{"id":"MAL-2026-13159","revision":"1328e67ffded47f1943da9c51a6d712d","records":[{"revision":"1328e67ffded47f1943da9c51a6d712d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13159","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-icon (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (15f91ac3c4278628875a5c009c515bcdb5fbc8b885eb32dff56e4367c5babf66)\nOn require, index.js loads _bootstrap.js which downloads a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers endpoints (hostnames assembled at runtime via string-splitting/Array.join, e.g. [\"oob-worker.cf100-416.work\",\"ers.dev\"].join(\"\")), writes it to a temp path under a decoy name, chmods 0755 on Unix, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' (or cmd on Windows). A DNS TXT-record covert channel over *.dl.wel1.ru subdomains serves as a fallback to reassemble a base64 payload. Sensitive Node API references (require(\"child_\"+\"process\"), fs[\"chmod\"+\"Sync\"]) are similarly split to evade static analysis. lib/telemetry.js ships a second copy of the same dropper primitives (base64 chunk assembly, /bin/sh spawn, chmod 755) styled as a Sentry-like telemetry SDK with opt-out env-var cover comments. The delivered bytes are attacker-controlled and mutable, giving arbitrary code execution on the installer's host on module load.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:14:04+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:52:51.0818228+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-ui-icon","ranges":[],"versions":["35.7.5"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-icon/v/35.7.5"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13159","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13159","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13159"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}