{"id":"MAL-2026-13179","revision":"072daae368474cfd8ccfb0e3141fe441","records":[{"revision":"072daae368474cfd8ccfb0e3141fe441","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13179","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-react-version-switch (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1ee4e207fd01bae956d7fe084377ecea438f81774ea01ca6b02a50c1962c6cca)\nPackage advertises itself as a React UI helper but its index.js unconditionally require()s./_vendor at load time. _vendor.js selects a platform-specific asset path, fetches bytes over HTTPS from a randomly-ordered pool of string-split-obfuscated hosts assembled via.join('') (oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev and sdk/ext/pkg/net.dl.wel1.ru), with a DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback to bypass HTTPS filtering. The downloaded bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmod 0755'd on POSIX, and spawned detached via /bin/sh or cmd.exe. No hash verification is performed despite a cover-story comment claiming a SHA-256 integrity check. The package's declared 'interface elements' purpose is a cover story: index.js is a trivial no-op class stub, and the dropper is the only functional behavior.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:11:54+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:53:00.4136708+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-ui-react-version-switch","ranges":[],"versions":["35.6.1"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-react-version-switch/v/35.6.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13179","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13179","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13179"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}