{"id":"MAL-2026-13220","revision":"171f215bf10e4571bba42a219daf9224","records":[{"revision":"171f215bf10e4571bba42a219daf9224","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13220","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bigops-jsonpath-mapper (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (784552abf30d07bd647e0c3844dc45ea0205cf20c166ca1e38ef924c5fd999b7)\nOn require of bigops-jsonpath-mapper, index.js loads _bridge.js which assembles hostnames from string-array joins to hide the destinations (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, cf101-adf.workers.dev, cf102-baf.workers.dev, cf103-070.workers.dev, with DNS-TXT chunked-base64 fallback to *.dl.wel1.ru), fetches a platform-specific native binary over HTTPS, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as.cache_<hex> and dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmods 0755 on Unix, and spawns it detached and unref'd via spawn(\"/bin/sh\",...) or spawn(\"cmd\",...). A /tmp/.analytics_state TTL file suppresses re-execution across imports. Comments frame the behavior as telemetry/session tracking, but the shipped code is a fetch-and-execute dropper of opaque bytes from author-controlled non-publisher infrastructure that runs at module load time.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:38:20+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T16:49:58.3813485+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bigops-jsonpath-mapper","ranges":[],"versions":["35.4.6"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bigops-jsonpath-mapper/v/35.4.6"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13220","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13220","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13220"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}