{"id":"MAL-2026-13214","revision":"c1412d9f17ed41a0af662c1934ff3829","records":[{"revision":"c1412d9f17ed41a0af662c1934ff3829","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13214","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6ceac45508e2f9506a082b2195d3bae4b046f096d11856d72ea53f784ad5992e)\n@zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token@0.4.0 is a typosquat/impersonation of @solana/spl-token (README self-describes as a 'drop-in replacement'; author metadata is set to 'solana-labs'). On module load, index.js enumerates the full process.env and augments it with hostname, username, homedir, platform, and cwd, base64-encodes the JSON payload, and sends it as an HTTPS GET to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage with chat_id=8969499041. A temporary flag file gates the beacon to once per host. Variable names are randomized (dmcp, uqxj, bhhs, _h, _flag) and the payload is base64-wrapped to hide the exfil body. If the real @solana/spl-token is not installed, the package falls back to a stub API exporting createWallet/generateMnemonic that returns random bytes rather than real key material. On typical developer and CI machines, process.env contains credentials such as AWS_*, GITHUB_TOKEN, and NPM_TOKEN, which are shipped off-host to the attacker's Telegram chat.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:32:40+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T16:50:19.3888201+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token","ranges":[],"versions":["0.4.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@zzzcrypto/solana-spl-token/v/0.4.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13214","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13214","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13214"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}