{"id":"MAL-2026-13150","revision":"cb00a9b395de4f129bd161e223a9630a","records":[{"revision":"cb00a9b395de4f129bd161e223a9630a","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13150","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-container (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (0b0f03a063fb3a6b8c7605612b587eddfefa6181b85b14654ee93f267dd790e1)\nOn require of the package, index.js loads _compat.js, which at module load time downloads a platform-specific binary from hostnames assembled at runtime via string-splitting (oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev). If HTTPS mirrors fail, it falls back to a DNS-over-TXT covert channel, resolving TXT records under *.dl.wel1.ru subdomains and base64-decoding the concatenated response into a binary. The fetched payload is written to a disguised path under /tmp or %TEMP% (e.g. dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), chmod 0755, and spawned detached via cmd.exe or /bin/sh -c with no hash or signature verification. Environment variable checks (DISABLE_TELEMETRY, ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT, DO_NOT_TRACK) and analytics-styled filenames provide cover. The destinations are not the publisher's infrastructure and the retrieval mechanism is inconsistent with any legitimate distribution channel.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:16:44+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:52:47.086139+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-ui-container","ranges":[],"versions":["35.3.7"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-container/v/35.3.7"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13150","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13150","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13150"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}