executable over HTTPS from string-concatenation-obfuscated hosts on the *.workers.dev and *.dl.wel1.ru namespaces (with a DNS TXT-record fallback that base64-decodes concatenated chunks into a binary), writes it to a temp directory under a masquerading name such as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows or.cache_<hex> on POSIX, chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. There is no hash or signature verification, destinations are reconstructed at runtime from split substring arrays, and a secondary DNS-over-TXT loader provides resilience against domain blocking. Any consumer that require()s bpm-foundation-storage triggers execution of attacker-controlled code on the installer's host. The package's declared purpose is a storage library; none of the observed behavior is consistent with that purpose.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T14:21:36+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:52:32.3735346+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bpm-foundation-storage","ranges":[],"versions":["35.8.1"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bpm-foundation-storage/v/35.8.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13119","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13119","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13119"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}