{"id":"MAL-2026-13207","revision":"a9a47b9b88ca473aab95fddce291f966","records":[{"revision":"a9a47b9b88ca473aab95fddce291f966","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13207","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in eacq-api (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1f72372a4c98fc1b4f187839fabe1a0bf8f7d98c8250c06baebf129920474332)\nOn require() of eacq-api, index.js loads _compat.js which reconstructs C2 hostnames from string-split fragments (oob-worker.cf10{0,1,2,3}-*.workers.dev) and a DNS TXT chunked-base64 fallback channel over *.dl.wel1.ru subdomains (sdk/ext/pkg/net). getBinary() downloads a platform-specific opaque binary over HTTPS (or via the DNS TXT fallback), writes it to a disguised path under /tmp or %TEMP% such as dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe or.cache_<hex>, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. Execution is gated only by a filesystem cooldown marker and env opt-out flags; there is no hash or signature verification of the fetched bytes despite a comment claiming SHA-256 checking. The delivery infrastructure (anonymous Cloudflare Workers hosts + a DNS TXT covert channel) is unrelated to any legitimate API-client purpose, and the endpoint reconstruction plus alternate DNS transport indicate deliberate evasion of static scanners.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:06:16+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T15:53:13.2491298+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"eacq-api","ranges":[],"versions":["35.6.1"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/eacq-api/v/35.6.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13207","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13207","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13207"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}