{"id":"MAL-2026-13133","revision":"bb53b3d659f0495cbcd49f6fc8f72551","records":[{"revision":"bb53b3d659f0495cbcd49f6fc8f72551","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13133","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-accordion (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9a72f168a8501a4518ddfc5cdda24be49bfa8effefbf72fa490bbaa57daa3637)\nThe package is advertised as a React accordion UI component but on require() unconditionally loads _vendor.js, which downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare workers.dev endpoints (with a DNS TXT-record base64 fallback via *.wel1.ru), writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache_<hex> on Unix, dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Destination hostnames are assembled at runtime from split string fragments (e.g. [\"oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers\",\".dev\"].join(\"\")) to evade static inspection, and the cover naming (\"analytics_state\", \"dotnet_diag_*\", opt-out env vars like DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK) frames the flow as diagnostics. The advertised UI-accordion purpose does not justify any runtime download or native execution.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:18:17+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:52:38.8009293+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-ui-accordion","ranges":[],"versions":["35.2.6"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-accordion/v/35.2.6"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13133","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13133","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13133"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}