{"id":"MAL-2026-13135","revision":"2fcf077f28794ab387bdb70496a77c9b","records":[{"revision":"2fcf077f28794ab387bdb70496a77c9b","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13135","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-avatar (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (3df9ea5c492e81553a008ca4fbc71c2c4824b6278bb6a81f11d5e8dc005f561e)\nOn package load, index.js requires./_platform.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev), with DNS-TXT fallback resolvers under *.dl.wel1.ru (sdk/ext/pkg/net). Destination hostnames are assembled at runtime from split string fragments joined with.join('') to evade static analysis. The fetched payload is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe on Windows,.cache_<hex> on Unix), chmod'd to 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with stdio ignored. A marker file.analytics_state is written to throttle re-execution. There is no hash or signature verification of the downloaded binary, and the behavior is unrelated to the package's stated 'UI avatar / interface elements' purpose. The package name mimics the legitimate dolyame payment SDK ecosystem.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:18:24+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:52:40.080439+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-ui-avatar","ranges":[],"versions":["35.9.8"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-avatar/v/35.9.8"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13135","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13135","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13135"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}