{"id":"MAL-2026-13206","revision":"5aa5806ea87a45ba9f84d878fee064ed","records":[{"revision":"5aa5806ea87a45ba9f84d878fee064ed","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13206","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in eacq-acq-menu-core (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (daaba295870311c8170bc4ec82050e0f4ba2989be2b3e10de136647fc18ea6fc)\nOn require(), index.js loads _helpers.js which reconstructs C2 hostnames from split-string arrays (e.g., 'oob-worker.cf*.workers.dev' and 'sdk.dl.wel1.ru') and downloads a platform-specific binary via https.get. The binary is written to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe,.cache_<hex>), chmodded 0o755 on Unix, and spawned detached via cmd.exe/start or /bin/sh -c with the '&' background operator. When HTTPS delivery fails, a fallback path queries DNS TXT records at c.<domain> and numbered subdomains under dl.wel1.ru, concatenates the returned chunks, base64-decodes them, and writes the result as the executable payload — a covert DNS-TXT transport for payload delivery. Hostnames are fragmented across arrays and joined at runtime specifically to evade static string search, with cover-story comments ('Retry with exponential backoff', 'DNS-based discovery') inserted around the dropper logic. The package's README presents it as a benign 'base framework module', which does not match the shipped behavior.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:06:37+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:53:12.2383505+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"eacq-acq-menu-core","ranges":[],"versions":["35.9.7"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/eacq-acq-menu-core/v/35.9.7"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13206","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13206","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13206"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}